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Abstract 
 
This thesis theorises the relationship between the transactional literary experience and the 
experience of being in quest of wisdom in literary studies. It achieves this by constructing a 
dialogue between two thinkers deeply concerned with aesthetic experience and personalist 
modes of learning: the twentieth-century educator and literary theorist, Louise Rosenblatt, and 
the modernist prose writer and poet, H.D. The ‘transactional literary experience’ is a phrase at 
the heart of Rosenblatt’s humanistic philosophy, while H.D. is a figure who devoted her life to 
articulating the personal experience of being in quest. While literary theory in the past twenty 
years or so has turned its attention to re-exploring the nature of the human, the role of affect, 
and the centrality of ethics, this thesis contributes to these fields by foregrounding the 
pedagogical potential at the heart of them. My approach is to adopt a personalist framework for 
reading H.D. and Rosenblatt as thinkers who intersect productively by drawing upon romantic, 
modernist, and existential ideas, tropes, and commitments. Embracing Rosenblatt’s entire 
oeuvre and unpublished materials, and H.D.’s autobiographical and later quest poetry and prose, 
the thesis models a personalist approach to literary study by actively developing potential 
connections between the two thinkers. Chapter 1 lays the groundwork by theorising 
Rosenblatt’s and H.D.’s emphasis on the individual and her experience. Chapter 2 constructs a 
theory of what I term ‘personalist textual sociability’, which denotes a mode of context building 
especially suited to the personal nature of the transactional literary experience. Chapter 3 
explores the centrality of literary imagination for fostering personal connections across time 
and space, both within the literary experience, and in the wider world among real people, and 
the role of the individual who seeks to communicate their vision of human flourishing to others. 
Finally, Chapter 4 folds the insights of the first three chapters into an exploration of what it 
means to be in quest of wisdom, where wisdom is characterised as an inherently existential and 
personal quality. 
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Introduction: The Personal and the Literary 
 
Wisdom is an ancient concept, but also a strangely de-familiarising one – a word not often 
uttered in the academy today. Wisdom has the capacity to unsettle because it is largely an 
unknown quantity; unlike some forms of knowledge, there is something elusive about this other 
kind of knowing. ‘We know it when we see it’, some might like to say. Wisdom seems personal, 
connected to learning. Wisdom delights in the growth and development of concrete 
personalities. It is a condition grounded in process, in moments of transformation, flashes of 
insight, quivers of intimacy. Far from being a linear process, growth in wisdom can be erratic 
because human beings are frequently unpredictable; indeed, perhaps wisdom delights in this 
human quality. In the realm of wisdom, knowledge about the world and human existence seems 
harnessed to helping individuals make a better life for themselves and for others, in 
transforming what is into what might be. In a world beset by challenges that call for wisdom, 
would anybody therefore argue that wisdom can be dispensed with? The question this thesis 
asks then is whether or not the language of wisdom has any place in contemporary English 
studies. How can the quest for wisdom be integrated into a stream of literary study which has 
institutional sanction?  
 There are two important elements to hold in balance as I set about answering these 
questions. The first is that, as an intervention in literary theory, my approach is to connect ideas 
about literature and literary experience to the institutional contexts in which these are explored. 
Intersecting literary studies and English education, ‘In Quest of Wisdom’ foregrounds the 
capacity for wisdom-oriented learning inherent in specific kinds of literary experience. 
Secondly, in order to honour the personal nature of wisdom – its capacity to be incarnated in 
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living human beings – my approach is also to develop a theoretical contribution which is 
grounded in an interpersonal study of two thinkers.  
Louise Rosenblatt (1904-2005) was an American literary theorist who sought to 
develop literary theory openly in the context of student learning and for this reason she is often 
called an ‘educator’. But she also refused to separate literary theoretical concerns from 
pedagogical ones. From the 1930s until her death, in 2005, Rosenblatt engaged with and 
critiqued a range of dominant critical approaches (formalism, structuralism, and 
poststructuralism) and channelled them through her pioneering vision concerning the function 
and value of literary studies for American society. H.D. (1886-1961), on the other hand, was a 
modernist American poet and prose writer who thought hard about personal transformation. 
Interpreted as a thinker, H.D.’s affective, emotionally-wrought writing catalyses Rosenblatt’s 
more abstract and analytical writing. H.D. is rightly touted as being characteristic, perhaps even 
unique among modernists for her combination, particularly in her later writing, of personal 
self-revelation and mystical thought concerning art’s relationship to personal and social 
transformation. An analysis of Rosenblatt’s work will benefit from that of H.D.’s, in order to 
incarnate – to tussle with – some of her theoretical convictions, and H.D. needs Rosenblatt in 
order to generalise her ideas and practice, to take them out of ‘H.D.’ and let them address the 
quests of those other than herself. As I will show, literary experiences can be a potent means 
of fostering interpersonal connections, in increasing understanding of and empathy for others. 
I am simply modelling this approach in my own method, creating a crucible of dialogic 
synergy, personalising the theoretical, and theorising the personal. 
 
Focus on the Personal 
Not only do Rosenblatt and H.D. focus on personal experiences of art in their work, but they 
actively assert their importance, albeit in different ways. Not only is the focus on the personal 
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a descriptive account of where my thinkers often pinpoint their attention, but it is also a 
normative rallying cry, to focus on the personal, both on oneself and on others, and to move 
the personal to the centre of attention during a literary experience, because to do so is to open 
oneself up to the possibility of increasing in wisdom. As I shall explain in Chapter 1, an idea 
of the individual and her experience is the starting point for each thinker’s divergent paths, 
meeting at points in glances of synergy. Yet because the ‘individual’ and the ‘personal’ are 
terms which are liable to multiple interpretations as to what they indicate, I have chosen to 
ground my study in a specifically personalist framework – personalist rather than humanist.  
 There is more that unites humanism and personalism as philosophies than divides them. 
But they do differ in some important ways, and particularly given the entrance of the ‘new 
literary humanism’ onto the literary theoretical playing field, it seems prudent (not to say wise?) 
to stake out my position from the outset. In his book, Literature and the Human (2013), Andy 
Mousley, who advocates a ‘new literary humanism’, explores literature’s distinctive ability to 
engage emotion, approach history in experiential ways, tackle the complex binary of the 
universal and the particular, and behold instances of depth in literature, leading to renewed 
insight into the human condition.1 In his work Mousley has created a modern literary humanism 
by re-engaging with Renaissance humanism, especially within the context of Shakespeare 
studies. For Mousley, humanism need not, indeed should not, be naïve, essentialist, anti-
religious, or foundational. Instead, humanism can be seen to be deeply engaged with human 
complexity. What Mousley sees is an inherent flexibility in humanism, and he offers a new 
perspective after the years of High Theory, which tended to see humanism as ideologically and 
theoretically suspect.2  
                                                          
1 Andy Mousley, Literature and the Human: Criticism, Theory, Practice (London: Routledge, 2013). See also 
Andy Mousley, ‘The new literary humanism: towards a critical vocabulary’, Textual Practice, 24 (2010): 819-39. 
2 Offering a new perspective after High Theory (the explosion of theoretical thought in the West from the 1960s 
through the 1980s) is something Peter Barry attributes to theoretical approaches from the 1990s, especially new 
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 The point of departure for personalism within the context of literary studies is that it is 
more overtly concerned with the concrete person than humanism is. As I understand it, literary 
humanism, both new and old, is, among other things, interested in demarcating human traits 
that seem to persist across time and space. Mousley, for instance, is keen to nuance and 
complicate some of the older, taken-for-granted assumptions about human nature that were 
swept away during the years of poststructuralism. To that end he talks of ‘deconsecrated 
universals’ and ‘re-consecrated universals’, the creation of which requires the reader’s critical 
faculties.3 Personalism, on the other hand, is more exclusively interested in the microcosmic 
world of specific human beings, seeing them as existential subjects. According to Keith E. 
Yandell in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), personalism ‘develops a 
worldview that begins with immediate, self-conscious experience and interprets not only the 
life of the individual but the world at large in personalistic terms. This involves the claim that 
the basic categories or fundamental concepts of our thought should be understood in terms 
applicable to persons and their experiences’.4 The theory of literary studies which I am 
developing in this project is absolutely concerned with re-connecting literature to ‘persons and 
their experiences’, with conceiving literary study as an explorative, wisdom-oriented journey 
which creates a web of personal (and interpersonal) connections, from specific readers to 
literary work(s) and back out again, to other students and people beyond the classroom.  
Although younger than humanism, personalism, which originated in the 1780s with F. 
H. Jacobi as a critique of pantheism, is a transnational philosophy, with pockets of personalist 
thought appearing in Scandinavia, Britain (where it was called ‘personal idealism’), North 
                                                          
aestheticism. See Peter Barry, Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory, 3rd ed. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 301. 
3 Mousley, Literature and the Human, pp. 79-80. 
4 Keith E. Yandell, ‘Personalism’ in Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1998). 
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America, France, and Russia.5 It is a Russian strain of personalism in which I am especially 
interested, and which I draw upon at various times throughout the thesis. According to the 
twentieth-century Russian-British philosopher, Isaiah Berlin, attitudes towards literature and 
the arts can be divided into two broadly cohesive types – the ‘French’ and the ‘Russian’. Berlin 
makes this symbolic distinction in order to show how Russian thinkers conceive the human, 
implying that a personalistic approach is somehow characteristic of Russians in particular, and 
that this personalistic mentality has a bearing on how literature should be approached: ‘Man is 
one, and what he does, he does with his whole personality’.6 Whereas the ‘French’ approach is 
more atomistic, creating divisions within the personality and perhaps seeking universals, the 
Russian viewpoint is integrative and is valued as such for its commitment to what Russians 
perceive to be sincerity. I draw attention to Berlin’s distinction because it strengthens my 
tendency in this thesis to adopt a specifically Russian strain of personalism with which to 
organise the various facets of the project: it is a perspective which is earnest, self-aware, plain-
speaking, and generally lacking in self-importance. 
In particular, the philosophies of the Slavophile, Ivan Kireevsky (1806-1856), and the 
Silver Age thinker, Nikolai Berdyaev (1874-1948), whose philosophy I shall draw upon 
throughout this thesis, emphasise connections between a focus on the person (philosophical 
anthropology), a particular way of thinking (epistemology), and an approach to human relations 
(sociology), which represent the three areas of concentration in the thesis and which manifest 
in the progression of its chapters. Kireevsky was a more overtly religious thinker than 
Berdyaev, deeply preoccupied with the emergence of Russian self-definition. Although 
Berdyaev, who was influenced by Kireevsky largely through the intermediary work of 
Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900), was also deeply spiritual, he moulded his intellectual work 
                                                          
5 See Jan Olof Bengtsson, The Worldview of Personalism: Origins and Early Development (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
6 Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994), p. 128. 
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by selectively working with non-Christian (and non-Russian) materials as well, including the 
philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler, the polemics against ‘the good’ in Nietszche’s 
writing, the emphasis on social justice in the work of Marx, and the psychological insights of 
Adler and Jung. The personalist insights of Kireevsky and Berdyaev enable me to draw 
connections between Rosenblatt and H.D. which would not be possible were I to frame the 
synthesis simply in terms of humanism. Berdyaev in particular is uniquely positioned in time 
and place as a Russian personalist intervention in Western perspectives which touched and 
influenced Rosenblatt and H.D. Profound, mystical, and with a sense of apocalyptic urgency, 
Berdyaev offers a discourse for focusing on the personal in the modern, twentieth-century era, 
which is neither pessimistic nor optimistic, but grounded in an apprehension of the absolute 
value of the concrete, personal subject. In short, I am not saying that Rosenblatt and H.D. were 
personalists, although they were often personalistic in their visions. Rather, I am engaging a 
personalist philosophical framework because it allows me to do the work of this thesis – in 
particular, creating synergies between Rosenblatt and H.D. that draw out the incarnate, 
existential quality of being in quest of wisdom, where the experiences of concrete persons 
matter. 
To focus now on H.D. specifically, my position in this work is to contribute to 
scholarship that reads her as a thinker. In 2003 Adalaide Morris noted that critics ‘rarely define 
H.D. as a thinker’.7 In 2012, however, Polina Mackay asserted that ‘first and foremost, H.D. is 
a modern thinker, evident primarily in her adoption of the language of psychoanalysis, her 
connection between the artist’s vision and spirituality and her elaborate interest in sexuality 
and sexual expression’.8 These three themes arguably constitute the general direction which 
                                                          
7 Adalaide Morris, How to Live / What to Do: H.D.’s Cultural Poetics (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 
2003), p. 11. 
8 Polina Mackay, ‘H.D.’s modernism’ in Nephie J. Christodoulides and Polina Mackay (eds), The Cambridge 
Companion to H.D. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 51-62, p. 52. 
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H.D. scholarship and criticism has taken in the past decade or so; although interest in H.D. and 
psychoanalysis seems to have waned since the publication of Claire Buck’s exploratory H.D. 
and Freud: Bisexuality and a Feminine Discourse (1991) and Diane Chisholm’s authoritative 
H.D.’s Freudian Poetics; Psychoanalysis in Translation (1992). What I wish to make clear is 
that by conceiving H.D. as a thinker, it is also possible, indeed desirable, to read her as a learner 
as well. I am, so to speak, personalising our understanding of H.D. by drawing attention to her 
as an existential subject whose learning, whose development, enabled her to exercise her 
freedom in creating her own sense of selfhood.   
It is arguably the areas of spiritualism and the occult that have seen the most 
concentrated focus of recent H.D. scholarship, which has often paralleled the recent surge of 
scholarly publications of some of H.D.’s complex later and previously unpublished prose 
writing, such as The Sword Went Out to Sea (2007), Majic Ring (2013), and The Hirslanden 
Notebooks (2015). Elizabeth Anderson’s H.D. and Modernist Religious Imagination: 
Mysticism and Writing (2013) reads some of H.D.’s mature writing in the light of Hélène 
Cixous’s ideas about writing and the sacred. Anderson’s book highlights H.D.’s interest in the 
material world and the search for the sacred, especially in times of conflict (such as the Second 
World War).9 Meanwhile, Suzanne Hobson’s 2013 essay, ‘Credulous Readers: H.D. and 
Psychic Research Work’ establishes H.D. as a self-identified thinker in terms of her spiritualist 
activities carried out in London during the Second World War, as explored in The Sword Went 
Out to Sea and Majic Ring. Hobson looks at the delicate balance H.D. struck between 
conveying to her ‘credulous readers’ the authenticity of her experience of spiritualism, and her 
insistence on the scientific rigour of her ‘research work’.10  
                                                          
9 Elizabeth Anderson, H.D. and Modernist Religious Imagination: Mysticism and Writing (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013). 
10 Suzanne Hobson, ‘Credulous Readers: H.D. and Psychic Research Work’ in John Attridge (ed.), Incredible 
Modernism: Literature, Trust and Deception (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 51-65. 
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Yet it is probably Matte Robinson’s The Astral H.D.: Occult and Religious Sources and 
Contexts for H.D.’s Poetry and Prose (2016) that crystallises the idea of H.D. as an extensive 
reader and sensitive thinker with regard to her occult references in some of her obscure later 
poetry and prose.11 Robinson’s work requires that further attention to H.D. recognises her as a 
formidable thinker, whose learning manifests itself in her interest in complex reference systems 
for self-discovery. However, I suggest that H.D. was not a ‘learner’ in the sense in which 
educationalists ordinarily use the term; for only a short period in her life (1905-06) was she 
registered (at Bryn Mawr College) on an institutional programme of learning. But in a broader 
sense H.D.’s entire adult life was concerned with learning. She was concerned with 
understanding her experiences and delineating a sense of self. At times she has even been 
criticised for being narcissistic: only relatively recently, in 2002, Ian Hamilton wrote of her as 
a ‘thinly gifted poet’, whose autobiographical fiction, moreover, has become a ‘godsend to 
chroniclers of her various psychic upheavals’ and ‘offers an unappealing mix of cosmic 
breathiness and fiddling narcissism’.12 Some of H.D.’s writing does seem needlessly repetitive, 
disjointed, and unclear, which tends to undermine her overall project of inviting readers to 
imagine her personal experience. Nevertheless, it is her autobiographical orientation which 
invites more nuanced readings which link this genre to issues of learning. 
I find the most persuasive readings of H.D.’s oeuvre which confront her 
autobiographical impetus to be Susan Stanford Friedman’s Penelope’s Web: Gender, 
Modernity, H.D.’s Fiction (1990) and Psyche Reborn: The Emergence of H.D. (1981), 
alongside Janice S. Robinson’s H.D.: The Life and Work of an American Poet (1982). 
Admittedly, these texts are likely to be those Hamilton singled out as being particularly 
                                                          
11 Matte Robinson, The Astral H.D.: Occult and Religious Sources and Contexts for H.D.’s Poetry and Prose 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2016). 
12 Ian Hamilton, Against Oblivion: Some Lives of the Twentieth-Century Poets (London: Viking, 2002), pp. 62-
66.  
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interested in the supposedly less desirable aspects of H.D.’s work. And yet Psyche Reborn and 
Robinson’s H.D. come closest, in my opinion, to seeing H.D. as a learner.  
Robinson in particular seems to start from the premise that H.D. was a profoundly 
personal writer, whose interest in psychoanalysis and modernism means that her presentations 
of personal experience are especially original and compelling. I am fully aware of the criticisms 
levelled against Robinson’s biography, most severely by Sandra M. Gilbert in her 1983 review 
essay for Contemporary Literature, ‘H.D.? Who Was She?’.13 Gilbert accuses Robinson of 
fantasising about H.D.’s relationship with D. H. Lawrence (something which almost convinced 
the critic Denis Donoghue of its truth) and of committing various academic sins; as with H.D.’s 
in her early essays, Robinson’s discourse in this biography escapes its generic conventions, and 
depending on the perspective, this could be seen in either a positive or a negative light.14 But 
Robinson’s premise is essentially the same as Friedman’s – that H.D.’s artistry was intimately 
connected to her preoccupation with self-knowledge and the quest for understanding that would 
lead to personal and social transformation. Robinson’s Lawrence—H.D. thesis can be ignored 
while still gleaning important critical insights concerning H.D.’s project as a thinker: her 
emphasis on the individual and her experience, her aesthetic imagination and its methodology, 
her approach to history and human relations across space and time, and finally, her need to 
process her experience and write herself toward transformation.  
Turning to Rosenblatt, one is confronted with someone who can more straightforwardly 
be categorised as a thinker. Her genres were the theoretical exposition, the critical essay, the 
academic interview, and the review. So from one perspective, evaluating Rosenblatt as a 
thinker is nowhere near as challenging a task as it is with regard to H.D. But Rosenblatt is a 
                                                          
13 Sandra M. Gilbert, ‘H.D.? Who Was She?’, Contemporary Literature, 24 (1983): 496-511. 
14 Robinson implies that Lawrence was the father of H.D.’s daughter, Perdita. See Denis Donoghue, ‘Her 
Deepest Passion was D. H. Lawrence’, New York Times, February 14, 1982. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/14/books/her-deepest-passion-was-dh-lawrence.html (accessed January 21, 
2015). 
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complicated figure because of her historically liminal status in literary studies and the tendency 
for others to mistake her for a reader-response theorist only concerned with subjective 
responses to literature.15  
For her first twenty years in the profession, Rosenblatt was installed in liberal arts 
departments at Barnard College (1928-38) and Brooklyn College (1938-48). In 1948 she 
moved to an education department and gained professorship at New York University (NYU), 
where she remained until 1972, when she retired from this position. From 1972 until around 
the year 2000, Rosenblatt held visiting professorships at various universities, including Rutgers 
University and the University of Miami, while also holding a position as Emeritus Professor at 
NYU. Moreover, she was an interdisciplinary thinker whose interests ranged across the arts, 
social sciences, and even the natural sciences. She was mostly neglected as a thinker in literary 
circles until the reader-response conversations of the 1980s and 1990s, but she had always been 
popular in English education circles since the 1970s, particularly after the Dartmouth Seminar 
in 1966, which inaugurated widespread interest in the United States in reading as personal 
process.16 Some of Rosenblatt’s major contributions only appeared after her official retirement 
date, by which time she was already well into her seventies.  
Thus, even her age factors into her relative neglect in literary studies; in the current, 
historically conscious environment of English studies, Rosenblatt could prove a stumbling 
block to those who would wish to pigeonhole her as belonging to a movement or an epoch. In 
his 1995 foreword essay to the fifth edition of Literature as Exploration, Wayne Booth chose 
instead to phase Rosenblatt’s career in terms of ‘moments’ in literary theory, which is a helpful 
                                                          
15 See Gordon M. Pradl, Literature for Democracy: Reading as a Social Act (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1996), 
pp. 81-93.  
16 See John Dixon, Growth through English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). Thanks to Gordon Pradl for 
pointing this out to me.  
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way of positioning her.17 ‘Moments’ suggest a dynamic movement of thought particular to the 
individual in question, while still recognising lines of continuity through the decades.  
After 1972 Rosenblatt tried to enter more directly into conversations with literary 
theorists, and her 1978 work, The Reader, the Text, the Poem: The Transactional Theory of the 
Literary Work, published by Southern Illinois University Press under ‘Literary Theory’, is self-
conscious about its difference to dominant theoretical trends, especially structuralism and 
lingering New Critical approaches. By her final collection of essays, Making Meaning with 
Texts: Selected Essays – published days before her death, in 2005 – Rosenblatt managed to 
weave her educational commitments and perspectives fairly seamlessly with her literary-
theoretical ones. In fact, as commentators on Rosenblatt’s work have sometimes noted, for her, 
literary theory and issues of learning should never be separated.18  
It is this connected aspect of her vision that this thesis draws out, and, by putting 
Rosenblatt into dialogue with H.D. under an organising framework of personalism, it offers the 
first extended posthumous study of her entire output, from the 1920s through to the 2000s. 
Aspects of Rosenblatt’s modernism, postmodernism, and feminism have been explored by 
Elizabeth A. Flynn, and as such offer a glimpse into her influences.19 Norbert Elliot’s ‘A 
Midrash for Louise Rosenblatt’ (2008) focuses on the early development of Rosenblatt’s 
thought, while Mark Dressman and Joan Parker Webster have carefully analysed the 
differences in the various different editions of Literature as Exploration.20 Jeanne M. Connell, 
on the other hand, has reflected on Rosenblatt’s philosophical debt to the American pragmatist 
                                                          
17 Wayne Booth, ‘Foreword’ in Louise M. Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed. (New York: MLA, 1995), 
pp. vii-xiv. 
18 See the collection of essays in John Clifford’s edited volume, The Experience of Reading: Louise Rosenblatt 
and Reader-Response Theory (Portsmouth, NH: Boynton / Cook, 1991). See also Pradl, Literature for Democracy.  
19 See Elizabeth A. Flynn, Feminism Beyond Modernism (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 
2002), pp. 99-115 and ‘Louise Rosenblatt and the Ethical Turn in Literary Theory’, College English, 70 (2007): 
52-69. 
20 Norbert Elliot, (Elliot); Mark Dressman and Joan Parker Webster, ‘Retracing Rosenblatt: “A Textual 
Archaeology”’, Research in the Teaching of English, 36 (2001): 110-45. 
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philosopher, John Dewey, and highlights the role Rosenblatt’s late political activism in the 
early 2000s played in terms of rounding off her career.21 Dewey, of course, was a crucial 
influence on Rosenblatt’s thought; she adapted and affirmed his ideas on epistemology, art, 
education, and politics, and his ideas will appear periodically through the thesis.  
As might be expected, Rosenblatt’s legacy primarily survives in English education 
circles, predominantly in the United States, but to an extent in Britain also, although James 
Britton was probably more of a founding influence in British English education.22 
Nevertheless, Rosenblatt has become staple reading for training secondary school teachers in 
English, and British academics such as Michael Benton have developed Rosenblatt’s 
transactional theory as applied to secondary school teaching of English.23  
In spite of the way in which English educationalists have positioned Rosenblatt as one 
of the founders of American English education, it is perplexing that very few, except Flynn and 
possibly Gordon M. Pradl (see below), have continued to relate, as Rosenblatt did, the 
transactional theory to literary studies in higher education, and attempts to put the transactional 
theory into dialogue with contemporary literary theory are non-existent. By focusing on 
Rosenblatt as a thinker who linked literary theory with issues of learning and the growth of the 
individual, I am able to return discussion of Rosenblatt’s transactional theory to conversations 
in literary theory – with literature’s relationship to the human, affect, and ethics. In short, in 
different but intersecting ways Rosenblatt and H.D. engage with various discourses of selfhood 
in order to create their particular personalistic visions.   
 
                                                          
21 Jeanne M. Connell, ‘Continue to Explore: In Memory of Louise Rosenblatt (1904-2005)’, Education and 
Culture, 21 (2005): 63-79. 
22 Gordon Pradl studied Britton and edited a volume of his essays, Prospect and Retrospect: Selected Essays of 
James Britton (Montclair, NJ: Boynton / Cook, 1982). 
23 For example, see Michael Benton, ‘Exploring Response’ in Michael Benton et al., Young Readers Responding 
to Poems (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 1-35, pp. 13-17. I am grateful to Marcello Giovanelli for directing me 
to Benton. 
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Discourses of Selfhood 
At this introductory stage it is important to indicate how Rosenblatt and H.D. conceive of 
selfhood, as the ‘personal’ is so central to this project. My overarching personalist framework 
takes ‘selfhood’ and ‘person’ to be one and the same entity: personalism understands the person 
to be an existential subject, created over time by the agency of individuals as they transact with 
their environment (including with one another). This does not mean, however, that a person is 
ever completed; on the contrary, selfhood is subject to flux and change. And yet personalism 
envisages lines of continuity in selfhood as well as manifestations of change. ‘Person is 
resistance’, wrote Berdyaev, ‘resistance to the determinism of society and nature, an heroic 
struggle for self-definition from within’.24 For Berdyaev in particular, personalism is always 
existentialist; human experience is pervaded by contradiction, tension, and paradox. Although 
he acknowledged the new wave of twentieth-century European existentialism created by 
Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre (among others), Berdyaev believed that existentialism per se 
was much older, for ‘we may discover its vivifying theme throughout the whole history of 
thought’.25 Seen through the lens of Berdyaev’s personalism, existentialism entails ‘emphasis 
on the subject as against the object, of the will as against the intellect, of the concrete and 
individual as against the general and universal; the antithesis between intuitive and conceptual 
knowledge, between existence and essence’.26 These binaries are characteristic of the dualisms 
which Berdyaev sees throughout life. Moreover, for Berdyaev they are a peculiarly Russian 
fascination which tends to emphasise contradiction and paradox, whereby ‘The human soul is 
[seen to be] divided, an agonizing conflict between opposing elements is going on in it’: for 
                                                          
24 Nikolai Berdyaev, ‘The Problem of Man (Towards Construction of a Christian Anthropology), trans. Stephen 
S. Janos ([1936] 2000). http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/berd_lib/1936_408.html (accessed February 17, 
2017). 
25 Nicolas Berdyaev, Dream and Reality: An Essay in Autobiography, trans. Katharine Lampert (London: 
Geoffrey Bles, 1950), p. 102. 
26 Ibid.  
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example, a conflict between ‘opposites [such] as love and hate, purity and uncleanness, 
concentration and absent-mindedness, etc.’.27 That Berdyaev affirmed binaries does not mean, 
however, that they are always and everywhere normative or should be endorsed without 
adaptation. However, personalism, via its romantic and existentialist overtones, certainly 
embraces complexity and in part locates this at the kernel of life’s variety that brings it into 
proximity with new humanist thought, as I outline above.  
For the purposes of this thesis, I have identified three ‘discourses’ which Rosenblatt 
and H.D. touch upon with varying degrees of intensity in their work that forge connective lines 
between my thinkers as well as throwing into relief the wider personalist vision at the heart of 
this thesis. Although historical moments of thought in their own right, discourses of 
romanticism, modernism, and existentialism offered Rosenblatt and H.D. concepts and 
sentiments which enabled them to articulate their sense of who the individual is and might 
become, particularly in relation to aesthetic experience. They are, in turn, discourses which 
feed into and grow out of this thesis’s core personalist position.   
Rosenblatt’s interest in romanticism, primarily British in focus, coalesces around the 
potential of aesthetic experience to shape the imaginations of individual people, and thus 
potentially change the world. In The Reader, the Text, the Poem: The Transactional Theory of 
the Literary Work (1978), she frames her career as trying to reconcile two romantic positions: 
Keats’s ‘sense of the unique values of art’ and Shelley’s ‘feeling for its social origins and social 
impact’ (see Chapter 3 for more on Shelley).28 Linked to Keats’s sense of art’s distinctiveness, 
Rosenblatt drew upon Wordsworth’s preface to Lyrical Ballads (1798) and stressed 
romanticism’s concern with affect, or with ‘powerful feelings’.29 By offering a theory of 
                                                          
27 Nicolas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, trans. Natalie Duddington (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1945), pp. 74. 
28 Louise M. Rosenblatt, The Reader, the Text, the Poem: The Transactional Theory of the Literary Work, 
paperback ed. (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1994), p. xi. 
29 Ibid., p. 4. 
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aesthetic experience at the heart of a wide-ranging vision of literary study, Rosenblatt 
combined emphasis on an individual’s personal experience of literature with attention to its 
potential social impact.  
H.D.’s interest in romanticism, on the other hand, has been more clearly documented, 
especially by Cassandra Laity in H.D. and the Victorian Fin de Siècle: Gender, Modernism, 
Decadence (1996). Since H.D.’s early days in Pennsylvania with her then fiancé, Ezra Pound, 
she expressed interest in romantic authors. Pound and H.D. would read William Morris, Dante 
Gabriel Rossetti, Swinburne, and Pound would write verses for H.D. after their style; he 
collected these poems in ‘Hilda’s Book’ (written 1905-07). In White Rose and the Red (written 
1948), H.D. revisits the Pre-Raphaelites and writes herself into a depiction of Elizabeth Siddall 
(see Chapter 3). H.D.’s imagination was periodically fired by historical artistic experimenters, 
whose lives and personalities, for her at least, were often as interesting as their art.  
H.D.’s early autobiographical fiction also reflects her interest in personal emotions and 
desire – in the microcosm of the individual. Paint it Today (written 1921) and HERmione 
(written 1927) utilise first-person points of view and lyrical outbursts of emotion; these texts 
can be read as cries of the heart, expressing resistance to an oppressive home environment and 
the need to retreat from others in order to create a world of intimacy and passionate intellectual 
activity. What Hamilton reads as ‘fiddling narcissism’ might thus more accurately be read as 
stemming from a romantic tradition of self-examination, self-expression, individuality, and 
passionate emotion directed at these ends. Part of H.D.’s originality, however, was because she 
revisited romantic tropes in a modernist way. 
In her 2012 essay, ‘H.D.’s modernism’, Polina Mackay argues that H.D.’s modernism 
can most clearly be seen in her early imagist aesthetics, in her work for ‘little magazines’, in 
her interest in psychoanalysis and spirituality, and in her experimentation with gender and 
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sexuality.30 Mackay notes that H.D. refined traditional romantic preoccupations, such as 
natural beauty, in a modernist way through her clear and sharp imagist aesthetic, revealed in 
her 1916 collection of poetry, Sea Garden. Miranda B. Hickman has further argued that H.D.’s 
natural imagery is non-gendered and emphasises power relations, especially the experience of 
being in thrall to an external presence – ‘a surrender on the part of one figure involving an 
intermingling of passivity and self-command’.31 Without question H.D.’s aesthetics, 
throughout her career, were experimental; her genres are famously and problematically 
indeterminate, as is her ‘subject matter’: they are many and various, and frequently overlap and 
react with each other. Rather than a decisive break with her self-identified Victorian 
predecessors (Swinburne, Rossetti, Morris), it is more correct to talk of revision, tussle, and 
transformation. H.D.’s modernism is actively in conversation with a self-identified romantic 
literary past.  
 I contend though that it is Susan Stanford Friedman who has done the most to highlight 
the role of H.D.’s modernism in forming her sense of quest. In Psyche Reborn Friedman places 
H.D.’s prose and poetry after the First World War as part of a broader search for new meanings 
in light of so much destruction. H.D. is situated alongside W. B. Yeats, Hart Crane, D. H. 
Lawrence, and William Carlos Williams – writers who often figure characters or speakers in 
search of a new settlement and new experiences in the wake of former decay. Typically, such 
authors might also allude to or explicitly invoke mythological and religious themes, metaphors, 
and tropes in order to articulate their vision. Friedman writes that ‘H.D.’s development from 
imagist to epic art places her squarely in the center of this modernist mainstream. Her work 
shares with all of these writers the fundamental spirit of quest given shape by myth and mythic 
consciousness, by religious vision or experience, and by a new synthesis of fragmented 
                                                          
30 Mackay, ‘H.D.’s modernism’, pp. 51-52. 
31 Miranda B. Hickman, ‘“Uncanonically seated”: H.D. and literary canons’ in Christodoulides and Mackay (eds), 
The Cambridge Companion to H.D., pp. 9-22, p. 19. 
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traditions’.32 H.D.’s individualised vision of quest, therefore, is a modernist refraction of an 
essentially romantic preoccupation with the individual, perhaps with his loneliness, with his 
search for identity and meaning in life.  
Moreover, as Shari Benstock has noted, H.D. was associated with other women 
modernists in Paris during the 1920s, and when considering the context of H.D.’s modernism, 
it can be useful to position her, if only for reference, as part of a broader collection of artists 
who considered Paris as at least an important professional centre if not the cultural epicentre 
of the world.33 Although she was still at the beginning of her career in the mid-1920s, 
Rosenblatt was also a part of the Paris community of American ex-pats, even if she remained 
on the fringes. Rosenblatt completed her doctoral thesis at the Sorbonne University in Paris 
between 1926 and 1931, and in her interviews she is open about her literary networks at the 
time. Rosenblatt lived on the Left Bank and often used to go to Ford Madox Ford’s apartment 
in the afternoons, where she met W. H. Auden, Robert Penn Warren, and Gertrude Stein; 
Rosenblatt and the poet, Léonie Adams, were also good friends, and this link constitutes a 
tantalising if ultimately insignificant connection to H.D., who also knew Adams.34  
Nevertheless, Rosenblatt felt connected to developments in literature at the time by 
frequenting the bookshops run by Sylvia Beach (for Anglophones) and Adrienne Monnier (for 
Francophones).35 Together with the poet and critic, Allen Tate, and his wife, the novelist and 
critic, Caroline Gordon, Rosenblatt frequented the Café Select, and it was here she intended to 
meet Hart Crane (she eventually met him at his studio on the Left Bank).36  
                                                          
32 Susan Stanford Friedman, Psyche Reborn: The Emergence of H.D. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1987), p. 5. 
33 Shari Benstock, Women of the Left Bank: Paris, 1900-1940 (London: Virago, 1987), pp. 311-356. H.D. was 
never enamoured with Paris. 
34 Louise Rosenblatt, The Reminiscences of Louise Michelle Rosenblatt. 2 vols. Interview with Ed Erwin. New 
York: Columbia University Oral History Research Office. 22, 24 June and 13 and 15 July 1982, p. 69. 
35 Ibid., p. 259. 
36 Ibid., pp. 105-106. 
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The significance of all these networking events in Rosenblatt’s Parisian life is that she 
began to assess a modernist aesthetic and centre of productivity, and particularly to relate it 
back to her PhD work, which was concerned with English advocates of the autonomy of art 
from social concerns in the Victorian era.37 Rosenblatt maintained sympathy for modernism, 
especially for its emphasis on sexual freedom and a re-evaluation of gender roles; she also 
became interested in scientific explanations of human behaviour and psychology.  
Later, in the 1960s, Rosenblatt indirectly reaffirmed her commitment to modernism and 
psychological intensity in her supervision of Mitchell A. Leaska’s doctoral thesis (1970) on 
Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, in which he connects his project to Rosenblatt’s theory of 
literary experience.38 The hint is that Woolf’s modernist aesthetic finds an appropriate parallel 
in Rosenblatt’s experiential approach to literary study (see Chapter 2). Having said this, 
Rosenblatt’s engagement with literary modernism is fairly minimal and out of the three 
discourses in this thesis, modernism is the least directly relevant; romanticism and 
existentialism are more pertinent to the overall direction of my theory. Indeed, a focus on 
experience and the freedom of the individual resonates more strongly with Rosenblatt’s and 
H.D.’s engagement with existentialism, which represents the third major connecting point 
between Rosenblatt and H.D – their third discourse of selfhood. 
There are two levels to framing my thinkers’ engagement with existentialism. The first 
is to find explicit instances where Rosenblatt and H.D. speak of existentialism – usually the 
French twentieth-century variety. The second, perhaps more fruitful path is to approach 
existentialism through personalism, after the manner of Berdyaev, as a ‘vivifying theme’ latent 
throughout their work. That is, I will proceed by highlighting areas where the subject, the 
                                                          
37 Her conclusion foregrounds the contemporary situation by noting censorship, current critical trends, and artistic 
activity. 
38 See Mitchell A. Leaska, Virginia Woolf’s Lighthouse: A Study in Critical Method (London: Hogarth, 1970), p. 
6. 
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individual, the concrete, existence, intuition, and passion are emphasised or given special 
attention. If romanticism and modernism were two historical moments of thought and 
expression concerning individual experience with which Rosenblatt and H.D. were engaged – 
a focus on the personal – existentialism can be said to be a deeper commitment they shared – 
a reminder to focus on the personal. Existentialism is a discourse which can perhaps more 
readily be put to work with personalism in the present institutional context of literary studies, 
than romanticism and modernism. 
 In Reader, Text, Poem, Rosenblatt states that ‘Existentialism strengthened certain of 
my emphases, though mainly the early literary works of Malraux and Sartre’.39 Rosenblatt’s 
understanding of existentialism is confined to twentieth-century French works; she rarely if 
ever mentions Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, or Heidegger – philosophers whose work represents a 
northern European existentialist tradition ranging from the nineteenth through the twentieth 
centuries. Existentialism is most apparent in Rosenblatt’s thought in her emphasis on the 
freedom of the individual, in recognising various tensions felt by young people in the mid-
century United States, and in highlighting the need to make choices which have ethical 
consequences. Yet her interest in aesthetic experience and ways of connecting literary texts can 
also be read as existential, as Chapter 2 will show.  
 H.D., on the other hand, engaged openly and more extensively with existentialism in 
her work of the 1950s, than did Rosenblatt. For H.D., existentialism – especially Sartre’s 
French version – underscores the individuality of the human person in the face of contemporary 
urban life which seems to anonymise and objectify the human. For H.D. existentialism also 
emphasises the need to be jolted out of deadening habits of thought and patterns of living – in 
critiquing and being free of the status quo – to focus, to become more self-aware. H.D. also 
uses existentialism to modernise her romantic interest in passionate experience and the healing, 
                                                          
39 Rosenblatt, Reader, Text, Poem, p. xiv. 
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transformative role of art. For H.D., wisdom is that which can lift the individual out of mental 
drudgery, to create new values to live by and new conceptions of beauty to enjoy. As with 
psychoanalysis, H.D. is hard to pin-down as an existentialist, in the sense that she does not 
subscribe to any one person’s philosophy uncritically. As I say, it is better to see it as a 
‘vivifying’ theme through her work. The amenability of existentialism and perhaps its strength 
for this thesis is its resistance to systematics and its preference for the microcosmic world of 
the individual, faced with responsibility to live in freedom and make wise choices.40 
 
Pathways to Wisdom 
The existentialist emphasis which pervades this thesis, and which is reinforced by personalism, 
is indelibly concerned with the nature of the choices individuals might make, and thus with 
questions of wisdom. I explore wisdom in detail in Chapter 4, but at this stage it is sufficient 
to highlight the personalist way in which I interpret wisdom. I always couple wisdom with 
being in quest, with being on a journey of self-discovery and learning, growing in 
understanding of oneself, others, and more universal questions such as what it might mean to 
live a meaningful life. Because I want to emphasise the literary dimension of the thesis – that 
wisdom is a desirable telos of literary experience – I do not confront the complex concept of 
wisdom until the final chapter when I fold the insights of the previous three chapters into a 
discussion of how literary experience might be central to learners who are able and wish to 
position themselves in quest of wisdom in registered courses in English studies.  
For Rosenblatt, wisdom is deeply connected to her emphasis on value selection – on 
the need for an individual to create his or her own philosophy of life by which to live, always 
subject to revision in the light of new experience. Rosenblatt’s significance lies in her resistance 
                                                          
40 For a congenial critique of existentialism, see Mary Warnock, Existentialist Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1967). 
Some existentialists, such as Heidegger, have been criticised for presenting existentialist ideas in a systematic 
form which undermines their existential nature.  
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to a knowledge-driven vision of literary studies, and moves more towards a pragmatic, life-
based model, concerned with the growth of the human person in the context of a democracy. 
As I explore in Chapter 1, her seminal text, Literature as Exploration, is panoramic in its 
attention to the student’s experience of literature in the context of his day-to-day life. 
Rosenblatt’s theory of literary experience cannot, at least on the surface, be separated from her 
vision of the development of American citizens.  
H.D. also scarcely uses the word ‘wisdom’, and when she does, it is never in a wholly 
positive way. It is something to be avoided as part and parcel of a patriarchal, proverbial 
tradition often associated with conventional, Western Christianity.41 Nevertheless, I maintain 
that the quest for wisdom is at the heart of H.D.’s work, particularly in her later period (1941-
61). For H.D., wisdom is a mix of self-knowledge and intuition concerning some of the central 
existential problems of life, especially in the West. Her modernist revision of gender roles and 
sexuality feeds into her concern for re-evaluating relationships and seeking partnerships based 
on peace and harmony. H.D.’s modernist mythological revisionism, so imbricated in her sense 
of quest, is put in the service of such value creation, foregrounding prominent mythological 
women (including the Virgin Mary, Helen of Troy, and Isis) as alternate ontologies of feminine 
being.  
The overarching emphasis on process and transformation in this thesis means that for 
Rosenblatt and H.D., a person is always in quest of wisdom. In fact, ‘quest’ is the best route 
into H.D.’s relationship toward wisdom, especially considering her disdain for its traditional, 
static conception of patriarchal dictates. While the experience of being in quest of wisdom is 
important to my thinkers, and part of their romantic heritage, it is never enough; there must 
always be some kind of goal, even if it is faint and indeterminate. In The Walls Do Not Fall 
                                                          
41 Nietzsche was an important influence on modernist distancing from traditional Christianity, and yet Nietzsche’s 
view of Christianity must also be critiqued as partial and somewhat unhelpful. See Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 
pp. 114-115. 
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(1944) H.D. declares that ‘we are voyagers, discoverers / of the not known’; although we might 
not have a map which explains the meaning of life clearly, ‘possibly we will reach haven, / 
heaven’ (see Chapter 3).42 During the 1940s the ‘voyage’ became a significant trope for H.D., 
and it is related to her spiritualist activity as well as her psychoanalysis with Sigmund Freud. 
H.D.’s conception of ‘haven’ and ‘heaven’ is intimately bound to the experience of journeying 
there. As such, it resonates with Rosenblatt’s emphasis on the transactional literary experience 
as speaking to students’ quests for meaning and direction in life. For Rosenblatt in particular, 
it was essential to make practical changes to the institutional running of literary studies – to 
make English a central discipline in personal and social development. 
Even in her most theoretical work, Reader, Text, Poem, Rosenblatt incorporates 
substantial comment concerning her students’ responses to literary works. Yet rather than 
seeing this fusion of theory with pedagogy as a stumbling block, invalidating Rosenblatt’s 
status as a literary theorist, I read it as a strength and capitalise on this link. Although this thesis 
is intended as an intervention in literary theory, offering fresh readings of Rosenblatt and H.D., 
part of my intervention is to highlight the need to be more explicit about pedagogy when 
discussing questions of literary theory. And although H.D. pursued her career outside 
university structures, her personal project of learning is especially amenable to strengthening 
certain of Rosenblatt’s insights. H.D. recalls our attention to the experience of learning, and 
how aesthetic experience can energise a project of becoming. She prevents growth in wisdom 
from becoming a systematic course with easily measurable outcomes, and yet she also prevents 
wisdom from being something remote and thus unsuitable for university study.  
By foregrounding issues of learning in literary studies within a theoretical context, I am 
positioning this work alongside others in Britain who are turning to pedagogy as an integral 
                                                          
42 H.D., Collected Poems 1912-1944, ed. Louis L. Martz (New York: New Directions, 1983), p. 543, original 
italics. 
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part of envisioning English studies for the future. In Britain, Ben Knights and Peter Abbs are 
two scholars who have consistently tried to close the gap between literary theory and education. 
Abbs’s English Within the Arts: A Radical Alternative for English and the Arts in the 
Curriculum (1982) and Ben Knights’ and Chris Thurgar-Dawson’s Active Reading: 
Transformative Writing in Literary Studies (2006) are representative texts from different 
historical moments that connect developments in literary theory and literary history to the 
experience of learning English at various educational levels. Knights’s most recent and 
summative book, Pedagogic Criticism: Reconfiguring University English Studies (2017) 
foregrounds literary studies as ‘practice’, and how such a framing can suggest alternative ways 
of learning – learning through teaching texts and learning through reading texts. In Active 
Reading Knights references Rosenblatt, although he and Thurgar-Dawson choose to situate 
their congenial approach in a more eclectic matrix of influences.43 Nevertheless, their emphasis 
on transformation and the creative activity of reading and writing leads into discussion of 
pedagogy, as it does for Rosenblatt.  
A decision to include pedagogical issues in a work of literary theory is ultimately a 
methodological one, but it is also an evaluative commitment – a belief in the wisdom of relating 
critical approaches back to the institutional learning contexts in which they are often carried 
out. This is a useful reminder that methodology is never innocent – a way to get from A to B. 
As Rosenblatt would have said, critical methodology is a selective activity situated in a broader 
decision-making process concerning what is and is not valuable for a specific course of action. 
Methodology is thus also a pathway to wisdom, of choosing one path over another, a way of 
materialising deeper commitments. 
 
                                                          
43 Ben Knights and Chris-Thurgar Dawson, Active Reading: Transformative Writing in Literary Studies (London: 
Continuum, 2008). 
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Research Questions 
The central questions which this thesis seeks to answer are as follows. How can the quest for 
wisdom in English studies find institutional sanction as well as intersect with pressing concerns 
in literary theory? How can the theory of the transactional literary experience be developed so 
that it provides a critical method suitable for those in quest of wisdom? Finally, which 
approaches and theoretical frameworks can be drawn upon in order to situate the transactional 
literary experience in a broader pedagogical vision?  
 
Methodology 
Primarily a work of literary theory, this dissertation constructs a dialogic conversation between 
two thinkers in order to offer a personalist contribution to re-configuring English studies for 
the future. Born from the ongoing synthetic dialogue which is central to this thesis, my 
contribution can be summarised as follows: by re-conceptualising and re-affirming the 
importance of the individual and her experience, I create a framework for exploring the 
question of literary contexts, moving away from dominant historicist understandings of context 
towards a personalist understanding of what I term ‘textual sociability’, after a reflection by 
Rita Felski on the value of context. I locate personalist textual sociability as being central to 
the transactional literary experience, as a process which foregrounds the role of imagination 
for growth in self-knowledge and understanding of others, leading to wisdom. By drawing 
attention to the ways in which Rosenblatt and H.D. draw upon discourses of romanticism, 
modernism, and existentialism, I am able to frame my contribution as personalist because of 
personalism’s ability to connect such disparate domains as philosophical anthropology, 
epistemology, and sociology. In other words: the thesis is structured by showing how a 
particular anthropology (idea of the human and his experience) leads to a particular philosophy 
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(conception of knowledge in relation to literary experience), which in turn implies a particular 
sociology, or vision of human relations.  
 Each chapter helps to develop my line of argument by exploring various synergies 
between Rosenblatt and H.D, while acknowledging important differences. Significantly, this 
thesis is not an exercise in literary history or textual scholarship. I am preoccupied with 
developing a theory of literary experience and its relationship to wisdom, by means of 
exploring the ways in which Rosenblatt and H.D. approach these topics, because I consider 
these thinkers to be the most rewarding when brought together for this purpose. Indeed, there 
is an argument to be made that in developing a personalist theory of literary experience and the 
quest for wisdom, I am also modelling a personalist method. In my discussion I consistently 
read H.D. alongside Rosenblatt and vice versa, and I utilise the intuitive connections which 
emerged during this process. Indeed, I may be so bold as to suggest that I am the principal 
adhesive link between these two thinkers; there are three of us in this intellectual partnership, 
and this thesis was born of my own transactions with H.D.’s and Rosenblatt’s writing. And so 
I engage closely with specific texts by these authors, and therefore also contribute to criticism 
on such texts.  
 H.D.’s entire oeuvre could conceivably be read as demonstrating her interest in 
learning. Yet with a few exceptions, I focus on H.D.’s prose and poetry from the 1940s. During 
the Second World War she experienced a renaissance in her creativity and it was during these 
years that she engaged most intensively in spiritualism, the occult, mystical experiences, and 
other discourses which she harnessed for her learning.44 Her poetry and prose are also closely 
intertwined, so generic distinctions are less important as they were in previous decades, where 
the H.D. of her poetry and the H.D. of her autobiographical novels were more distinct.  
                                                          
44 For a phasing of H.D.’s career, see Matte Robinson and Demetres P. Tryphonopoulos, ‘Introduction’ in H.D., 
The Hirslanden Notebooks, ed. by Matte Robinson and Demetres P. Tryphonopoulos (Victoria, BC: ELS, 2015), 
pp. ix-xxix, pp. xiv-xxv. 
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 There are, however, certain texts by H.D. that I have excluded from this study on 
purpose. Hermetic Definition, written at the end of H.D.’s life, explores her relationship to 
various men in the late 1950s who had an impact on her self-identity as a wise woman, which 
is also affirmed in Bid Me to Live. Hermetic Definition is a difficult, obtuse poem with complex 
symbolic references; it is more fitting to read it within H.D.’s religious experience rather than 
her preoccupation with aesthetic experience. On the other hand, I include texts of the 1950s 
which relate to H.D.’s engagement with the existential psychoanalyst Erich Heydt, such as 
Magic Mirror. The organising principle has been selecting those texts from outside the 1940s 
which do the most to frame the impulse toward quest during and after the Second World War. 
Texts which anticipate this quest are included, whereas those which concern themes which are 
more peripheral to this study (such as film, religion, sexuality, and family history) are excluded.  
 Rosenblatt’s output is somewhat easier to navigate, simply because it is so much smaller 
than H.D.’s even though it extends across eighty years. I have endeavoured to embrace her 
entire corpus, which begins with the editorial comments for The Barnard Bulletin in the early 
1920s, and ends in 2005 with her collected volume of essays, Making Meaning with Texts. 
Although Rosenblatt developed her thought over her long life, there are distinct lines of 
continuity from her earliest publications to her last, which make it advisable to seek a panoramic 
perspective. But again, if there is a concentric circle of Rosenblatt texts in this thesis, then 
Literature as Exploration and Reader, Text, Poem lie at its heart.  
During the 1980s and 1990s Rosenblatt also participated in a number of interviews, 
which are extremely helpful in understanding the development and phases of her career. I am 
especially indebted to the 1982 interview for Columbia University, conducted by Ed Erwin, 
which is still housed in Columbia’s university archives. I have also drawn upon unpublished 
material in H.D.’s archive, at Yale University. But unlike other studies on H.D., this thesis is 
not an archive-intensive one; there is more than enough primary-source material in her 
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published books, particularly given the spate of posthumous publications of her later writing in 
the last ten years or so.  
 Moreover, while H.D. and Rosenblatt are the core pair of thinkers in my thesis, at times 
I engage a number of other discourses and thinkers in order to illuminate aspects of my core 
dialogue. Indeed, both Rosenblatt and H.D. themselves are expansive in their intellectual and 
aesthetic range, drawing on multiple discourses (cognitive science, philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, spiritualism, psychology, and politics) in order to enhance their own particular 
vision. There is something significant about this multidisciplinary, eclectic approach which 
arguably does intellectual work by its very presence. As the editors of the Lindisfarne Library 
of Russian Philosophy have said of Russian thought: it ‘is broad and individualistic, bearing 
within it many different perspectives – religious, metaphysical, erotic, social, and 
apocalyptic’.45 This thesis is not a contribution to Russian philosophy. However, because I 
adopt a personalist framework with which I draw together the various threads, there is 
something in this ‘Russian’, eclectic approach to thought which speaks of my own position, 
and which surfaces throughout the four chapters. But before I offer a chapter outline, I shall 
explain my key terms as they are used throughout the thesis. 
 
Definition of Terms 
Personalism relates to the thesis’s overarching framework, whereby it denotes attention to the 
concrete person and his or interpersonal growth. Personalism is more interested in specific 
individuals than broader ideas about persisting traits in humankind, as in humanism. Moreover, 
personalism differs from individualism, which tends to see the individual’s rights as 
inalienable. In this thesis individualism stems from humanistic ideas about the self-sufficiency 
                                                          
45 Aleksei Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevsky, On Spiritual Unity: A Slavophile Reader, eds. Boris Jakim and Robert 
Bird (Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne Books, 1998), p. 368. 
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of the individual. By contrast, personalism sees the person’s growth in the context of 
interpersonal relationships.  
 Romanticism and existentialism refer to broad areas of focus and sympathy among the 
various thinkers whose work is explored in this thesis. Although they intersect specific, historic 
movements, such as German Romanticism and French existentialism, it is not these movements 
which are given attention in this project. Romanticism denotes particular interest in subjectivity 
(feelings, emotions, and passions) and the complexity of human experiences. Existentialism is 
concerned  with the inner world of persons and is an axiological principle, insisting that humans 
act out of freedom and create values by which to live.  
 Modernism, by contrast, relates to a specific historical literary movement, dating 
roughly between 1890 and 1940, although in H.D.’s case, ‘long modernism’ is a more apt term 
to describe her aesthetic, but modernism will be used in a flexible sense, to include works 
written by H.D. after 1940. In this thesis, modernist elements include the quest as an 
undertaking in the wake of individual and social breakdown, and the indeterminacy of generic 
boundaries. 
 Pragmatics and warranted assertability relate specifically to Rosenblatt’s 
philosophical influences and how she developed her thought along pragmatist lines. Rosenblatt 
is most obviously indebted to pragmatist philosophers such as John Dewey, William James, 
and Charles Sanders Peirce. Pragmatism complements personalism in its interest in concrete 
situations individuals encounter, and the exercise of knowledge in such situations. Warranted 
assertability concerns Rosenblatt’s attempt to explain the dynamics of validity of interpretation: 
is an interpretation warranted by the way textual symbols are presented in a text?  
 Similarly, the transactional literary experience refers to Rosenblatt’s transactional 
theory of the literary work, whereby she described aesthetic experiences with literature by 
drawing upon the transactional philosophy of John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley. Personalist 
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textual sociability, by contrast, is my own term, which I develop in Chapter 2 as a way of 
describing the way texts can be brought together in an existential way. 
 Finally, wisdom refers to that tentative goal of transactional literary experiences as they 
are explored in English studies, denoting increased insight into oneself, other personalities, and 
some of the central existential issues concerning human beings more generally. Wisdom is a 
multifaceted phenomenon which balances practical and more philosophical concerns.   
 
Structure 
Chapter 1 examines the concepts of ‘individual’ and ‘experience’ in the work of my two 
thinkers. This chapter prepares the ground for the more theoretical chapters that follow. I 
contextualise Rosenblatt’s and H.D.’s interest in the individual and his or her experience and 
show how this manifests in specific works – Paint it Today, HERmione, and Literature as 
Exploration – as well as folding their separate interests into a coherent personalist vision. I 
focus this interest in the individual within the context of learning, thus channelling this broad 
interest into a factor that will be significant throughout the rest of the thesis. 
 Chapter 2 develops a theory of personalist textual sociability by extending Chapter 1’s 
interest in the individual’s experience by applying it directly to literary experience. I build on 
Rita Felski’s notion of a text’s ‘sociability’ to show how Rosenblatt and H.D. present material 
for a personalist understanding of textual sociability, which privileges associational modes of 
consciousness in the literary experience and the subsequent work of thinking about literary 
experiences. While never subsiding into pure subjectivism, the personalist angle of textual 
sociability is controlled by reference to the overall transactional nature of literary experience, 
which posits warranted assertability as a way of concentrating on the text-reader dyad. In this 
chapter I engage in close reading of Rosenblatt’s theory in Reader, Text, Poem, and Making 
Meaning with Texts and H.D.’s associational consciousness in The Sword Went Out to Sea and 
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her interest in associations more generally in The Mystery. These close readings form the 
crucible out of which a theory of personalist textual sociability can emerge. I finally show how 
my theory of textual sociability impacts actual learning situations, by drawing on the work of 
Rosenblatt’s colleague, Gordon Pradl. 
 Chapter 3 further explores the link between personalist textual sociability and 
overcoming differences in human experience to find commonalities. I explore how Rosenblatt 
and H.D. – in Literature as Exploration, ‘The Greek Boy’, The Walls Do Not Fall and 
Rosenblatt’s essay, ‘Whitman’s Democratic Vistas’ – channel imaginative identification with 
others in literary experience as the basis for creating new patterns of human relations in society. 
In the second half of the chapter, I show how both thinkers translate this connection between 
literary experience and human relations into a new social role for the learner who writes about 
this link for an audience.  
 Chapter 4 folds the previous discussion of literary experiences and their potential 
impact into a discussion of what it means to be in quest of wisdom in institutional English 
studies today. Both ‘quest’ and ‘wisdom’ are carefully explored in relation to both Rosenblatt’s 
and H.D.’s trajectory, and as operational concepts in a personalist pedagogy. At this stage, I 
draw on a number of other thinkers such as Maxine Greene, Nicholas Maxwell, Roger Walsh 
– some directly related to Rosenblatt, and some who are less directly connected – in order to 
place my discussion in a contemporary context of revived interest in literary humanism, affect, 
and ethics, and thus crystallise my contribution to English studies.
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1. The Importance of the Individual’s Experience 
 
It has been said that for personalists, the individual is the key to reality.1 Not only is the person 
considered the pinnacle of existence, she is also the ground from which knowledge arises: the 
human being is a microcosm. As Jan Olof Bengtsson states, quoting J. H. Lavely, personality 
is ‘the fundamental explanatory principle’ for personalists.2 What this means for this thesis is 
that a focus on the individual and his experience needs to come before any further consideration 
of literary experience and wisdom. As I shall argue, Louise Rosenblatt and H.D. were 
especially preoccupied with the individual and with the nature of his experience, and this also 
forms the basis for their subsequent explorations into literary experience and learning.  
Rosenblatt grew up on a diet of romantic, libertarian, and anti-authoritarian literature 
which defended the individual’s right to develop as a person. H.D., on the other hand, staked 
out her originality within the modernist moment by experimenting with presentations of 
personal experience. Over the course of her career, Rosenblatt became steadily more focused 
on the fortunes of the student in American institutions of higher education; her interest in the 
individual’s experience therefore became centred on the student’s experiences and how these 
might be brought to bear on literary study.  
By contrast, H.D.’s failure to succeed at college-level English studies intensified her 
commitment to carving out her own, distinctive exploration of (particularly female) personal 
experience. Her autobiographical novels of the 1920s, especially Paint it Today (written 1921) 
and HERmione (written 1927) experiment with points of view and situate the individual’s 
experience within the body, approximating Simone de Beauvoir’s existentialist concept of the 
‘body as situation’. While H.D.’s method was somewhat intuitive and deeply personal, by the 
                                                          
1 Jan Olof Bengtsson, The Worldview of Personalism: Origins and Early Development (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p. 67. 
2 Ibid. 
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1960s Rosenblatt had developed a very specific theory of human experience, which proceeded 
from her prior commitment to the individual (born of different intellectual heritages): namely, 
the transactional theory of being, adapted from John Dewey’s and Arthur F. Bentley’s Knowing 
and the Known (1949).  
In this chapter I explore the ways in which Rosenblatt and H.D. framed their 
commitment to the individual and her experience, and how this lays the foundation for a more 
specific interest in the personal nature of the transactional literary experience, to be explored 
in Chapter 2. I move from an exploration of ‘experience’ (as primarily existential in the case 
of H.D., and primarily transactional in the case of Rosenblatt), to a discussion of Rosenblatt’s 
and H.D.’s particular commitments to ‘the individual’ – commitments nurtured in specific, 
personal contexts. The inclusion of biographical material in this and the third chapter serves to 
demonstrate the arc of my thinkers’ work, and to foreground lines of continuity amidst various 
changes in genre and focus. Moreover, the neuroscientific component of this chapter prefigures 
that in Chapter 4, where the task is to emphasise the ways in which assumptions about wisdom 
are being confirmed and strengthened by neuroscientific research.  
The central premise in this chapter is that a personalist discourse of literary study rests 
on a particular philosophical anthropology – a view of human nature. I will now explore my 
thinkers’ various understandings of human experience, and draw some parallels between them.    
 
Towards a Transactional Theory of Experience 
Being in Paint it Today 
H.D.’s autobiographical writing is the best place to assess how she envisaged human 
experience. Paint it Today (written 1921) was her first substantial attempt at prose writing; it 
inaugurated over a decade of emotionally wrought autobiographical prose. Indeed, H.D. 
claimed in 1925 that ‘the things I write are all indirectly (when not directly) inspired by my 
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experiences’.3 Of the ‘Madrigal’ cycle of prose fiction, which includes Asphodel (written 1921-
22), HERmione (written 1927), Bid Me to Live (1960), and arguably other novels as well, such 
as Palimpsest (1927) and Pilate’s Wife (written 1928), Paint it Today is perhaps the most 
readable, the most direct and the least hampered by over-determined craftsmanship. Robert 
Spoo even refers to HERmione and Asphodel as the ‘Her-Asphodel sequence’, pointing out that 
HERmione was written as a prequel to Asphodel.4 Although Asphodel’s composition is actually 
closer to Paint it Today’s, the only surviving manuscript of Asphodel is likely to have been a 
revised version, written around 1926-27 ‘as an aesthetically consistent sequel to Her’.5 As 
such, Paint it Today reads differently to the other Madrigal novels, with important formal 
differences that make the relationship between the individual and her experiences all the more 
potent.  
Cassandra Laity has argued that Paint it Today is evidence of H.D.’s interest in 
romanticism, particularly Swinburne’s androgynous ‘sister love’.6 In my reading of Paint it 
Today, however, I contend that H.D.’s depiction of the novel’s heroine, Midget Defreddie, also 
approximates an existential vision of human being as situated in the body. As I noted in the 
Introduction and explore more fully in Chapter 4, in her later years H.D. actively engaged with 
the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, but as a broader approach to human existence, Paint it 
Today certainly anticipates some of the more explicit visions which twentieth-century French 
existentialists such as de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty formulated some decades later. It is, 
however, Toril Moi’s What is a Woman? (2001) which draws out the implications of de 
Beauvoir’s thought with clarity and verve, to which I turn to analyse Midget’s experience in 
                                                          
3 Quoted in Robert Spoo, ‘Introduction’ in H.D., Asphodel, ed. Robert Spoo (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1992), pp. ix-xxi, p. xi. 
4 Ibid., p. xiii. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Cassandra Laity, ‘Lesbian Romanticism: H.D.’s Fictional Representations of Frances Gregg and Bryher’ in H.D., 
Paint it Today, ed. Cassandra Laity (New York: New York University Press, 1992), pp. xvii-xliiii. 
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Paint it Today. Viewed in the light of ‘body as situation’, I suggest that H.D.’s autobiographical 
writing, Paint it Today, also anticipates Rosenblatt’s transactional theory of being. Although 
transactional theory and existentialism are separate modes of thought, they have much in 
common in their attempt to break down the subject-object, Cartesian dualism of older ways of 
conceiving human experience, and create something more holistic, more personal.  
In Paint it Today painting is a metaphor for writing, or ‘painting with words’, to echo 
Flannery O’Connor.7 H.D. uses a number of other verbs to describe this activity, such as 
‘etching’ and ‘carving’.8 The product is variously a ‘picture’, ‘painting’, or an ‘etching’ (3-6). 
Often these nouns are followed by a question mark, evoking a tone of insecurity on the part of 
the one doing the painting to do it with any degree of accuracy (3-5). But by claiming that the 
picture is ‘that of being’, both process and product are situated in a state of flux (6). ‘Being’ 
might refer to a human being – a girl ‘sitting in the grass, this Midget’ – but it also suggests an 
ongoing, present continuous activity that is not yet completed (6). To understand being as a 
continuous reality causes Midget to be viewed first as ‘unborn’, and subsequently as an 
individual who unfolds like a ‘hatched bird’ (6). The natural imagery with which H.D. 
envelopes Midget further underscores the dynamic relationship Midget has with her 
environment. The young Midget sits in the grass rather than on it, and ‘crawls’ into a rabbit 
hutch with ‘elbows scraping the rough lathes’ (4). Midget has an impact on her surroundings 
at the same time as her surroundings influence her.  
When the novel’s action shifts to Europe and explores Midget’s travels with her friend, 
Josepha, Midget’s assessment of people’s relationship to their environment deepens. Situated 
on the beach at Etaples in France, Midget considers her relationship to the ‘trailing herd’ of 
Americans and Europeans she sees (15). Rather than being a comment on these people – 
                                                          
7 Jolly Kay Sharp, ‘Between the House and the Chicken Yard’: The Masks of Mary Flannery O’Connor (Macon, 
GA: Mercer University Press, 2011), p. 128. I am grateful to Becky Cullen for pointing this echo out to me. 
8 H.D., Paint it Today, pp. 5-6. Further references to this text are given in parentheses in the main body.  
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looking like a ‘herd’ – I would argue that H.D.’s language indicates something about the way 
Midget is perceiving other people; the focus is on Midget rather than the walkers on the beach. 
The beginning of the chapter describes ‘the wind against an old hulk on the sands below 
Etaples’, and the ‘trailing herd’ is set against the backdrop of a sunset that seems to ‘smother’ 
(15). In spite of the haziness of sight, Midget declares that ‘these and others, trailing in leisurely 
procession, were surely people, authentic realities’ (15). Rather than making an objective 
statement about these people, Midget is trying to understand the individual’s relation to others 
within a total situation, contingent on time and place – the smothering sunset and the wind 
against an old hulk. The bracketing out of ‘authentic as paper dolls, cut out front and back, 
matched front and back’ seems to be a description of Midget’s thought processes, intruding, as 
it were, into the narrative which then returns more positively after this to ‘each a reality, an 
individual’ (15). Describing those she sees as ‘paper dolls’ is a tentative expression of 
perception for Midget, one which quivers between adjectives that distance people and merge 
them into a ‘herd’, and words which tend to foreground their individuality, or their 
‘differentiated’ status (15).  
The conclusion that Midget arrives at – ‘that was it’ – is insignificant compared to the 
overall meditation on human experience and perception of that experience, which seems to see 
experience as dynamic – as an event in time which changes both perceiver and perceived (15). 
When the author declares that ‘language and tradition do not make a people, but the heat that 
presses on them, the cold that baffles them, the alternating lengths of night and day’, this is a 
vision of human experience particular to Midget’s developing sense of what experience might 
entail (15). Language and tradition are of course important, but ‘the cold that baffles’ and the 
‘alternating lengths’ of time are different phrasings of the same understanding of how people 
are ‘made’ and then re-made in contingent and shifting contexts. Midget’s conclusion is a 
rejection of static conceptions of identity and experience in favour of something more fluid.  
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Part of H.D.’s attention to Midget’s experience and understanding of experience in 
Paint it Today is closely connected to the overall feminist direction of the novel, which tells 
the story of a young woman of late-nineteenth-century middle-class suburban background 
freeing herself from the constraints imposed on her. The European tour becomes a site of 
resistance for Midget, whose body and those of other women are foregrounded as a way of 
overcoming the silences Midget feels to be imposed on women in her home environment. Of 
the French existentialists, Maurice Merleau-Ponty is perhaps the most well-known philosopher 
to focus on embodied experience. His concept of the ‘lived body’ is meant to overcome the 
Cartesian split between mind and body. He writes that ‘the union of soul and body is not an 
amalgamation between two mutually external terms, subject and object, brought about by 
arbitrary degree. It is enacted at every instant in the moment of existence’.9 Merleau-Ponty is 
aware that such moments of existence are often pre-conceptual; human beings have an 
‘intentional arc which projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting’.10 The 
‘intentional arc’ helps us to live and move and have our being in a quietly composed way, 
aware of the familiar which enables us to exist, structure, and carry out day-to-day, habitual 
activities. Of course, frequently our habitual ‘structures’, as Merleau-Ponty calls our 
‘sedimented’ intentional arc in The Structure of Behavior (1942), are challenged by new 
experiences. Not only are Midget’s intentional arc and habitual structures transformed during 
her European excursion, they are transformed by a will on her part. And this is why Toril Moi’s 
analysis of Simone de Beauvoir’s concept of ‘body as situation’ is especially relevant here. 
Moi stresses de Beauvoir’s interest in how people – especially women – come to understand 
themselves as an embodied situation, as being beyond determinacies. This understanding may 
then enable women to take control of their lives in a more meaningful fashion. 
                                                          
9 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1962), pp. 88-89. 
10 Ibid., pp. 135-36. 
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The basic claim that Moi makes with regard to de Beauvoir’s thought is that, as with 
Merleau-Ponty’s vision of ‘lived body’, the notion of ‘body as situation’ erodes subject / object 
dualism. Moi uses de Beauvoir’s concept in order to offer a workable understanding of female 
subjectivity for twenty-first century readers with a residual knowledge of American 
poststructuralist thought, particularly Judith Butler’s. Use of the existentialist concept of ‘lived 
experience’ in this context presupposes that, contrary to Butler’s thought in Bodies That Matter 
(1993), we do indeed have a ground to existence, and that the body (independent of its 
socialisation) is that ground. While it does not follow that the body determines the nature of 
human being, it does follow that the body profoundly affects it, constituting limitations as well 
as possibilities. In short, humans experience through the body. ‘Perceived as part of lived 
experience’, writes Moi, ‘the body is a style of being, an intonation, a specific way of being 
present in the world’, which also has ‘specific physical properties’.11 Being is personal in the 
fullest sense, proceeding from our bodies. 
It could, of course, be argued that animals also experience through their bodies, in 
which case what is different about humans? While also deploring Cartesian dualism and 
emphasising the reality of the body, Berdyaev’s personalism would temper emphasis on the 
body by recalling the spiritual nature of bodies – not as a split or divide, but as something at 
the very depths of human being which reveals our connection to the divine – however this may 
be envisaged.12 On this model, to experience the world through our bodies should be a 
profoundly spiritual experience, wherein humans are neither subordinated to matter nor are 
                                                          
11 Toril Moi, What is a Woman? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 65. 
12 See Nicolas Berdyaev, Freedom and the Spirit, trans. Oliver Fielding Clarke (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1948), 
pp. 1-51. On connection to the divine, see Michel Alexander Vallon, An Apostle of Freedom: Life and Teachings 
of Nicolas Berdyaev (New York: Philosophical Library, 1960), pp. 195-210. 
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they elevated above it. There is a transactional dynamism between body and spirit, wherein 
growth in wisdom would also entail a greater sense of coherence between body and spirit.13  
Although Paint it Today is peppered with references to Midget’s body and that of others 
(the Hermaphrodite in the Louvre and her friend Althea, for example), one instance will suffice 
for discussion, because it is a substantial one that preoccupies the narrator over a number of 
pages. Standing as a young child in a ‘little flat in Chelsea’ with her mother, Midget tries to 
tell her that she, Midget, should have become more independent much sooner (39). The narrator 
articulates this experience through drawing attention to the intermingling of emotional and 
physical sensations. Images of existential correspondence, such as the aristocratic lady 
climbing the steps to the guillotine, Orestes under physical stress when holding a knife to his 
mother Clytemnestra’s throat, and a man drowning, underscore the bodily situation Midget is 
experiencing (40, 42). The effect of refracting Midget’s story of lived experience through the 
bodily immediacy of her particular present moment strengthens her cry ‘you are tyrannizing 
me. You are hurting me’ (42). By the end of the scene, Midget sobs and sees herself on the 
floor: ‘She might have been fifteen and all the ten years, her years, yet to live. All the ten years 
her mind was clamouring for’ (44).  
The strain that Midget feels – the ‘clamouring’ that she senses in herself – can be read 
as a strength; it means that she is deeply engaged in the situation, and with the evaluative 
thinking it is calling forth. The thinking materialises in a ‘little speech’ that she has rehearsed 
in her mind ‘for the last few feverish nights’ (40). Instead of ‘submitting’ to geometry and 
conversation with ‘all the girls you chose for me as friends’, Midget believes that she would 
have been better off had she ‘gone away from home when [she] was fifteen, into a shop; hats, 
dressmakers, assistant, anything, anything’ (40). Speech comes to Midget here as ‘a hot wave 
                                                          
13 For an exploration of what ‘spirit’ is and means, especially in a twentieth-century context, see Nicolas Berdyaev, 
Spirit and Reality, trans. George Reavey (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946), pp. 33-47. 
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across her brain’ (40). Thoughts rise in her mind ‘clearer, sharper, more intense and crushing 
as the anythings crowded faster and faster, with more and more fury, upon each other’s heels 
– “anything, I should have known, rather than stay at home”’ (40-41). A tussle between emotion 
and reason characterises this process. By drawing attention to her body, Midget is claiming one 
form of resistance to her mother as an individual person, even if she feels she has failed at other 
forms of resistance (not leaving home before). While consciousness of her body may have been 
more muted in her younger years, Midget recognises it as a situation, as the ground of her being 
through which she engages with the world in a conscious, dynamic fashion.  
In fact, Midget’s thought processes, which are depicted so viscerally, are consistent 
with some of the findings of current neuroscientific research, which tries to describe the ways 
in which humans deal with difficult situations, and possibly move toward some kind of 
resolution, or what Merleau-Ponty might have called, a ‘transformed structure’. When deciding 
whether or not one ‘should’ do something, the thought processes that accompany this decision 
can sometimes feel like ‘a hot wave across the brain’.14 Synthesising discourses pertinent to 
literature on wisdom and moral philosophy, Stephen S. Hall has drawn attention to the 
exploratory link between physical repulsion and moral indignation.15 ‘Emotions like 
repugnance’, writes Hall, ‘are wonderful teachers and guides, informing us at the unconscious 
but felt level about what is right and what is wrong’.16 Midget’s struggle consists of trying to 
control the emotion that threatens to overwhelm her and which eventually does: ‘It was then 
that Margaret stamped. It was then that Midget exploded’ (43). Why might Midget’s mother’s 
reference to ‘blue or pink forget-me-nots for Sissie’s bonnet’ cause Midget to ‘stamp’ the 
ground, especially when the bonnet is held to Midget’s face (43)? According to Hall’s 
understanding, it is possible that her protest at inspecting the bonnet is a somatic manifestation 
                                                          
14 Stephen S. Hall, Wisdom: From Philosophy to Neuroscience (New York: Knopf, 2010), p. 104. 
15 Ibid., p. 99. 
16 Ibid., p. 104. 
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of Midget’s accumulating distress at trying to tell her mother an emotional truth about herself. 
While more objective moral reasoning employs parts of the brain (such as the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex) associated with cognitive ‘impersonal’ deliberation, the incorporation of 
loved-ones into the moral decision-making process tenses one’s reflection, so that the ‘rational 
part of the human brain must override occasionally conflicting moral evaluations from the 
emotional part of the brain [such as the medial prefrontal cortex] in order to reach the kind of 
abstract decisions that promise the greatest benefit’, for others as well as for oneself.17 When 
Midget therefore tells her mother, ‘you are tyrannizing me. You are hurting me’, this has double 
significance (43). The statement refers to Midget’s overall feeling of oppression and need to 
escape. But the statement also refers to the pressure Midget feels to keep her mother happy. 
Deciding what one ‘ought’ or ‘should’ do (or have done), especially in such an emotional 
context of close, familial relationships, is a process ‘achieved by exhaustive, excruciatingly 
deep reflection and deliberation’ (109). It is a process which leaves Midget ‘defeated’ (44).  
Inclusion of scientific evidence relating to decision-making process underscores and 
makes clear the ways in which the body is active in human experience, especially intense 
experiences which cause us to re-evaluate what we think and feel about a given person, topic, 
problem, and so on. Paint it Today, as a representative example of H.D.’s voluminous 
autobiographical prose writing, presents personal experience as a site of potential 
transformation and, for women, resistance to determinacies which may lead to a feeling of 
oppression and even of wasted opportunity. H.D. politicises human experience by focusing on 
female interiority, and as such her autobiographical writing can be placed beside other female 
modernist autobiographical writing that attempts similar embodied moves, such as Dorothy 
Richardson’s Pilgrimage (1938) and Virginia Woolf’s Moments of Being (written 1907-36). 
H.D.’s autobiographical impetus, which resurfaces throughout this thesis, is always intensely 
                                                          
17 Ibid., p. 110. 
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personal: her fictional persona’s body is not just a site for experience, which is also true of 
animals, but something connected to her evolving sense of personality.  
While H.D. never engaged with the transactional theory of twentieth-century American 
pragmatism, it is easy to see how her representation of human experience at least approximates 
to transactional theory, especially given her amenability to existentialist conceptions of 
experience and the body. And although twentieth-century existentialism and pragmatism are 
separate schools of thought (in separate countries, France and the Untied States), Rosenblatt’s 
adoption of transactional theory at the same time as exploring the existentialism of Sartre 
indicates that, at least in this instance, H.D.’s vision of human experience, which I have argued 
is sympathetic to the existentialism of Sartre’s associates, de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, can 
be folded into more explicitly transactional understandings.  
 
The Rationale for the Transactional Theory of Experience 
In her 1978 theoretical work, The Reader, the Text, the Poem: The Transactional Theory of the 
Literary Work, Rosenblatt declared that she was influenced in the development of her 
transactional position by the existentialism in the ‘early literary works of Malraux and Sartre’.18 
She is not explicit about the nature of this influence, other than, as I noted in the Introduction, 
that these works by Malraux and Sartre ‘strengthened certain of [her] emphases’.19 By the 
fourth edition of her seminal text, Literature as Exploration (1983), Rosenblatt used the word 
‘existential’ in the sense of being an oppositional stance among adolescents toward ‘the 
Establishment’.20 Implicit in Rosenblatt’s references to existentialism in the 1970s and 1980s 
is a concern for young people’s responsibility for creating a society befitting a democracy, 
                                                          
18 Louise M. Rosenblatt, The Reader, the Text, the Poem: The Transactional Theory of the Literary Work, 
paperback ed. (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1994), p. xiv.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Louise M. Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 4th ed. (New York: MLA, 1983), p. 83. See below for a 
discussion of the various editions of this text. 
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where each person takes responsibility for his own existence, and automatic acceptance of the 
status quo is discouraged.  
Rather than drawing more extensively on twentieth-century French existentialism, 
however, Rosenblatt chose to build her theoretical approach to reading on the transactional 
model. Although she states that ‘transaction’ was (implicitly) ‘already present’ in her 1938 
edition of Literature as Exploration, it was not until the 1980s, after the publication of Reader, 
Text, Poem that ‘transaction’ appears with any degree of frequency in her work.21 In the 1980s 
and 1990s Rosenblatt produced a number of essays and interviews that employ ‘transaction’ 
and emphasise its usefulness in articulating her theory of reading. The largest and most 
significant interview is The Reminiscences of Louise Michelle Rosenblatt (conducted by Ed 
Erwin in 1982), and the most valuable essays: ‘Viewpoints: Transaction Versus Interaction – 
A Terminological Rescue Operation’ (1985), and ‘The Transactional Theory of Reading and 
Writing’ (1994), both of which are reprinted in the ‘Theory’ section of Rosenblatt’s Making 
Meaning with Texts: Selected Essays (2005).22 The fifth edition of Literature as Exploration 
(1995), which includes the essay ‘Retrospect and Prospect’, also belongs in this cluster of 
writings that explore the ramifications of ‘transaction’. Finally, although Rosenblatt 
acknowledges the psychoanalytic school of transactionalism, which was developed in the late 
1950s by Eric Berne, her use of this term in relation to experience is distinguished by its 
political overtones and removal from the psychoanalytic framework, espousing the freedom of 
the individual from authoritarian and institutional oppression.23  
                                                          
21 Louise M. Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed. (New York: MLA, 1995), p. 291. 
22 Additional pieces include ‘Literature – SOS!’, Language Arts, 68 (1991): 444-448; ‘The Literary Transaction: 
Evocation and Response’, Theory into Practice, 21 (1982): 268-277; Nicholas J. Karolides, ‘Theory and Practice: 
An Interview with Louise M. Rosenblatt’, Language Arts, 77 (1999): 158-170; Eugene F. Provenzo Jr., ‘Louise 
Rosenblatt Interview’, School of Education, University of Miami. 14 March 1999. 
http://www.education.miami.edu/ep/rosenblatt/ (accessed online, June 17 2015). 
23 Rosenblatt, Reminiscences, p. 325. 
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Rosenblatt places the emergence of transactional frames of human experience as part 
of a wider, twentieth-century paradigm shift in how scientists conceive of being, away from 
the dualisms of Descartes and his ‘view of the self as distinct to the world around 
us’.24Appropriating the terminology of Dewey’s and Bentley’s Knowing and the Known 
(1949), for Rosenblatt ‘transaction’ consisted of the alternative view that ‘the knower, the 
knowing, and the known are seen as aspects of “one process.” Each element conditions and is 
conditioned by the other in a mutually constituted situation’ (3). The shift that Dewey and 
Bentley made in their book was away from ‘interaction’, which represented an older way of 
conceiving human being in the world, which placed stress on a static nature of people and the 
environment, and towards ‘transaction’.  
While pointing out that Dewey had been thinking along transactional lines since the 
1890s, Rosenblatt appreciates the significance of the terminological transition because it 
crystallises the ethical consequences of choosing one term over another (41, 39). ‘Interaction’ 
in her writing is associated with dualisms, stasis, objectivity, and impersonalism; ‘transaction’, 
on the other hand, is more ‘organic’ and postulates a ‘living organism’ (40). In addition to 
carrying overtones of Coleridgean romanticism, Rosenblatt felt that the transactional ‘living 
organism’ is a concept amenable to ecologists, where the emphasis is placed on the individual’s 
situated position as ‘part of nature, continuously in transaction with an environment’, wherein 
each conditions the other moment by moment, as part of a ‘total situation’ (3, 40). ‘Nature’ 
should be read in this instance as a metaphor for the broader environment, for one’s habitat, as 
well as denoting the natural world of plants and animals.25  
                                                          
24 Louise Rosenblatt, Making Meaning with Texts: Selected Essays (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2005), p. 2. 
Further references to this text are given in parentheses in the main body. 
25 Rosenblatt never drew upon ecocriticism, although her understanding of ‘environment’ echoes ecocriticism’s 
interest in the relationship between nature and culture. See Greg Gerrard (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Ecocriticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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I believe that Rosenblatt was particularly attracted to the transactional approach because 
it offered her a clear way out of the kind of scientific thinking she was engaged in during the 
1930s, while also being amenable to theoretical clarity, and thus the new theory presented her 
with a gentle departure from her social scientific studies. While working as an instructor in 
English at Barnard College from 1928 to 1938 Rosenblatt undertook further graduate work, 
this time in anthropology, working under the guidance of renowned anthropologists Franz Boas 
and Ruth Benedict, and benefiting from her friendship and intermittent cohabitation with 
Margaret Mead. Boas and Benedict appear in Rosenblatt’s 1938 Literature as Exploration as 
methodological exemplars, as people who pioneered an ethnographic approach to the study of 
other cultures, as well as those who advocated a tolerant approach to human differences. For 
Rosenblatt, the anthropological method of Boas, Benedict, and Mead offered a scientific 
method for thinking about students’ experiences with literature – with the ways in which 
students encountered human relations in an anthropological way during the literary experience. 
By turning to Dewey’s transactional theory, Rosenblatt was able to deepen her theoretical 
approach and attend to her political concerns at the same time as retaining a mildly scientific 
stance which avoided what she believed to be the excesses of analytic philosophy 
(behaviourism and logical positivism).  
When Rosenblatt says in ‘Retrospect and Prospect’ (1990-95), for instance, that the 
New Criticism prevailed in post-war America because of a range of causes related to an overall 
fetishisation of science, she reveals her via media. On the one hand, she deplored what she 
thought of as the ‘postwar glorification of science, fueled by fear of Soviet scientific 
superiority’, which suited ‘an intellectual climate of narrow empiricism in which behaviorism 
dominated psychology and logical positivism reigned in philosophy’.26 And yet her own 
                                                          
26 Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed., pp. 289-90. 
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methods of theoretical development relied on empirical studies, as she herself admitted.27 
Rosenblatt was attracted to Dewey because, his politics aside, he suited her preference for the 
matter-of-fact responses to complex problems. Thinkers who seek to build on or evaluate 
Rosenblatt’s transactional approach must at some point reconcile themselves to the limitations 
inherent in her qualified reification of science; although, as we shall see, the scientific element 
is further mitigated somewhat by Rosenblatt’s less controlled, more individualised exploration 
of literature’s potential to nurture personal growth.   
Rosenblatt’s colleague and friend at New York University (NYU), Gordon M. Pradl 
(see Chapter 2 for further discussion of his work), has found it regrettable that she should have 
been so pedantic about the precision of her terminology, describing to me ‘her need to have the 
last word, to hold fast to the notion that no one else was quite capable of fully articulating and 
thus understanding the full import of her theory / wisdom’.28 Although this tendency may, as 
Pradl points out, present a challenge to Rosenblatt’s espousal of democratic practices, 
Rosenblatt makes it clear that it is not the words themselves – their denotations – which pose 
the problem, but rather their connotations or associations in the minds of other people.29 
Whereas the language for ‘transaction’ is ‘living organism’, the language for ‘interaction’ is 
that of the ‘machine’.30 And herein lies the ethics of terminology, and thus the need to get it 
right: ‘transaction’ is a move away from the mechanistic colouring of ‘interaction’. Translated 
to individuals and their experiences, asserting the transactional way of being in the world was 
a way for Rosenblatt of representing the activity of individuals in ‘having an experience’, and 
by extension, in marshalling their thought to the challenge of living in a democratic society, 
                                                          
27 Ibid., p. 290. 
28 Gordon M. Pradl, email to the author, July 4, 2015. 
29 Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, p. 40. 
30 Ibid. 
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where choice is ranged against subservience to authoritarianism.31 Seen biographically, 
transactional philosophy offered Rosenblatt a professional pathway for honing her deeper 
commitments to romantic visions of the uniqueness of the human person (see below). 
If Dewey provided Rosenblatt with the term ‘transaction’ in order to describe the 
human’s way of existing in the world, Dewey’s fellow pragmatist, the Harvard philosopher 
William James, helped Rosenblatt develop an understanding of the way in which individuals 
experience the world. Rosenblatt was especially drawn to James’s concept of ‘selective 
attention’, which James explored in his two-volume The Principles of Psychology (1890). 
Rather than turn more directly to phenomenology, Rosenblatt saw James as anticipating the 
work of the German phenomenologist, Edmund Husserl, and therefore found it sufficient to 
turn to the master rather than the pupil. In any case, Rosenblatt found Husserl’s idealist 
framework ‘uncongenial’ to her overall transactional, post-foundational approach, which the 
pragmatists were championing at the turn of the century.32  
According to Rosenblatt’s understanding of James’s philosophy, ‘we are constantly 
selecting out of the stream, or field, of consciousness’.33 This requires foregrounding on the 
one hand and ‘pushing into the background’ on the other.34 In Literature as Exploration 
Rosenblatt likened James’s famous phrase ‘stream of consciousness’ to a ‘swishing over the 
surface of the mind’.35 Selective attention counteracts what Rosenblatt refers to as the 
‘emptiness’ of this swishing.36  
                                                          
31 For an alternative reading of Rosenblatt’s use of Dewey’s ‘transaction’, see Mark Dressman and Joan Parker 
Webster, ‘Retracing Rosenblatt: “A Textual Archaeology”’, Research in the Teaching of English, 36 (2001): 110-
45, pp. 135-37. 
32 Rosenblatt, Reader, Text, Poem, p. xiv. See William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 (New York: 
Henry Holt, 1890), pp. 284-86. 
33 Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, p. 3. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed., p. 105.  
36 Ibid.  
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It is characteristic of Rosenblatt’s work that in the context of formulating her theory, it 
is often only a tiny aspect of another thinker’s work that is explicitly grafted into her own. 
Dewey’s preference for transaction over interaction, and James’s notion of selective attention 
are recurring themes in Rosenblatt’s writing, and chime on some levels with the existentialist 
currents in her work. By de-contextualising these concepts from their originators’ own work, 
Rosenblatt reinforces the distinctiveness of her own theory and stakes out her territory as an 
original thinker rather than as a critic (explicator) of other people’s thought.  
By the 1980s Rosenblatt’s use of selective attention in her work had been further 
influenced by Gestalt psychology and latterly by cognitive psychology. Rosenblatt 
acknowledges having read the Austro-Hungarian-born psychologist, Max Wertheimer.37 She 
also reports being involved with Gestalt experiments organised by Adelbert Ames and Hadley 
Cantril at the New School for Social Research in Manhattan.38 These experiments sought to 
bring to light the way an individual’s perception works with ‘tentative Gestalts’.39 Cognitive 
psychology translates ‘tentative frameworks’ into ‘image schemas’ and ‘idealised cognitive 
models’ (ICMs), and if they are shared, as ‘cultural models’.40 Cognitive psychology also 
draws attention to an individual’s selective attention, whereby ‘attention’ and ‘neglect’ are 
forms of mental activity that foreground ‘figure’ and push ‘ground’ into the recess, which 
emphasise one thing over another.41 Rosenblatt was attracted to these ideas because, on the one 
hand, they emphasised the activity of the individual in negotiating a new experience, and on 
the other, they highlighted the equipment an individual brings to this negotiation by way of 
tentative frameworks. In the transactional experience, the individual is actively involved in 
making an experience meaningful for herself, by way of mental activity oriented to selection.  
                                                          
37 Rosenblatt, Reminiscences, p. 322. Rosenblatt references Wertheimer’s Productive Thinking (1945). 
38 Ibid., p. 324. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Peter Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 33.  
41 Ibid., p. 18.  
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Rosenblatt’s decision to link, albeit tentatively and intuitively, James’s theory of 
selective attention and the later work of cognitive psychology, further underscores her 
underlying preference for scientific frameworks for developing her particular theory. Yet the 
way in which Rosenblatt touches on such scientific ideas means that she softens the rather 
detached and clinical way in which these ideas are originally couched. Rosenblatt’s connection 
between James’s pragmatism (and indirectly, to his romanticism and transcendentalism) and 
later, cognitive science, against a backdrop of broader commitment to romantic and 
existentialist ideas of human experience means that her transactional approach represents a 
deepening of, rather than a detachment from, H.D.’s broadly existential framing of human 
experience.  
H.D.’s approximation to the philosophy of de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty constitutes 
similar concentrations to Rosenblatt; for example, on the individual’s negotiation of new 
experiences in the context of a broader process of personal growth and resistance to the 
establishment. Where Midget’s experience is explored by concentrating on the visceral nature 
of her thought processes, which impact her body, Rosenblatt’s tacit commitment to the findings 
of cognitive psychology represent a more concerted attempt to explain in more analytic 
language how an individual engages in selective attention in order to make an experience 
meaningful to him. For example, faced with a ‘new situation in life’ – a new experience – 
according to Rosenblatt, the individual needs to ‘understand his own emotional response to the 
person or situation’.42 This understanding will be coloured by ICMs or the ‘intentional arc’ 
with which the individual attends to or neglects aspects of a situation. Of course, sometimes 
‘preoccupations and prejudices may have led him to exaggerate some things and ignore 
others’.43 And so the individual ‘has to bring his basic moral or psychological assumptions 
                                                          
42 Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed., p. 215.  
43 Ibid.  
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[embedded or sedimented in his intentional arc or ICMs] out into the open to test the validity 
of their application to this new situation’.44 Emotional conflict, which may cause a distortion 
of perception based on incongruous ICMs, encapsulates the transactional nature of an 
experience, wherein the individual is dynamically part of the situation – an active participant. 
 According to Rosenblatt, the individual is charged with an important responsibility to 
counter the empty ‘swishing’ over in the stream of consciousness with selective attention and 
the critique of ICMs. As with Midget in Paint it Today, in order for a person to grow and 
become critical of received wisdom, she must be encouraged to find ways of focusing her 
attention on how she constructs an experience in her mind. As Dewey maintains in his Art as 
Experience (1934), to have an experience requires a certain kind of attention towards that 
experience; it requires a mental activity which is conscious of being witness to and actively 
creating an experience, which typically has a beginning, a middle, and an end.45 Evidently 
therefore, such ‘experiences’ are focused, and are likely to be unique according to the 
individual concerned, determining which events and situations to pay special attention to. 
However, one could also argue that the pressures of modernity were beginning to undermine 
the capacity to construct such a storied experience, which is apparent in some modernist 
writing, such as Woolf’s ‘moments of being’.46 Yet the importance of emphasising the 
possibility of a focused experience may for Rosenblatt have been that much greater, given the 
nature of contemporary pressures on individuals. 
For Midget, however, her attention is fixed on an argument with her mother, which 
holds important meaning for her because it represents a pivotal moment in her life, when a 
course of action is either opened or closed to her. Such experiences are not likely to occur every 
                                                          
44 Ibid.  
45 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Penguin, 2005), p. 58. 
46 See Bryony Randall, Modernism, Daily Time and Everyday Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
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day, and Rosenblatt’s transactional theory of experience is similarly realistic in recognising 
that there is a necessary banality to life which makes ‘having an experience’ all the more 
important, because it does not happen at every moment of every day.47 Rosenblatt’s 
engagement with the Jamesian notion of ‘stream of consciousness’ therefore differs in part 
from that of Joyce and Woolf, whom Rosenblatt acknowledges reading in the 1920s as their 
novels were published.48 While advising her students to grow in awareness about particular 
moments of heightened experience – moments of tension which require increased focus – 
Rosenblatt cautions against an overly introspective and insular mentality in her students.  
Selective attention to experience is the organising principle of Rosenblatt’s advocacy 
that students develop their own philosophy of life, to help them avoid passing passively through 
life, subject to the whims of others. Rosenblatt began advocating a philosophy of life in her 
editorial comment for The Barnard Bulletin between 1923-24. Here she rejected the concept 
of college ‘as a place where experts are trained for the punctiliously accurate administration of 
our complex industrial machinery’ and stressed instead that the student ‘should be able to 
comprehend the machine in its entirety’ – to be critical of it, in other words.49 Such critical 
activity, which derives from an evolving ‘student philosophy’, would assess the value of 
academic study and its relationship to ‘actual life’ and the ‘development of […] a well-rounded 
personality’.50 Eschewing a mechanistic conception of life and espousing a discriminating 
attitude of mind attentive to ‘actual life’ are the means of nourishing a ‘well-rounded 
personality’ which is, most importantly, capable of evaluating ‘new trends of opinions’ and 
forming ‘new values’.51  
                                                          
47 Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration 5th ed., p. 32. 
48 Rosenblatt, Reminiscences, p. 259. 
49 [Louise M. Rosenblatt], ‘Comment’, The Barnard Bulletin, November 2, 1923, p. 2. 
50 [Louise M. Rosenblatt], ‘Comment’, The Barnard Bulletin, January 18, 1924, p. 2. 
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It is difficult to say whether Rosenblatt was influenced by Dewey at this stage in her 
career, but her commitment to the development of ‘well-rounded’ individuals capable of living 
meaningful lives in an American democracy certainly chimes with Dewey’s ideas about 
education – ideas which Rosenblatt imbibed more consciously a decade later in her work for 
the Progressive Education Association.52 Importantly, such ideas differed from the later, post-
war ‘life adjustment’ movement in American higher education, which sought to cater to the 
vastly increased numbers attending college due to the 1944 G.I. Bill. ‘Life adjustment’ was 
problematic for Rosenblatt because it represented ‘an anti-intellectualistic effort to prepare 
pupils to serve, to “adjust” to the needs of the status quo’, which ‘was confused with the 
progressives’ concern for meeting the needs of students. The progressives sought rather to help 
them to develop their capacities to the full, a view of education assuming a democratically 
mobile society’.53 
In the 1930s, with one eye on the totalitarian threats in Europe, Rosenblatt set the 
evaluation of opinion and the formation of new values as a crucial activity of literary study that 
could connect this activity to the world of the individual student. In her essay, ‘Retrospect and 
Prospect’, Rosenblatt reminds her readers that in 1938 ‘democracy was being threatened by 
fascism in Italy and totalitarian governments in Germany and Russia’, and draws attention to 
more recent events concerning the collapse of Eastern European communist regimes.54 Present 
in both the 1995 and 1938 editions of Literature as Exploration is Rosenblatt’s claim that 
unpreparedness to think independently – or exercise a ‘discriminating attitude of mind’ – makes 
it more likely that ‘the young man and woman [will] seek to return to the infantile state in 
which there is no responsibility to make decisions; they are thus willing to blindly follow some 
                                                          
52 Rosenblatt often referenced Dewey’s 1938 Experience and Education. 
53 Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed., pp. 288-89. On the growth of progressive education, see John 
Howlett, Progressive Education: A Critical Introduction (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
54 Ibid., p. 296. 
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“leader” whose tools they become’.55 It is important to note here that Rosenblatt grew up with 
a working-class father who, at the age of fifteen, resisted and escaped imperial Russia and 
arrived at the port of Baltimore to pursue a new life where he could be freer than he was in 
Russia.56 Perhaps this family history, recalled by Rosenblatt on numerous occasions in later 
life, meant that she set the bar rather high for the possibilities of individual agency (see Chapter 
3 for further discussion of Rosenblatt’s interest in democracy).57  
Nevertheless, if Rosenblatt partly developed her thinking out of her own experience 
(see below), she sought generalisation of it sufficiently to give direction to her transactional 
approach. Her belief in the importance of selecting values by which to live is a fundamental 
stream of thought throughout Rosenblatt’s career, from the 1920s to the 2000s, and as such 
makes Rosenblatt a deeply American thinker, descending from the American pragmatists who 
sought to create new ways of thinking after the Civil War of the 1860s.58 When Ann E. Berthoff 
wrote that ‘Louise Rosenblatt makes me proud to be an American’, she was referring to 
Rosenblatt’s very American approach to cultural problems, in this case the value of literary 
studies for the wider society.59 A pragmatic selectivity of values among students was central 
to this vision. 
As I draw this half of the chapter to a close, it should be remembered that Rosenblatt’s 
transactional theory of human experience consists of three main elements. Firstly, she adopted 
the term ‘transaction’ in order to emphasise an individual’s dynamic engagement with the 
world, to stress experiences as conditioning people who in turn condition experiences. 
                                                          
55 Ibid., p. 123. 
56 Jonathan Ratner in an email to the author, July 13, 2015. 
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Secondly, she appropriated James’s concept of ‘selective attention’ in order to highlight the 
work that goes in to ‘having an experience’ in the meaningful sense of the term. Rather than 
succumbing to the empty ‘swishing’ of the stream-of-consciousness, Rosenblatt encourages 
individuals to focus on potentially meaningful experiences and to shape them in their thinking. 
Finally, Rosenblatt extends this preoccupation with selective attention to the formation of 
people’s philosophies of life, to the stirrings of wisdom. As with H.D., Rosenblatt sees the path 
to progress in the struggles individuals undertake to resist the pressures of conformity.  
Where H.D. is more imaginative in her depiction of human experience, Rosenblatt’s 
political concerns temper her obvious inclination to scientific exploration of human experience; 
they make her more of a maverick in terms of staking out an original approach to existing 
scientific concepts (such as transaction and selective attention). Indeed, Rosenblatt’s individual 
approach manifests in her style of writing, which cherry picks the thought of others to develop 
her own line of thinking, which is entirely consistent with what she is advocating other people 
do also: develop a personal philosophy.  
My central purpose, therefore, in examining how Rosenblatt and H.D. explore human 
experience is to theorise a vision of experience which is constructed. Even though an 
experience may emerge by way of epiphanies and successive ‘moments of being’, the 
important point is that when reflecting on an experience, the individual is actively involved in 
making meaning from it, which in turn feeds into the development of a philosophy of life that 
brings us into the domain of wisdom. I will now turn to the ways in which Rosenblatt and H.D. 
draw attention to the individual, and how they came to do so. Having theorised experience for 
the purposes of this thesis, I now theorise the individual, and so complete the groundwork of 
my personalist approach to literary experience and the quest for wisdom. 
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Commitment to the Individual 
Personal Contexts 
Befitting a personalist outlook, a commitment to the individual among my thinkers was born 
of personal experiences. If a commitment to the individual can be said to be a revelation about 
something universally profound about the human person – applicable in all times and places – 
then it is worth bearing in mind that for personalists ‘revelation’ is usually something which 
emerges from within before it finds expression in concrete forms of commitment.60 For 
Rosenblatt and for H.D., a commitment to the individual began as an intuition and as an 
experience immanent in their lives. It is therefore necessary to proceed from assessing the 
personal contexts of this commitment among my thinkers before looking at their 
manifestations.   
 Rosenblatt’s commitment to the individual is fairly easy to delineate because she 
explored this extensively from an autobiographical angle in the 1980s and 1990s. In her 1982 
interview for Columbia University, Rosenblatt revealed that growing up she had been 
‘enveloped in an atmosphere in which there was constant thinking about the importance of the 
individual and the need for the individual’s right to develop freely and fully’.61 Her father, 
Samuel, encouraged Rosenblatt in her early reading, which highlighted Charles T. Sprading’s 
anthology of writing, Liberty and the Great Libertarians (1913). More than an abstract 
philosophical ideal, Rosenblatt was attracted to the lives of people, often Europeans as well as 
Americans, who exhibited a marked degree of individuality and purpose in defending the rights 
of others to live a free and full life. Moreover, being named after the French nineteenth-century 
anarchist Louise Michel exerted a strong influence on Rosenblatt’s commitment to the 
individual. ‘I had this image of being named after a woman who had been a leader and an 
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achiever […] She fought on the barricades and so on’.62 It is significant that Rosenblatt focuses 
on such nouns for describing human character, especially ‘achiever’. It was a feature of 
Rosenblatt’s American, pragmatist turn of mind that high ideals had to be translated into actual 
practice: ‘it was very important if you were going to improve the world (and obviously for 
somebody who was named [after] Joan of Arc of the Poor, this was part of my image of myself), 
that you had to do something’.63  
As with intellectual matters, Rosenblatt and her father shared their ideas about politics 
and when speaking of her early political activities, Rosenblatt implies that she and her father 
were of one mind in all things political. Early in her life her father’s commitment to the ideas 
of the Russian anarchist philosopher, Petr Kropotkin, particularly ‘mutual aid’, served to direct 
Rosenblatt in the way of individuals helping each other rather than competing excessively with 
one another.64 Although politically broadly libertarian, in the 1920s and 1930s Louise and 
Samuel supported Norman Thomas of the Socialist Party of America, before switching their 
allegiance to Franklin D. Roosevelt, because they felt that Roosevelt could meet the challenge 
of the Great Depression better than Thomas and the Socialists.65 Later, in the 1960s, long after 
Samuel Rosenblatt had died, Louise and her husband, Sidney Ratner, were politically active in 
supporting civil rights because they saw these as fundamental to a democracy. ‘I cannot recall 
when we were not members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People’, Louise noted in 1982.66 Moreover, Rosenblatt recalled supporting the efforts of Martin 
Luther King, Jr., but resisted the attempts of the Black Panthers to push King’s calls for change 
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in a more extreme direction, because she dreaded the road to separatism, which she saw as 
antagonistic to a pluralistic, democratic society (see Chapter 3).67  
Rosenblatt’s commitment to the individual must therefore be seen against the backdrop 
of an equally important commitment to democracy, which requires that individuals co-operate 
in building a society which is conducive to others as well as to oneself. Rosenblatt’s 
commitment to the individual was an intuition moulded by conversations with her father; it 
manifested later in life in the explicit formulations of her beliefs as well as political activism, 
defending democracy in order to defend the individual. The moment one finds stress on one 
element in her writing (democracy or the individual), one encounters the other. The only way 
to reconcile these two emphases, on the micro and the macro, is to see them as facets of 
Rosenblatt’s overall intellectual sympathies, which she reconciled on the basis that they 
answered the problem of the needs of the individual and the needs of society. That is, her 
sympathy with romanticism and existentialism, which traditionally prioritise the individual as 
the primary unit of reference for creating value in life, co-existed with an active interest in 
socialist politics. Rosenblatt’s pragmatism simply acted as a channelling force for translating 
broad principles into action, which for her involved political campaigning, from door-to-door 
canvassing in New York City, to applying pressure on political figures regarding policy 
changes, particularly in education.68 Of course, her commitment to the individual also 
translated into a specific theory of literary study which Rosenblatt expounded and developed 
over a number of decades, to be explored shortly.  
H.D.’s commitment to the individual, on the other hand, is more diffuse because she 
never engaged directly with politics in the way that Rosenblatt did throughout her life. H.D.’s 
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commitment to the individual is simultaneously a commitment to herself – to defining a sense 
of herself against the definitions provided by others. She focused her interest on the individual 
through exploring the effect of conflict within the bounds of human experience, from her own 
marital struggles to the global conflict of world war. H.D.’s creative development began in the 
early modernist years of the 1910s, which in some instances was casting off the shackles of 
dominant discourses such as nineteenth-century liberalism.69 As Rachel Potter has observed, 
modernists like H.D. and D. H. Lawrence absorbed a range of liberal ideas, but H.D. and 
Lawrence were also influenced by the German philosopher Max Stirner, whose concept of the 
‘egoist’ posited ‘an individual who “owns” himself, “knows” himself, and returns “into” 
himself’.70 Echoing the little magazine of that name, in which H.D. and Lawrence published, 
egoism permits the individual the freedom to ‘create his own understanding of the world’, 
which in Lawrence’s case is demonstrated in poetry collections such as Look! We have come 
through! (1917) and Pansies (1919).71 
Lawrence may have been ambivalent about ‘egoism’ as a term, particularly from 1914, 
when he considered egoism to be the ‘epitome of modern irreverence, the particular spiritual 
malady of the modern soul’.72 But as Clark and Potter admit, Lawrence eschewed one 
conception of the individual to promote another – what Potter terms ‘singularity’.73 The idea 
of ‘singularity’ anticipates my later discussion in Chapter 4 of Derek Attridge’s use of this 
term, which focuses on the particular, individual nature of reading literature as a singular event 
in time. In the context of H.D.’s writing, however, to be ‘singular’ is to find a way of developing 
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the self, of becoming free from the status quo. H.D. was concerned to ‘highlight experience in 
its immediacy’ (as in Paint it Today), and to expand ‘the possibilities of perception’.74 
As for other modernists, such as Woolf, Mansfield, and Lawrence, the First World War 
intensified H.D.’s preoccupation with the experience of individuals and the forms of 
individualism in the Western world. In a post-war review of W. B. Yeats’s collection of poems, 
Responsibilities (1916), H.D. recognises the struggles of artists in the 1890s to resist the 
oppressive denouncements of so-called ‘Philistines’, but claims that the war’s intensification 
of technological mastery has had a devastating effect on the way people experience beauty, and 
thus enrichment in their lives.75 H.D.’s reference to her group of artists in this essay as les 
jeunes echoes her similar exploration of the challenges facing her group in Bid Me to Live 
(1960). Although not the ‘lost generation’ of the 1920s – the American expatriates in Paris with 
whom Rosenblatt was affiliated (see Introduction) – H.D.’s group (Richard Aldington, the 
Lawrences, Dorothy Yorke, Cecil Gray) was ‘lost actually in fact, doomed by the stars in their 
courses, an actuality, holocaust to Mars, not blighted, not anaemic, but wounded, but dying, 
but dead’.76 By casting her sense of loss and care for individuals with which she is intimate in 
the language of astronomy and astrology, H.D. universalises her war experience at the same 
time as alluding to the characteristically individualistic nature of astrology, which positions the 
individual at the centre of the natal chart.  
In his history of Bloomsbury responses to the First World War, Jonathan Atkin argues 
more generally for a ‘notion of a person standing apart from the war and feeling an aesthetic 
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or humanistic reaction against it’.77 By ‘humanistic’ Atkin means its ‘formal meaning, that of 
Classical studies and literary culture and an intellectual order that placed the mind of man and 
human interests first’.78 Atkin is locating an area of activity which was pitted against the values 
inherent in war, where individuals are subordinated to national interests. Although not phrased 
in the language of humanism, H.D.’s modernist concern in ‘Responsibilities’ is to claim that 
war survivors have a responsibility to invoke the aesthetic in order to create a world alternative 
to the technological trajectory that led to the efficiency of slaughter in the war. H.D. is 
suggesting that the search for beauty is an ethical response to the evil of war – a response which 
is personalistic because this search is conducted by and for individual persons rather than the 
interests of an aggregate, such as the nation. 
Having given an indication of how Rosenblatt and H.D. arrived at a commitment to the 
individual, I now wish to show in more detail how they manifested this commitment, especially 
in relation to the experience of being a student. As thinkers interested in learning and personal 
growth, Rosenblatt and H.D. also naturally draw attention to the experiences of learners who 
are concrete persons as well. For Rosenblatt, this had a tangible impact on the nature of her 
theory of reading and the context in which she set literary studies. For H.D., her own sense of 
failure at a college education found expression in prose writing which asserts personal ways of 
approaching knowledge. 
 
The Student’s Experience 
In her biography of H.D., Barbara Guest claims that H.D.’s failure at Bryn Mawr College was 
not down to ill health, as H.D. herself hinted, but instead to a sense of shame at failing English 
and scoring near-failures in her other subjects, as well as the pressures of being Ezra Pound’s 
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friend.79 H.D. entered Bryn Mawr in 1905 and became friends with fellow students William 
Carlos Williams and Marianne Moore, while Pound was studying at the University of 
Pennsylvania. However, H.D. left in her mid-sophomore year. When she entered Bryn Mawr 
she was fairly unschooled: her knowledge consisted of ‘fairy tales, myths, music, Moravian 
legends’.80 In addition to her subjects at Bryn Mawr, Pound introduced her to ‘the troubadours, 
Provence, William Morris, Algernon Swinburne’ as well as ‘the classics – Latin and Greek 
poets; Henrik Ibsen, Count Maurice Maeterlinck, even yoga, whatever his greedy mind picked 
up’.81 On the one hand, Pound denounced nineteenth-century American poets (especially Henry 
Longfellow), but on the other hand he chose late English romantics such as Morris and 
Swinburne to energise his modernising impulses, as well as drawing upon the exotic European 
traditions of the much earlier Provençal troubadours. As his 1916 poem, ‘A Pact’ suggests, 
Pound gradually reconciled himself to some of the strengths of his poetic predecessors (with 
Walt Whitman, in this case): ‘We have one sap and one root – / Let there be commerce between 
us’, he declares.82 Yet for H.D., Pound’s enthusiasms were all a bit much. As Guest puts it: 
‘The truth was that she was facing dual worlds: an authoritarian institute of learning, and an 
equally authoritarian poet. It was either Ezra Pound or Bryn Mawr. “Remember,” wrote Hilda 
[to her friend, Mary Herr] about her abrupt departure, “I was an outcast.”’83  
 In her novel, HERmione (written 1927), H.D. explores this sense of feeling like an 
‘outcast’. The novel concentrates on the period immediately following her departure from Bryn 
Mawr, around 1906. When H.D.’s daughter, Perdita, wrote an introductory essay to HERmione, 
she talked of opening Pandora’s Box in looking back at her mother’s early years: ‘As I expected, 
                                                          
79 Barbara Guest, Herself Defined: The Poet H.D. and Her World (London: Collins, 1985), p. 5. 
80 Ibid., p. 4. 
81 Ibid.  
82 Ezra Pound, ‘A Pact’ in Margaret Ferguson et al., The Norton Anthology of Poetry, 5th ed. (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2005), p. 1269.  
83 Quoted in ibid., p. 5. 
 61 
 
there are skeletons and poltergeists. But uplift too, illuminations. I’m learning so much – a 
scholar’s pupil, trailing them in a postgraduate course of my own’.84 It is suitably ironic that 
Perdita conceived of exploring HERmione in terms of an advanced university education given 
that the impetus for her mother’s writing the novel in the first place was a need to come to terms 
with her feelings surrounding her own educational failure. On the other hand, perhaps Perdita’s 
comment reclaims her mother’s experience as instructive in itself, questioning whether H.D.’s 
‘failure’ was really a failure. Perdita is coming to terms with the past in the language of a 
‘postgraduate course’ replete with ‘skeletons and poltergeists’, supernatural figures which are 
also (usually) ‘outcasts’ in academic, university environments.  
 H.D.’s language in HERmione is unhinged rather than fixed; first and third-person 
pronouns are interchanged; states of being are repeated; words appear and then reappear. Rather 
than recalling her experience in linear progression and in clear language with straightforward 
syntax, H.D. causes her language to buckle in the same way that she felt her life buckling at the 
time:  
Only now she knew that failing at the end meant fresh barriers, fresh 
chains, a mesh here. The degree almost gained would have been 
redemption, something she hardly realized, tutoring or something, 
teaching … something she had an inkling would bring her in, would 
have brought her in a ‘salary.’85 
Recalling Midget’s thoughts in Paint it Today, Hermione Gart moves the attention in the 
direction of employment through extensive use of hypotaxis. As with the ‘anythings’ which 
crowd upon Midget’s heels in Paint it Today, in this passage the ‘somethings’ crowd on one 
another, while information is slowly leaked through subordinate clauses which delve into the 
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narrator’s psyche: ‘would bring her in’ (a general statement of possibility) is then followed by 
‘would have brought her in a “salary”’ (greater specificity with the pathos of the hypothetical). 
Through the staggered release of this information we feel Hermione’s struggle, and perhaps 
sense her pain in not only failing her education, but in being denied the opportunity to become 
an educator herself.  
 It is the distinction in HERmione between academic and especially scientific language, 
and Hermione’s more personal way of expressing her emotional states, which is especially 
striking, and gestures at her attempt to reclaim her learning experience from failure according 
to external authorities. Writing her novel in 1927, H.D. is conscious of the gap between her 
understanding of psychology then and what she had understood back in the late 1900s. Principal 
among such new understandings are the concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis: ‘Words that had 
not (in Philadelphia) been invented, beat about [the household]: Oedipus complex, inferiority 
complex, claustrophobia. Words beat and sizzled and a word bent backward like a saw in a 
sawmill reversed, turned inward, to work horrible destruction’ (15). Rather than concepts such 
as the Oedipus complex doing positive work in helping Hermione to understand how she is 
feeling, H.D. is suggesting that retrospective knowledge is bittersweet. H.D. sees the language 
of psychoanalysis working forcibly and invisibly around Hermione, somewhat detached from 
her; its concepts are unable to help her, and instead ‘work horrible destruction’. ‘The catch 
was’, says the narrator, ‘that her perception was ahead of her definition. She could put no name 
to the things she apprehended’ (13). Unable to grasp either the language of psychoanalysis or 
the scientific language of her brothers and father (a professor of astronomy at the University of 
Pennsylvania), H.D. moves the attention to her perception and apprehension and finds suitable 
ways of expressing this which resist the mastery of scientific definition.  
 In fact, Hermione is deeply preoccupied with the process of naming in HERmione. ‘The 
mind of Her Gart was a patchwork of indefinable association’, writes H.D. (24). Rather than 
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trying to define herself according to the logic of others (focusing on her failure as a formal 
student, for example), Hermione turns to Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale and through 
association finds a way of perceiving her experience and her personality. ‘I am out of The 
Winter’s Tale’, says Hermione (32). Hermione focuses on Perdita’s famous speech in Act IV 
Scene iii, which includes the lines ‘Daffodils, / That come before the swallow dares, and take / 
The winds of March with beauty’, and quotes ‘lilies of all kinds’ (32). Hermione links ‘lilies of 
all kinds’ to water scenery and imagines ‘water lying filled with weeds and lily-pads … lilies 
of all kinds … became even more fluid, was being taken up and up, element (out of chemistry) 
became vapour’ (32).  
Through reading her experience of being unsettled and displaced onto The Winter’s 
Tale, Hermione is able to extract herself from a situation in which she feels increasingly 
submerged, and begin to name herself: ‘She said, “HER, HER, HER. I am Her, I am Hermione 
… I am the word AUM.” This frightened her’ (32). ‘AUM’ is a variant of the ancient Eastern 
concept of Om found in the Upanishads, which is really an oral sound expressive of an inner 
self, an inner energy – something personal. What frightens Hermione is the bringing into 
existence of a name which is expressive rather than definitive of her evolving sense of self. 
Susan Stanford Friedman has read H.D.’s autobiographical prose in terms of narrative 
personalism and argues that for H.D., ‘words, most especially names, were potent forces that 
not only signified, but also called into being what they named’.86 Although Friedman focuses 
on H.D.’s noms de plume, her insights are pertinent to HERmione also: ‘names were texts that 
could be read for the selves they constructed, for the “spell” they cast in an endless process of 
self-conscious self-making’.87 By repeating to herself ‘I am Her, I am Hermione’, Hermione 
focuses her associative, patchwork thinking which perceives connections and apprehends 
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mysteries that are beyond the boundaries of external authorities such as scientific language. She 
is also calling herself into existence as a person, as an existential subject.  
 Feeling the ‘fresh barriers, fresh chains, a mesh here’ by remaining at home under 
fraught conditions (Pound’s looming presence, her mother’s domineering attitude, and her 
sister-in-law’s cohabitation), H.D., through Hermione, feels the scientific element about her in 
an oppressive way. Her response is to try and cultivate a personality which has a different 
attitude towards learning, one which is not bound, as Guest says, by the ‘authoritarian’ nature 
of Bryn Mawr or Pound, who prescribed reading for her which eventually overwhelmed her. ‘I 
am the word AUM’ is an explicit attempt at aligning herself with a different kind of identity, 
one which is focused in an inward way upon emotional energy. In some ways by writing 
HERmione H.D. was selecting out of her life those aspects which make an experience in the 
Peircean sense of the term, and part of her method was to engage Hermione with her namesake 
in The Winter’s Tale, thus validating Hermione’s distinctive turn of mind which departed from 
the established ways under whose standards she was deemed a failure.  
Rosenblatt began teaching a year after H.D. wrote HERmione, and although she taught 
in institutions somewhat different to Bryn Mawr, in New York City, Rosenblatt was 
nevertheless conscious of the ways in which students came to the study of literature as whole 
persons, whose lives beyond the classroom shaped their experiences with literature and vice 
versa. One wonders whether H.D. would have had more success in formal English studies if 
she had been able to approach literature in an exploratory manner, after the fashion of Literature 
as Exploration. 
 Part of the impetus behind Rosenblatt’s 1938 Literature as Exploration was to advance 
a mode of learning and teaching which was focused on seminar-style discussion, against a 
dominant transmission model of learning which manifested in the lecture syllabus then 
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predominating in the universities in the early decades of twentieth-century America.88 
Rosenblatt’s advocacy of de-centered teaching was well thought through and was deeply 
connected to her political orientation, which favoured democratic style conversations more than 
lectures that could easily communicate (indirectly) the idea that there was only one way to read 
a given text or approach a particular topic. Because Rosenblatt tended to focus her attentions 
on young adults, she was especially sensitive to the fact that such people were still in the 
formative years of their life, and thus especially impressionable. By promoting democratic 
conversations about literary experiences, Rosenblatt hoped to clear the path of potential 
obstacles to the kinds of encounters she hoped students would have with literature under her 
vision of literary studies. Turning to Rosenblatt after a discussion of H.D.’s experience as a 
student helps to generalise H.D.’s personal experience, and see how literary studies might be 
moulded by a firm commitment to the individual. 
 Rosenblatt’s 1938 Literature as Exploration was ‘written on the rebound’ from work 
completed for the U.S. Progressive Education Association’s Commission on Human Relations 
from 1935-36, which released her from teaching commitments at Barnard (she was still an 
instructor at this point).89 This Commission was ‘charged with the responsibility of helping 
young people with the urgent problems of personal and social living today’.90 The 1938 edition 
of Literature as Exploration is Rosenblatt’s most explicitly reader-centred and practical work; 
indeed, perhaps the work most overtly concerned with the individual – or with ‘personality’, 
as she writes frequently, devoting Chapter 7 entirely to ‘Personality’. ‘Individual’ and 
‘personality’ are interchangeable terms in Rosenblatt’s work and do not connote the more acute 
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differences Berdyaev located, wherein the individual is a natural, sociological entity and the 
personality is something existential and created as an ongoing project, concerned with the 
spiritual in human beings.91   
Although Literature as Exploration went through four subsequent editions (1968, 1976, 
1983, 1995), no substantial revisions were made.92 Ancillary texts were added or subtracted to 
the main body, cultural and literary references were updated, and stylistic adjustments are 
evident.93 The 1938 edition is nevertheless the richest edition to consult in relation to the 
student’s experience in the course of literary study. According to Dressman and Webster, in 
this edition Rosenblatt’s voice is more ‘intimate, immediate, and collegial’ than in subsequent 
editions.94 The author is very much a teacher speaking to other teachers, all of whom implicitly 
care about their students and what they bring to their reading of literature. In this overt concern 
for the student in the 1938 edition of Literature as Exploration, Rosenblatt anticipates the 
curricular design she later developed at NYU: together, these materials convey the way in 
which Rosenblatt appreciated the value of the individual and how a sense of this value should 
impact literary study. 
 According to Rosenblatt, in the classroom the student should be able to ‘feel the validity 
of his own experience’.95 The teacher of literature must therefore be aware of predominant 
themes present in contemporary American society and the wider world that may be shaping the 
student’s life outside the classroom. The student is set in the midst of an ‘unsettled world’ and 
a ‘society singularly lacking in consistency’ (3, 102). There are changes in economic and social 
attitudes appearing at an ‘unprecedented speed’ and where ‘few traditional ideas remain 
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unquestioned’ (102). The long-term development of industrial society in the U.S. after the Civil 
War ‘produced a welter of new relationships and new images of the values to be sought for’ 
(200). More recently, in the mid-1930s, the Depression called into question the assumption that 
a man without a job is ‘shiftless’, while the rise of totalitarian regimes in Germany, Italy, and 
Japan, exposed the way in which nations can mask racism with ‘national egoism’ (124, 185). 
Over the course of further editions, Rosenblatt adapted these social concerns to fit more 
contemporary developments.  
 Rosenblatt places emphasis on the need for the student to ‘feel the validity of his own 
experience’ because she is aware of the gap between theory and practice. As the educator 
Parker Palmer wrote many decades later, one does not need to look at the latest theories of 
pedagogy or epistemology to see what is happening in education; rather, one needs to ‘observe 
the way we teach and look for the theory of knowledge implicit in those practices. That is the 
epistemology our students learn – no matter what our best contemporary theorists may have to 
say’.96 Translated into broader terms, Palmer’s point resonates with Rosenblatt’s concern for 
developing a theory of reading by engaging with the student’s actual transactions with literature 
in an institutional setting.  
In her 1956 essay, ‘The Acid Test for Literature Teaching’, Rosenblatt points out the 
ways in which college students are often distrustful of their own experiences in relation to 
literary study. Because of particular New Critical teaching practices and implicit assumptions 
about the nature of literature (as a fixed, objective entity, for example), Rosenblatt believes that 
for many students, the ‘quest is for the sophisticated interpretation and the accepted 
judgment’.97 ‘Shock and confusion often result’, she continues, ‘when they are asked about the 
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impact of the work on themselves as unique personalities’.98 Thus, students ‘may divert their 
original interest in literature to studies around and about literature’, which in the mid-1950s 
usually meant intricate formal analysis.99 By using the language of ‘quest’ and ‘personality’, 
Rosenblatt reveals her sympathies and recognises that quest (to be explored in more detail in 
Chapter 4) and personality are important if often contested aspects of literary study. Positioning 
such words in unusual contexts, such as a ‘quest’ for knowledge which may actually ignore 
personality, Rosenblatt highlights the need to take the individual’s experience seriously, 
because it is not self-evident that it was at this time sufficiently valued in English studies, either 
by teachers or by the students themselves. 
 On the other hand, Rosenblatt draws attention to the student’s experience because, at 
least in the mid-1930s, the threat from fascism of conformity seemed especially threatening, 
hence her reference to national egoism. Like other thinkers with personalist sympathies, such 
as Berdyaev and Martin Buber, as well as Kant (who influenced Berdyaev), Rosenblatt 
condemned that which ‘reduces [the individual] to a mere thing, instrument, or automaton’ 
(195).100 For Rosenblatt, the individual possesses ‘fundamental dignity and worth’ and must 
be defended against subordination or ‘abstraction’ to ‘a superior reality or value, such as the 
State, the Nation, the Race, the Elect, the Heroes, or the Supermen’ (196). Revealing her 
distinctly personalist sympathies, Rosenblatt, at least in this instance, is effectively condemning 
what Berdyaev referred to as ‘objectivization’, which projects the individual as an abstraction, 
and thus as something liable to misuse and abuse. In his book, Slavery and Freedom (1944), 
for example, Berdyaev aligns objectivization with slavery; the abstraction of the human is 
liable to leave her vulnerable to being used as a means to an end, rather than valued as an end 
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in herself.101 However, as I argue in Chapter 3, at some points Rosenblatt is in danger of 
objectivising the human through her commitment to an idea of democracy which is supposed 
to safeguard human wellbeing.  
 In Literature as Exploration Rosenblatt is deliberately explicit about the kinds of 
experiences students may bring to their study of literature because she is aware of the threats 
to the voicing of these experiences. As with W. Somerset Maugham’s character from Of 
Human Bondage, Philip Carey, Rosenblatt suggests that the young person typically wishes to 
discern ‘man’s relation to the world he lives in, man’s relation with the men among whom he 
lives, and finally, man’s relation to himself’ (100).102 She then goes into much more detail, 
anticipating the kinds of questions young people may be asking themselves: 
What are the personal emotional realities behind the world of 
appearances? What indeed does it mean to the individual – and 
potentially to me, the adolescent, about to ‘live’ – to be a leader or a 
follower, to be a member of a community, to earn one’s living, to create 
a family, a circle of friends, to meet the ups and downs of fate, to know 
love and birth and death? What does it ‘feel like,’ from within, to be 
this kind of person or that? To be angelic, cruel, dominating, passive? 
What are the satisfactions, what are the elements, of the many roles that 
may be played? (101) 
It is important to recognise that the typical nature of these questions derives from Rosenblatt’s 
experience of teaching the generally affluent young women of Barnard College; adjectives such 
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as ‘angelic’, ‘cruel’, ‘dominating’, and ‘passive’ indirectly refer to Rosenblatt’s latent 
preoccupation in Literature as Exploration with women’s roles in society and their relationship 
to men.103 Furthermore, although Barnard had admissions quotas for minority students such as 
Jews (which is how Rosenblatt managed to study at Barnard in the first place), it was a fairly 
traditional liberal arts college, and Rosenblatt’s editorials for The Barnard Bulletin reveal her 
frustration with the apathy among some of the women who obviously were not greatly 
committed to their education.  
One exception to this trend of the conventional is Barnard’s Dean from 1911-47, 
Virginia Gildersleeve, whom Rosenblatt acknowledges in her 1931 PhD thesis. Gildersleeve 
was the only American female delegate in 1945 to negotiate the UN Charter, and was by all 
accounts instrumental in helping Rosenblatt in her graduate studies in France and London, 
introducing her to the British academic Caroline Gordon (wife of Allen Tate), for example. 
When Rosenblatt left Barnard in 1938, however, and joined the Department of English at 
Brooklyn College, she found that the English curriculum at Brooklyn was even more 
conservative, and tended to model itself on prestigious institutions such as Harvard. In any 
case, the longevity of Literature as Exploration means that the list of student preoccupations 
was tested by teaching experience over the decades in other institutions, such as NYU, Rutgers, 
Northwestern, Michigan State, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts.104 
 Turning to the potential of literature to engage the individual’s experiences, Rosenblatt 
declares that ‘no matter what the form – poem, novel, drama, biography, essay – literature 
makes alive and comprehensible to us the myriad ways in which human beings meet the infinite 
possibilities that life offers’ (6). She is keen to highlight ‘the human value, the human 
experience, that literature presents’ (8). These statements come after an almost lyrical passage 
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on literature’s potential to evoke human experiences, reminiscent of the conclusion to her PhD 
thesis, in which her critical voice emerges by aligning herself with earlier defenders of the 
value of literary art, in this case the Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce, and the Russian 
novelist, Lev Tolstoy: 
For is not the subject-matter of literature everything that man has 
thought, or felt, or created? The lyric poet utters all that the human heart 
can feel, from joy in ‘the cherry hung with snow’ to the poignant sense 
of this world ‘where youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies.’ The 
novelist sets forth the intricate web of human relationships with their 
hidden pattern of motive and emotion […] The writer of stories catches 
some significant moment, some mood, some clarifying clash of wills in 
the life of an individual or a group […] The dramatist builds a dynamic 
structure out of the tensions and conflicts of intermingled human lives 
[…] The joys of adventure, the delight in the beauty of the world about 
us, the intensities of triumph and defeat, the self-questionings and self-
realizations, the pangs of love and hate – indeed, as Henry James has 
said, ‘all life, all feeling, all observation, all vision’ – these are the 
province of literature. (5-6) 
Rosenblatt was especially fond of quoting this line from Henry James. By including references 
to Keats and A. E. Housman in the same breath, so to speak, she tacitly invokes a kind of 
literature, largely romantic, which is especially amenable to the kinds of literary experiences 
she thinks are most pregnant with questions concerning human existence. Furthermore, 
Rosenblatt singles out the roles of different kinds of artists because she sees these individuals 
as offering a service for other human beings. This is a subtle reordering of priorities in English 
 72 
 
studies, away from the author or the stylistics of a text as ends in themselves, toward a sense of 
literature serving readers in a more personal, experiential way. Rosenblatt is everywhere trying 
to assert the dignity of the reader, and the ways in which literature might energise the inner life 
of the student. To borrow her metaphor from Reader, Text, Poem, the lamp is firmly directed 
toward the reader, away from the author, and even the text (a tendency embodied by New 
Criticism).105  
 From 1948 onwards, once Rosenblatt moved to the School of Education at NYU, she 
sought to create an English curriculum which offered modules that helped to keep the spotlight 
on the reader, attentive to his experiences and mindful of his value as an end in himself. A 
‘Doctoral Evaluation Project’ from 1978 claimed, perhaps optimistically, that NYU’s English 
education programme continued to produce graduates who embody ‘a human being vitally 
alive, talented in the use of the English language, willing to accept responsibility for his own 
personal growth and self-renewal, and able to teach others the processes of how to use language 
to learn, to change, to be, and to become’.106 Rosenblatt aimed to counteract what she saw as 
‘trained incapacity to teach’ in graduates of traditional liberal arts courses.107 Simply 
‘marching’ through historical periods of literature and learning information, theories, and 
arguments essentially extrinsic to the experience of the human drama of literature was, for 
Rosenblatt and her colleagues, antithetical to the process of self-discovery that NYU embedded 
in its curricula (234). 
 A course entitled ‘Criticism and the Literary Experience’ (1948-73), for example, ran 
over two semesters and devoted the first semester to nurturing student reading of primary 
imaginative material. Only after this crucial stage would examples of criticism, from Plato to 
                                                          
105 Rosenblatt, Reader, Text, Poem, p. 1. 
106 ‘Doctoral Evaluation Project: New York University English Education Program, February 1978’, box 64, 
Office of the Dean, Daniel E. Griffiths, New York University Archives.  
107 Rosenblatt, Reminiscences, p. 234. Further references to this text are given in parentheses in the main body. 
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T. S. Eliot and beyond, be introduced (241). ‘I wanted’, Rosenblatt wrote, for ‘[my students] to 
be very much in command of a feeling of the nature of their own literary experience’ before 
they progressed to ‘see how critical theory might relate to it’ (242). Complementary courses in 
‘Literature and the Crisis in Values’ (1952-72) and ‘Literature and Human Values’ (1956-64) 
were similarly structured, although these courses were more explicitly preoccupied with the 
‘conflicts in values that the reader lived through as he or she read the [literary] work’ (242). 
Rosenblatt admitted that the works she chose – drawn primarily from European prose writers 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries such as Thomas Mann, T. S. Eliot, Dostoevsky, 
Tolstoy, Kafka – were ones in which ‘questions of values – what are the priorities in life – were 
of extreme importance’ (266). But such ‘importance’ should be understood simply as a cue for 
the student reader to join up the world of the novel with his own life experience and current 
preoccupations, while also being open to new potentialities in human experience (see Chapter 
3 on imagination). When Rosenblatt talks of the ‘importance’ of literature it is not in the 
Leavisite sense of observing something in a novel or novelist that should be apparent to 
everybody and have the same effect on all readers.108 ‘Importance’ is very much a transactional 
affair, specific to the particular relationship between a reader and a text. Thus, Rosenblatt 
speaks of a transactional ‘meshing’ of different value systems in the experience of literature in 
these courses – a meeting ground of individual personalities (242). 
As the 1960s progressed, NYU developed an array of modules that explicitly connected 
literature to the world of the student and to the world of the young people these students would 
eventually go and teach (244). As I mentioned in the Introduction, such an approach at NYU 
was influenced by the 1966 Anglo-American Conference at Dartmouth College, which sought 
to implement ‘growth’ models of learning in literary studies.109 In Rosenblatt’s retirement year 
                                                          
108 For example, see F. R. Leavis, The Great Tradition: George Eliot, Henry James, Joseph Conrad (London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1948). 
109 See Peter Smagorinsky, ‘Growth through English Revisited’, The English Journal, 91 (2002): 23-29. 
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(1971-72), for instance, there were courses entitled ‘Explorations in Reading: Experience and 
Process’, ‘Literature and the Adolescent Experience’, ‘Literature as Exploration’, ‘Explorations 
in Applied Literary Analysis’, ‘Literary Response and Personality’, and ‘The Reader’s 
Perception and Literary Form’.110 Rosenblatt’s theoretical commitments, shared in the 1960s 
by others in the U.S. such as James R. Squire and in the UK by James Britton, undergird these 
courses.111 Repeated use of ‘experience’ and ‘exploration’ imply that reading and studying 
literature should be seen as an extension of life experience that has an intimate, exploratory 
relationship with ‘real life’ – a mode of personal growth. The difference between ordinary 
experience and the learning process invited in these modules is that the experience is 
deliberately focused through reflection, examining relationships between emotional responses 
to the reading of literature and inextricable responses to the human values evoked from this 
reading. In every module, the value of the individual is manifest in the critical attention given 
to his experience and personal development.  
 While Rosenblatt initiated the process of developing the literary section of NYU’s 
English education programme, her younger colleagues, especially Gordon Pradl, John Mayher, 
Harold Vine, and Marilyn Sobelman, built firmly on Rosenblatt’s foundations so that numerous 
teachers have graduated from NYU with a highly distinctive understanding of the need to 
explicitly join up literary study to the student’s own experiences and current preoccupations, 
while also initiating the challenge to move beyond these into new vistas.112 If Dressman and 
Webster have criticised Rosenblatt for not writing a more expansive explanation of her 
theoretical commitments in the 1950s – after Dewey’s and Bentley’s philosophical Knowing 
                                                          
110 ‘Division of English Education, Speech, and Educational Theatre’, New York University Bulletin, 81 (1971): 
165-83, pp. 166-68. New York University Archives. 
111 See John S. Mayher (ed.), ‘The Legacy of English Education at NYU’, English Education, 40 (2008): 277-292 
for a more detailed commentary on NYU’s focus on life experience. 
112 Ibid. Conversation with Sondra M. Perl at the Graduate Center, City University of New York. March 30, 2015. 
See also Rosenblatt, Reminiscences, p. 280. 
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and the Known was published, which explored the transactional nature of experience – it should 
be remembered that these commitments were also born from an equally strong desire to engage 
with what Pradl has called the ‘messiness’ of actual teaching.113 ‘Actual teaching’ invited 
learning from experience when harnessed by intellectual investigation; indeed, these two 
activities were symbiotic for Rosenblatt.114 Her teaching was an exploration and demonstration 
of her theoretical commitments, as her theory was shaped by her teaching. As such, Rosenblatt’s 
method was personalistic; her theory grew from a series of intuitions which were then 
confirmed and developed by engaging with the thought of others.  
 As I draw this chapter to a conclusion, it is worth emphasising that the potentially 
polemical nature of Rosenblatt’s position, which became institutionalised at NYU, was largely 
due to her interpretation of the challenge and responsibility of educating people. It is 
understandable if the differences between growth or process models of learning in English and 
more traditional and re-imagined models evident in formalistic and historicist approaches to the 
discipline seem extraneous to the theory of literary experience among faculty of traditional 
English departments. However, through decades of observation and reflection as well as 
discussion with colleagues, Rosenblatt developed a commitment to literary study as a means of 
personal growth, valuing the individual and his experience, because she placed this within a 
broader educational vision which NYU aimed (and still continues to aim) to uphold.  
It is instructive to set Rosenblatt’s interest in the student’s experience alongside H.D.’s 
experience as a student, and, while H.D.’s career was fruitful and innovative, it was nevertheless 
marked by her early ‘failure’ at Bryn Mawr and her decision to leave formal education. There 
is a sense of urgency and earnestness to some of Rosenblatt’s writing, a reminder that reading 
is ‘a transaction between two great kinds of stuff – literary works and living persons’.115 
                                                          
113 Dressman and Webster, ‘Retracing Rosenblatt’, p. 141; Pradl, email to author, July 24, 2015. 
114 Rosenblatt, The Reader, the Text, the Poem, p. x; p. 178. 
115 Wayne Booth, ‘Foreword’ in Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed., pp. vii-xiv, p. xiii. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has begun to theorise the relationship between literary experience and the quest 
for wisdom, and to emphasise the personalist necessity of a prior commitment to the individual 
and his experience more generally. I have explored the way Rosenblatt and H.D. understand 
human experience and how their vision of experience entwines with their shared commitment 
to the growth of the individual. While both thinkers were receptive to the insights of French 
existentialism, Rosenblatt chose to put down intellectual roots in American pragmatism, largely 
because in her opinion it was so expansive and could approach many aspects of the individual’s 
experience in American society.  
I have argued that when placed together, Rosenblatt and H.D. urge a distinctly 
personalist perspective on the human being and his experience. The focus is very much on the 
way the person creates meaning for herself and strives towards freedom from determinacies. 
‘Having an experience’ is symptomatic of a developing self-critical voice, and thus evidence of 
a distinctive personality less likely to bend unthinkingly to the will of others. Although, as H.D. 
explores in her autobiographical fiction, sometimes the tensions in family life can be so strong 
that it is hard to be simplistic and set up a false dichotomy between freedom and slavery.  
The transactional vision precludes erecting a subject / object binary and instead posits 
an event in time, a coming together of multiple elements to create the work of literature which 
is deeply experiential and aesthetic. It is to this transactional theory of the literary work that I 
turn now, and explore its implications for literary context. For while Rosenblatt looked at the 
ways in which literature might engage an individual’s experience, her emphasis was always 
that literature itself be experienced. As the literary theorist John Schad reflected recently (citing 
Roland Barthes as an antecedent), ‘if literature [takes] “place” anywhere then it [is] in the 
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moment-by-moment act of reading’.116 The broader commitment to the individual’s experience 
shared by Rosenblatt and H.D. therefore translates into a more specific vision of personal 
autonomy in the literary experience and the ways in which a student might pursue their own 
course of learning, resistant to the dictates of others.   
      
  
                                                          
116 John Schad and David Jonathan Y. Bayot, John Schad in Conversation (Manila: De La Salle University 
Publishing House, 2015), p. 10. 
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2. Towards a Theory of Personalist Textual Sociability 
 
In this chapter I argue that a fundamental commitment to a vision of the individual and her 
experience, as explored in the previous chapter, shapes a specific way of thinking with regard 
to literary experiences. Rosenblatt’s transactional theory of the literary work teases out this 
connection in a fairly analytical way, although a deeper understanding of her theory in the 
context of institutional English studies serves a deeper knowledge of her approach and why it 
needs to be enhanced by turning to H.D. I contend that Rosenblatt’s transactional theory was 
generalist in nature, and her theory of the literary experience always reflected her politics – her 
faith in democracy and the value of the individual. Her notion of the aesthetic-efferent 
continuum for literary experiences creates a framework for conceptualising different types of 
thinking, some of them intuitive and more obviously personal, while others are more detached, 
impartial, and objective. What I wish to make explicit about Rosenblatt’s work, however, is its 
amenability to new notions of textual ‘sociability’ – a term the critic Rita Felski adapted in 
relation to a theory of contextualisms.1  
As I use it in this chapter, the term ‘textual sociability’ refers to a literary work’s 
relational pull to other pieces of writing, artworks, and non-artistic experiences. Rosenblatt’s 
transactional theory rests on a particular vision of contextualism, grounded in the reader’s 
personal reservoir of past experiences which are activated during the literary experience. I wish 
to show how this version of context translates into a way of conceiving textual sociability – a 
concept which emphasises the personalist nature of literary experiences. By turning to the work 
of Rosenblatt and H.D., in this chapter I set forth a theory of personalist textual sociability.  
 Continuing the emphasis on the individual which Chapter 1 introduced, this portion of 
my thesis foregrounds the manner in which transactional literary experiences offer the most 
                                                          
1 Rita Felski, ‘“Context Stinks!”’, New Literary History, 42 (2011): 573-91, p. 589. 
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appropriate way of conceiving textual sociability in a personalist manner. Furthermore, by 
analysing Rosenblatt’s theory alongside H.D.’s own explorations in The Sword Went Out to 
Sea (written 1947) and The Mystery (written 1949-50) into consciousness and aesthetic 
experience as pathways to learning, I show how this dialogue which I am constructing has 
implications for textual sociability and the negotiation of literary experiences alongside other 
people’s, especially in the classroom. By developing a theory of personalist textual sociability 
in this chapter, I proceed in the next chapter to explore the implications in H.D.’s and 
Rosenblatt’s work for the consideration of human experiences of different times and places. 
Whereas Chapter 2 focuses on the individual’s literary experience, Chapter 3 turns to the social 
aspects of literary experience. The personalist vision of textual sociability in this chapter 
implies a particular approach to the imagination, and ultimately, to the configuration of human 
relations in the wider society. The three correlates in the thesis – emphasis on the individual’s 
experience (Chapter 1), how this emphasis translates into a theory of personalist textual 
sociability (Chapter 2), and how such textual sociability has wider social implications (Chapter 
3) – form the crux of my H.D.-Rosenblatt dialogue. In Chapter 4 this journey then informs a 
broader exploration of what it means to be in quest of wisdom in institutional English studies.  
The first half of the chapter is a theoretical exploration of textual sociability in 
Rosenblatt’s work and in H.D.’s novel, The Sword Went Out to Sea, highlighting its personalist 
nature. The second half of the chapter then explores personalist textual sociability in more 
concrete situations – in the learning experiences foregrounded in H.D.’s historical novel, The 
Mystery, and in the work of Rosenblatt’s colleague, Gordon Pradl, who developed Rosenblatt’s 
democratic commitments and applied them to classroom dynamics which foreground 
personalistic exchanges between students. I also explain why I believe that the transactional 
approach lends itself to personalistic exchanges in a more substantial way than other contextual 
approaches.  
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Personalist Textual Sociability 
Aesthetic Reading, Associational Thinking, and Transactional Literary Criticism 
To begin this chapter section, it is useful to outline Rosenblatt’s transactional theory, and stress 
the importance of aesthetic reading within it. Since the millennium the ‘aesthetic’ in literary 
theory has been revived among those who practice a ‘new aestheticism’ – most notably Isobel 
Armstrong, who set forth her innovative agenda in The Radical Aesthetic (2000). As a response 
to the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’, which tended to distance literary works as being in some 
way complicit with devious politics, Armstrong calls for a return to (ultra) close reading by 
drawing upon the aesthetics of Kant and Hegel, and by reckoning with literature’s affective 
power.2 In many ways sympathetic to Rosenblatt’s transactional theory, the new aestheticism 
seems to be primarily text focused, although it certainly emphasises the fluidity of readings and 
the interplay of reader and text. However, I contend that Rosenblatt’s theory of aesthetic 
reading, which draws upon sources that include but extend the remit of Kant and Hegel, 
remains pertinent precisely because of how she embedded it into a wider pedagogical vision, 
born of a broader philosophical understanding of how humans experience not just literature, 
but the rest of life as well. 
The most pertinent textual material relating to Rosenblatt’s theory of aesthetic reading, 
associational thinking, and what she called ‘transactional literary criticism’ is found in her later 
two books, The Reader, the Text, the Poem: The Transactional Theory of the Literary Work 
(1978, 1994) and Making Meaning with Texts: Selected Essays (2005). The fact that the latter 
was published by the educational publisher, Heinemann, reflects the multiple research 
methodologies and intended readership of the essays Rosenblatt collected the year before she 
died, which span literary studies and education. Both the methodologies and the readership 
                                                          
2 See Isobel Armstrong, The Radical Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). 
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extend beyond the ‘literary’ orientation of Reader, Text, Poem, published by Southern Illinois 
University Press under the category of ‘Literary Theory’. But as Rosenblatt explains, the 
interdisciplinary nature of her later theoretical statements works to her advantage, as she 
believed that at the time, literacy experts usually ignored literature, and literary professionals 
tended to ignore ‘the problems of reading “ordinary” prose and how it differs from “literary” 
reading’.3 Together with the expansive discussions in Reader, Text, Poem, the essays in Making 
Meaning with Texts constitute a comprehensive repository of insight into the essentials of 
Rosenblatt’s critical theory. 
From the 1950s onwards Rosenblatt postulated a continuum of stances for transacting 
with texts – for both ‘ordinary reading’ and ‘literary reading’. On the one hand lies the efferent 
stance, taken from the Latin verb ‘to carry away’ (effere), and on the other hand the aesthetic 
stance, adopted in light of its Greek sense: ‘perception through the senses, feelings, intuitions’.4 
In its focus on perception, allusion to the Greek roots of the aesthetic stance conceals the 
element of choice Rosenblatt believed was involved in deciding among stances: ‘The efferent 
stance pays more attention to the cognitive, the referential, the factual, the analytic, the logical, 
the quantitative aspects of meaning. And the aesthetic stance pays more attention to the 
sensuous, the affective, the emotive, the qualitative’.5 On this account, to read any text 
efferently involves concentrating attention on extracting information from it. As Rosenblatt 
noted, this can be as obvious as a woman hurriedly reading a medicine bottle for information 
on dosage, or it can be as subtle as prefacing aesthetic reading of a poem ‘with requests for 
information or analysis that require predominantly efferent reading’.6  
                                                          
3 Louise Rosenblatt, Making Meaning with Texts: Selected Essays (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2005), p. 43. 
4 Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, p. 11. 
5 Ibid., p. 12. 
6 Ibid., p. xxvi, p. 103. 
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In both efferent and aesthetic stances there is a choice of attention required – an 
extension of the selective attention Rosenblatt and the philosopher William James believed 
characterised all human experience (see Chapter 1). While drawing on British thinkers with 
romantic sensibilities, such as Coleridge and Walter Pater, to emphasise aesthetic reading and 
give a sense of its long history, Rosenblatt distinguishes her position by framing her 
transactional theory as pragmatist and particularly American, which has implications for her 
politics (to be discussed in Chapter 3). And while not wishing to anticipate a later discussion 
about the role of reading as a ‘social act’, it is true that Rosenblatt emphasises the agency of 
the individual; her readers are not those of the reader-response theorist, Stanley Fish, who are 
undeniably and often unconsciously part of ‘interpretive communities’ which shape the way 
readers choose what to focus on and ultimately what gets read – the nature of the literary work, 
in other words.7 
Rosenblatt emphasised aesthetic reading because she felt that throughout ‘the entire 
educational process, the child in our society seems to be receiving the same signal: adopt the 
efferent stance’.8 As I explored in Chapter 1, the trend towards efferent reading in mid-century 
America coincided with the expansion of higher education after World War II and the need to 
prepare citizens instrumentally for life in a rapidly changing society – the so-called ‘life-
adjustment’ movement.9 Of course, Rosenblatt also stressed the continuum of aesthetic-
efferent reading and acknowledged that in most transactions with literary works of art there is 
a dynamic movement around the middle of the continuum.10 But she nevertheless emphasised 
the aesthetic stance because it was this orientation which she believed liberated students of 
literature to pursue inquiry on terms personal to them, and which might increase their 
                                                          
7 Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1980). 
8 Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, p. 81. 
9 Louise M. Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed. (New York: MLA, 1995), pp. 288-89. 
10 Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, pp. 12-13. 
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sensitivity to other areas of life too: ‘Sensitivity to literary technique should be linked up with 
sensitivity to the array of human joys and sorrows, aspirations and defeats, fraternizings and 
conflict’.11 
Indeed, the New Critical emphasis on the ‘poem itself’ or the ‘novel itself’ also 
concerned Rosenblatt because her theoretical insights led her to see that the aesthetic nature or 
‘literariness’ of a given text was not something inherent in the text as categorically distinct 
from the presence a reader to evoke it, for ‘Acquaintance with the formal aspects of literature 
will not in itself ensure aesthetic sensitivity’.12 ‘We cannot assume’, she wrote, ‘that a poem 
rather than an argument about fences will be evoked from the text of [Robert] Frost’s Mending 
Wall or that a novel rather than sociological facts about Victorian England will be evoked from 
Dickens’s Great Expectations’.13 If other theorists, especially structuralists and formalists, 
located the ‘literary’ in specific formal features of a text, Rosenblatt offers an alternative 
understanding of the ‘literary’ – as that which emerges during an aesthetic experience of a text: 
‘The individual reader brings the pressure of his personality and needs to bear on the 
inextricably interwoven “human” and “formal” elements of the work’.14 For Rosenblatt, the 
adoption of an aesthetic stance was essential in making sure that a poem or novel was read as 
precisely that, which, after all, is what distinguishes literary studies from other disciplines such 
as history, law, or politics, and even from other sub-disciplines within ‘English’, such as poetics 
or stylistics, which happen to be engaged in reading texts closely to elicit information.15  
                                                          
11 Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed., p. 50.  
12 Ibid., p. 51. See especially the chapter in Louise M. Rosenblatt, The Reader, the Text, the Poem: The 
Transactional Theory of the Literary Work, paperback ed. (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1994) entitled ‘The Quest for “the Poem Itself”, pp. 101-130. 
13 Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, p. 10. 
14 Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed., pp. 50-51. 
15 Although some have been advocating for the importation of discourse analysis into literary studies, which would 
align the discipline more with these social scientific ones. See Dominique Maingueneau, ‘Literature and discourse 
analysis’, Acta Linguistica Hafniensia, 42 (2010): 147-58. 
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As Rosenblatt describes the process of aesthetic reading, the personalist nature of 
textual sociability begins to emerge. According to Rosenblatt, to evoke a work of art from a 
textual pattern of symbols, the reader has 
to pay attention to the broader gamut of what these words in this 
particular order [are] calling forth within him: attention to the sound 
and rhythm of the words in the inner ear, attention to the imprints of 
past encounters with these words and their referents in differing life and 
literary contexts, attention to the overtones of feeling, the chiming of 
sound, sense, ideas, and association.16 
Beyond the emphasis here on the active role of the reader, the distinction of aesthetic reading 
is that evoking a literary work of art from a text involves tracing ‘the chiming of sound, sense, 
ideas, and association’ in the ‘inner ear’ – a supremely personal process unique to the individual 
in question. This is also an activity superfluous to efferent reading, which usually pushes to the 
background of attention such aspects that are irrelevant to, or which may impede, the rather 
detached stance that characterises every stage of this mode of reading. Rosenblatt’s writing on 
aesthetic reading, on the other hand, is saturated by language that recognises the importance of 
associations the reader experiences in evoking and responding to a work of art – the chiming of 
different facets of the emerging work in the inner ear. Such chiming represents the stirrings of 
personalist textual sociability in the literary experience.  
As a theorist, Rosenblatt frequently used metaphors to describe the chiming experience 
in reading; her method reflects her commitment to learning from multiple sources that, to her 
at least, resonated with her principal preoccupation with the experience of reading among 
individuals situated in quest. These metaphors were assimilated over a number of decades and 
                                                          
16 Rosenblatt, The Reader, the Text, the Poem, p. 26. 
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mostly from psychology. By the publication in 2005 of Making Meaning with Texts, which 
features essays ranging from the 1930s to the 1990s, these metaphors appear thoroughly 
integrated in her writing. While their original introduction in her work was accompanied by 
references to the original source, subsequent usage is often embedded in her own discourse of 
reading. From philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure she assimilated 
the distinction between sign and referent – the fact that, quoting Peirce, ‘the sign is related to 
its object only in consequence of a mental association’ – the activity of the interpretant, and 
thus of a person.17 The Scandinavian psychologist Ragnar Rommetveit offered Rosenblatt the 
term ‘associative network’ to denote the process whereby a child (or adult learner) infuses 
meaning into a referent (100). Meanwhile, from the American psychologist Elizabeth Bates 
Rosenblatt appropriated the ‘iceberg’ metaphor of language, in which the public aspects of 
meaning are only the tip to a submerged berg of private elements (4-5). Bates also offered 
Rosenblatt the metaphor of the ‘mental file drawer’ of associations (76). From the Soviet 
educator and psychologist Lev Vygotsky, Rosenblatt borrowed the metaphor of a ‘linguistic-
experiential reservoir’ that the reader must utilise not only in efferent reading to ascertain the 
publicly verifiable meanings of words, but also in aesthetic reading to render the transaction as 
emotionally meaningful as possible (4-5).  
 These metaphors reinforce Rosenblatt’s belief that it was only when ‘books arouse an 
intimate personal response’ that a ‘developmental process can be fostered’ (67, my emphasis). 
But to echo my discussion in Chapter 1, one of the potential challenges inherent in these 
particular metaphors is their analytic overtones (‘network’, ‘reading act’, ‘linguistic-
experiential reservoir’) and their origins in a disciplinary discourse somewhat alien to the 
humanism of literary studies in which Rosenblatt wished to embed herself. It is perhaps for this 
reason that Literature as Exploration was always more popular, especially among teachers of 
                                                          
17 Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, p. 3. The following references to this text are in parentheses in the main body. 
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English, than Reader, Text, Poem, because its discourse was arguably more appropriate to the 
kind of reading experience she was advocating, within the broader pedagogical trajectory of 
educating individuals.  
Still, I would nevertheless contend that even Rosenblatt’s efferent end of the aesthetic-
efferent continuum is tempered by its aesthetic counterpart, even if the aesthetic is consciously 
ignored in the reading act. Because Rosenblatt is concerned with the reading experience as a 
pathway to learning and to personal growth, any kind of reading – whether more efferent or 
aesthetic – is rescued from either excessive rationalism or irrationalism, both of which 
Rosenblatt sees as unhelpful to a fruitful pedagogy.18 In fact, such a distinction echoes the 
thought of the Russian Slavophile thinker of the nineteenth century, Ivan Kireevsky, who can 
be considered an influence on the Russian variety of personalism which is especially 
sympathetic to the approach I am developing in this thesis, where there is a type of reason which 
is connected to the ‘heart’ and a type connected to ‘logical understanding’, but both are called 
‘reason’.19 Kireevsky writes of a ‘concentration of self-consciousness that is the true locus of 
supreme truth, and where not abstract reason alone, but the sum total of human intellectual and 
emotional forces places a single stamp of credibility on the thought that is present to it’.20 I 
would suggest that Rosenblatt’s efferent model of reading is flexible enough to remain 
connected to the heart – to the emotional dimension of the person – which brings together the 
‘intellectual’ and ‘emotional’ forces. Indeed, Rosenblatt refuses to discard the efferent from her 
reading theory; it is simply re-positioned. While she critiqued one kind of efferent reading – 
one kind of ‘abstract rationalism’ – she retained and made her own another kind, and as such, 
                                                          
18 For example, see her chapter, ‘Emotion and Reason’ in all the editions of Literature as Exploration. 
19 Aleksei Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevsky, On Spiritual Unity: A Slavophile Reader, trans. and ed. by Boris Jakim 
and Robert Bird (Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne Books, 1998), p. 22. Kireevsky impacted the later philosopher, 
Vladimir Solovyov, who was in turn a profound influence on Berdyaev. Kireevsky was also well-read in German 
idealist philosophy, especially (the late) Schelling, and thus links back to the Romantics with which Rosenblatt 
was explicitly concerned. The attempt to reconcile subject and object unites all of these thinkers. 
20 Ibid., p. 262. 
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the efferent is an important element in the process of having a literary experience and in 
delineating the personalist nature of textual sociability within it. 
Rosenblatt’s transactional theory of the literary work can therefore be divided according 
to a sequence of broadly aesthetic acts followed by efferent ones, utilising the kind of reason 
outlined above. By positioning associative thinking within each of these stages, the process of 
learning at the heart of this reading-response mode can be conceived in terms of personalist 
textual sociability. The first stage is the initial encounter, where the reader performs the text on 
the instrument of the self to bring forth an artwork.21 But ‘even as we are generating the 
evocation’, writes Rosenblatt, ‘we are reacting to it; this may in turn affect our choices as we 
proceed with the reading’.22 ‘Reacting to it’, I suggest, involves the beginnings of understanding 
the potential sociability of the literary work in question, whereby the reader becomes conscious 
of his linguistic-experiential reservoir, or how his network of associations is being repeatedly 
utilised in mediating between the sign and the referent.23 For example, when reading a novel, 
the reader may realise that various prior experiences – encounters with situations or characters 
in other novels, films, drama, and with real people and non-literary experiences – are being 
drawn upon in order to make meaning with what the new text is evoking. To be personal for a 
moment, I read the novel Daniel Deronda and I find myself thinking about other adoption 
experiences in literature – in Great Expectations, for example, or in a contemporary novel, like 
A. M. Homes’s In a Country of Mothers – and I also think of my own experiences as an adoptee. 
I begin to create a personalist textual sociability based on what I do with this emerging network 
of literary and non-literary experiences, guided by the necessity for warranted assertability.  
                                                          
21 The performance metaphor will be explored in more detail in the next chapter, but for now, see Rosenblatt, 
Literature as Exploration, 5th ed., pp. 263-77. 
22 Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, p. 15. 
23 Rosenblatt preferred to talk of sign and referent, even in the 1990s, rather than signifier and signified, because 
a ‘referent’ most obviously links the interpretant back to the external world, and thus to the world of society and 
change: Literature as Exploration, 5th ed., p. 49. 
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‘Warranted assertability’ is Rosenblatt’s ambitious way of stressing the transactional 
nature of the literary experience, in which both text and reader are important. Eschewing 
subjectivist reader-response approaches, Rosenblatt drew on John Dewey’s concept of a 
‘warranted assertion’ in order to stress the need for criteria of interpretation, which, among 
other things, would highlight the need to pay attention to the text and avoid an experience which 
has little to do with the text at hand.24 In Making Meaning with Texts she suggests three criteria 
of interpretation which mean that warranted assertability is active: ‘(1) that the context of and 
purpose of the reading event, or the total transaction, be considered; (2) that the interpretation 
not be contradicted by, or not fail to cover, the full text, the signs on the page; and (3) that the 
interpretation not project meanings which cannot be related to signs on the page’.25 Points two 
and three do not, however, return to the New Critical notion of ‘the text itself’. On this 
Rosenblatt is emphatic: ‘I might speak of returning to the text, but that is because the signs on 
the page are the only observable, empirical aspect shared by readers’.26 Meaning occurs when 
the reader transacts with the text in a dynamic, to-and-fro fashion which highlights the activity 
of the reader as interpretant – the mediator between sign and referent – who is thus rooted in a 
triad of sign, interpretant, and referent, which ensures that each agent is brought into focus.  
There are, of course, a number of questions arising from Rosenblatt’s concept of 
warranted assertability, not least what constitutes the ‘full text’ and whether it is in fact desirable 
and possible that a reader try and absorb every particular aspect of the text, which might seem 
to negate the personalist dimension of the literary experience. As I explored in Chapter 1, there 
is always a danger in Rosenblatt’s work that her faith in scientific method overrides her intuition 
about the importance of the individual and the complexity of a person’s experience. Surely what 
seems more important than comprehensiveness or an idea of a ‘total experience’ is that, as 
                                                          
24 Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, p. 23. 
25 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
26 Ibid., p. xxiv. 
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Rosenblatt also recognises, a reader enters into conversation with others about his reading and 
ideas about a text, while at the same time ensuring that such a reader is helped to develop his 
personal intuitions about a text’s meaning and potential importance for himself and possibly for 
others also.  
Next in the sequence of Rosenblatt’s stages is ‘expressed response’, when a reader tries 
to cognise the way in which the literary work has emerged during his literary experience. But 
this is not necessarily straightforward, and may include a ‘re-experiencing, a re-enacting, of the 
work-as-evoked, and an ordering and elaborating of our responses to it’.27 As a reader 
crystallises his sense of the literary work and the way in which it has formed in his imagination, 
he can move into ‘expressed interpretation’, which is a more concerted effort at delineating the 
various threads pursued in performing the literary work on the self. At this stage, it will be more 
important in a classroom setting to enter into discussion with others about literary experiences 
in order to measure the validity of one’s own. If everyone else has concluded, for example, that 
‘Break of Day’ by John Donne focuses on the feeling of adultery provoked by the pull of 
business, and I decide that the poem is about the virtues of different kinds of love, then I would 
need to return to the text and ‘re-experience’ it and ‘re-enact’ it according to the new knowledge 
I have about other people’s responses, before I revise my expressed interpretation. I needn’t 
accept what the others say and thereby invalidate what may be a perfectly reasonable reading 
in which I was receptive to the way I was constructing the literary experience. But I will have 
listened to others and learned to become more self-critical, whether or not I find some common 
ground between my own reading and that of others.  
Eventually, a reader, at least one who is also a learner, must usually communicate their 
reading in some way; they must communicate their expressed interpretation, and at more 
advanced stages in literary studies such an interpretation may appear as a small aspect of a more 
                                                          
27 Rosenblatt, The Reader, the Text, the Poem, p. 134. 
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wide-ranging study, as in a monograph, for example, as well as guiding the overall subject 
theme of an article or book. In 1968 (some years before reader-response theory) Alan C. Purves 
and Victoria Rippere published a report for the National Council of Teachers of English called 
Elements of Writing about a Literary Work: A Study of Response to Literature – a text that 
Rosenblatt continued to reference in Making Meaning with Texts almost forty years later.28 
Purves and Rippere analyse in great detail the various possible elements a writer about literature 
can include in their text. However, they refrain from setting up a hierarchy of elements and 
permit the learner to do this for himself, echoing the difficulty of being too prescriptive about 
what individuals concentrate on.29 Rosenblatt implicitly capitalises on this position in Reader, 
Text, Poem when she turns her attention to devising criteria applicable to the kind of criticism 
she believes literary critics should have the freedom to pursue.  
Part of the activity at an advanced stage in the reading process, involves, therefore, an 
attempt to delineate some criteria of interpretation which can direct the writing about a literary 
work. I may decide I wish to focus on the experience of insular love in The Rainbow and the 
film, Like Crazy – historically and generically unrelated – yet when I experience them as 
‘literary works’, they seem to coalesce or evidence sociability around this experience of love 
which gradually insulates a couple from the outside world. The essay’s contribution would be 
an exploration of insular love by means of a comparative study of two texts linked by the 
author’s exercise of personalist textual sociability. The criteria of interpretation would therefore 
adapt to suit this assignment goal.   
The process of literary experience outlined above, however, is obviously context-
dependent on (1) the reader / learner in question and (2) the transitory factors affecting his 
reading and study environment. As Rosenblatt understood, readers may simply be bored or 
                                                          
28 Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, p. 33. 
29 Alan C. Purves and Victoria Rippere, Elements of Writing about a Literary Work: A Study of Response to 
Literature (Urbana, IL: NCTE, 1968), pp. 59-60. 
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uninterested in understanding their literary experience. As I suggested in Chapter 1, Rosenblatt 
tried to design courses in which there was some form of bridge between the projected world of 
a literary work or works and the world(s) of the student(s). But what if the response is still 
negative and mute? Or what if students actively try and resist a personalist approach? One 
response for the teacher is to try and understand why this might be. What might be getting in 
between the reader and the text? Am I as a teacher being overly reflexive about the learning 
process? Ought I to be subtler in how I pose the task of delineating personalist textual 
sociability? And am I demonstrating by my behaviour and attitudes that efferent reading is more 
valuable than aesthetic?  
One response to these questions would be to preface the target literary work with other, 
potentially more accessible literary works or para-literary works such as film adaptations, and 
then move on from there, as critical literacy often attempts to do.30 These ‘bridge works’ might 
be suggested by the students, even if it means a slight deviation from the syllabus plan, although 
sensitive teachers are likely to be aware of popular ‘texts’ which may provide an inroad. Of 
course, an additional challenge which arises here would be to avoid constructing a subtle 
hierarchy of texts, or digging one’s heals into a binary of ‘high’ and ‘low’ art forms (see my 
comments in the Conclusion). Moreover, Rosenblatt suggests that a spontaneous engagement 
with a literary work is more likely to occur if we ‘avoid placing undue importance upon the 
particular form in which the expression of the student’s reaction should be couched’.31 There 
should be sufficient flexibility and variety for exploring literary experiences. 
Without wishing to anticipate the discussion of Rosenblatt’s Whitmanian literatus in 
Chapter 3, it is, however, necessary also to allude to her concern for the personal qualities of 
readers who engage in aesthetic reading. In places her work might be interpreted as being 
                                                          
30 See Ray Misson and Wendy Morgan, Critical Literacy and the Aesthetic: Transforming the English Classroom 
(Urbana, IL: NCTE, 2006). 
31 Louise M. Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 4th ed. (New York: MLA, 1983), p. 67. 
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somewhat exclusive. The ideal critic, says Rosenblatt, is someone who ‘undoubtedly’ possesses 
‘a high degree of sensitivity to verbal nuances and will have devoted much energy to acquiring 
the capacity for intellectual and emotional self-awareness and self-criticism’.32 The critic 
should be cultivating ‘a deeply humane personality’ because for Rosenblatt ‘it takes much more 
than a knowledge of the tradition of the pastoral elegy to do justice to [John Milton’s] “Lycidas” 
[for example]’.33 Such a belief in the ideal critic is part and parcel of Rosenblatt’s overall 
pedagogical approach: she is concerned with the growth of individuals who are able to 
contribute fruitfully to American society – to creating the kind of environment in which oneself 
and others can be happy and fulfilled. If the study of literature (and not just Milton!) is to play 
an important role in society, a personalism which focuses on the transaction between individual 
and text in a matrix of other forces seems to be vital.  
But still, there is a tacit aristocratic aspect to Rosenblatt’s thought with which she never 
really reckoned, perhaps because she was so convinced she was democratic to the core. It is 
possible that one of the tendencies of philosophies like romanticism, existentialism, and even 
personalism is that because of their staunch belief in the importance of the individual, a kind of 
particularism can permeate the application of personalistic approaches. In Berdyaev’s 
philosophy, for example, he openly acknowledges that his personalism is aristocratic: the 
growth of the human person is a unique, unrepeatable process and different people will reach 
different levels of sensitivity, creativity, and other human qualities.34  
However, I think Rosenblatt can be absolved from charges of harmful exclusivity; she 
demonstrates antipathy towards the Nietzschean superman, for example, which seeks to make 
distinctions between types based on superior qualities.35 If there are some qualities which 
                                                          
32 Rosenblatt, Reader, Text, Poem, p. 147. 
33 Ibid. 
34 See Nicolas Berdyaev, Dream and Reality: An Essay in Autobiography, trans. Katharine Lampert (London: 
Geoffrey Bles, 1950). 
35 Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 4th ed., p. 166. 
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people are born with (a disposition towards emotional sensitivity, for example), then for 
Rosenblatt there are also other qualities which can be developed through literary study, such as 
attention to nuances, critical thinking, and democratic qualities of conversation and co-
operation with others in the classroom. The aesthetic stance also ensures that for Rosenblatt, 
students will be encouraged to focus as much on what signs might point to in the external world 
as the formal qualities of signs themselves: literature and life will be conjoined via the personal 
activity of the reader / learner.   
As I stated in the Introduction, Rosenblatt’s importance to literary theory, and to my 
project in particular, substantially derives from the way she developed her theory in an 
institutional context attuned to developments in pedagogy. In this sense, she can be 
distinguished from other thinkers of her recent past who also promoted similar ideas about 
aesthetic reading and its benefits for the individual. In her history of the development of ideas 
on literary criticism, Carol Atherton rightly aligns Pater and the Oxford critic A. C. Bradley as 
being of the ‘generalist’ school of literary individuals, in that they were critics who positioned 
themselves in opposition to the scholars and literary (historical) scholarship.36 These were 
authors Rosenblatt had researched for her 1931 doctoral thesis on art-for-art’s sake in Victorian 
writing.37 But whereas Pater and Bradley were reluctant to specify the need for readers to 
analyse their literary experience in detail, Rosenblatt is insistent on the need for readers – 
especially those enrolled as students in formal education – to make their literary experience an 
object of efferent analysis. 
For instance, using Virginia Woolf’s essay, ‘How Should One Read a Book?’ (1926) in 
Reader, Text, Poem, Rosenblatt tactically teases Woolf away from her Paterian inference, in 
                                                          
36 Carol Atherton, Defining Literary Criticism: Scholarship, Authority and the Possession of Literary Knowledge, 
1880-2002 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 80. 
37 See the chapter on Walter Pater in Louise Rosenblatt, L’idee de l’art pour l’art dans la littérature anglaise 
pendant la période victorienne (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1931). 
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stressing the reader’s ‘crystallisation’ of ‘the work as a whole, as a structure that, despite its 
ethereal nature, can be an object of thought’.38 Rosenblatt uses Woolf to strike a delicate balance 
between aligning herself with Woolf and the school of critics such as Pater and Bradley who 
emphasised the private experience of reading literature, and espousing a vision of engaging 
literature as something that can be trained and communicated to others as expressed 
interpretation – as ‘transactional criticism’. She espouses a kind of rationalism of the heart, to 
echo Kireevsky, where excessive subjectivism and excessive impersonalism are alike rejected. 
Rosenblatt’s concept of ‘transactional criticism’, written by professional critics and 
students and based on articulated criteria of interpretation, has the potential to be accessible to 
the ‘general reader’ and thus impact the world beyond the academy while still ensuring that 
transactional criticism can be considered ‘disciplinary’, in the specific sense delineated by 
Josephine M. Guy and Ian Small as embracing both specialisation and ‘social utility’.39 As a 
suitable goal of literary study, transactional criticism should ‘reflect more of the dynamics of 
reading, reporting it as an event in time, in a particular personal or environing context’.40 For 
although the influence of Pater and Woolf is most obviously visible in Rosenblatt’s literary 
theory, there is also a distinct vision of literary criticism deriving from the Victorian writer, 
Matthew Arnold, which is committed to engaging with cultural and social change. Rosenblatt’s 
approach might even be traced back to the nineteenth-century Russian Westerniser, Vissarion 
Belinsky, whom Isaiah Berlin has credited with launching cultural criticism in literary studies 
– with critiquing a literary work’s implicit and explicit values for their social implications.41 
There is a sense of earnestness in Rosenblatt’s writing, linked to her tendency to believe in an 
                                                          
38 Rosenblatt, Reader, Text, Poem, p. 133. 
39 Josephine M. Guy and Ian Small, Politics and Value in English Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), p. 167. 
40 Ibid., p. 149. 
41 Berlin, Russian Thinkers, pp. 156-57. 
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aristocracy of individuals who embody certain human qualities which make them receptive to 
literary experiences. 
The vital difference between Rosenblatt and those who may be considered her early 
contemporaries – the modernist Arnoldians, such as critics A. R. Orage and John Middleton 
Murry – however, is that Rosenblatt successfully translated this cultural or contemporary 
engagement into concrete, curricular terms that directed institutional learning in literary studies 
in a tangible manner (see Chapter 1 for curricular details).42 Although Orage and Murry were 
concerned to preserve the domain of the non-academic, generalist amateur writing criticism in 
public magazines, Rosenblatt imported a revised generalist vision into higher education: revised 
in such a way that transactional literary criticism cultivated specialist skills in aesthetic reading 
and the successive stages of further literary inquiry – the disciplinary specialisation required by 
Guy and Small. Whereas Orage and Murry saw themselves as ‘wise’ critics communicating 
wisdom in their literary criticism and other writings, Rosenblatt’s generalist educative 
framework goes some way to demystifying this claim to wisdom.43 For Rosenblatt, wisdom is 
the end-goal of a clearly delineated process of literary experience and replicable literary inquiry, 
which is not only specialist in the sense that it can be trained, but also of value in communicating 
insight, via transactional literary criticism, to others, and in nurturing democratic citizens.   
Rosenblatt provides the theoretical basis for envisioning textual sociability along 
personalist lines. By foregrounding aesthetic reading in the transactional literary experience, 
she emphasises the way in which the interpretant (the reader) makes meaning with signs by 
drawing on his reservoir of past experiences with what a sign and set of signs might indicate. 
The transactional approach, by positing a triadic semiotics as opposed to a dyadic one, embeds 
sociability into its very core. The aesthetic-efferent continuum allows for a dynamic movement 
                                                          
42 Atherton, Defining Literary Criticism, p. 115. 
43 Ibid., p. 116. 
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among different stances, so that an excessively private and intuitive approach is never 
advocated, but nor is an excessively detached one which only pays attention to ‘public’ 
meanings of words.  
When we turn to H.D.’s novel, The Sword Went Out to Sea, textual sociability becomes 
much more metaphorical than it usually is for Rosenblatt. Yet H.D.’s somewhat elliptical way 
of exploring sociability in consciousness lends itself to a decidedly personalist account of 
textual sociability and the mental processes involved in navigating a person’s reservoir of prior 
experiences with what new signs indicate. H.D. implicitly extends the discourse of personalist 
textual sociability by her supremely self-conscious, and thus more personally involved, 
exploration into ways of knowing linked to aesthetic experiences.  
 
Associational Consciousness in The Sword Went Out to Sea 
During the Second World War and in the years following it (1940-50) H.D. intensified her 
interests in psychoanalysis, astrology, spiritualism, and occult symbolism. She came to see 
herself as an individual whose birth (astrological) and genetic heritage preconditioned her to be 
interested in visionary, supernatural experiences and the communication of these in art.44 The 
relationship between investigatory, supernatural experiences and the aesthetic experience of art 
manifested itself in the nature of her writing during the war, when her questing activities found 
an outlet through her writing, appropriating different genres (journal, historical romance, novel, 
poetry, and memoir) according to their fitness for the particular experiences she wanted to 
understand.45 Faced with the possibility of annihilation and increasing cultural and social 
fragmentation during the war years, H.D.’s quest began with herself, responding to the Delphic 
                                                          
44 Susan Stanford Friedman, Psyche Reborn: The Emergence of H.D. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1981), p. 186. 
45 Ibid., p. 176. 
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oracle: ‘Know Thyself’.46 In the early 1940s she worked on a memoir of her psychoanalytic 
work with Freud in Vienna during 1933 and 1934, and at the same time sought to trace the 
‘correspondences’ not only between the self and the universe according to the hermetic mantra, 
‘as above, so below’, but also between different philosophical or theoretical models. In the same 
way that Rosenblatt assimilated ideas from different sources, in the 1940s H.D.’s approach to 
theoretical development can be summed up by Toril Moi’s assertion that ‘each text I read, 
regardless of genre, is at work on the same set of problems’.47 In tracing the planetary positions 
and relationships on her astrological natal chart and in pursuing the threads of the unconscious 
which Freud helped her to unearth, she was trying to gain a degree of self-knowledge or 
wisdom, which according to her ‘creates a far greater chance of happiness or fulfilment’.48  
Yet in spite of the complex way in which H.D. synthesised various organising 
frameworks for individual and cosmic existence, it was her spiritualist activity during the war 
that most obviously lends itself to theorising textual sociability in relation to aesthetic 
experience.49 From 1943-46 H.D. was engaged in ‘reading’ messages from spirits she believed 
to be deceased RAF pilots with ties to Air Chief Marshal Lord Hugh Dowding. H.D.’s 
spiritualist work and her relationship with Dowding form the substance of the memoir Majic 
Ring (written 1943-44), the novel The Sword Went Out to Sea (written 1946-47), and to a lesser 
extent the historical romances, White Rose and the Red (written 1947-48) and The Mystery 
(written 1949-51). Although Majic Ring contains valuable material relating to H.D.’s 
spiritualist activity, Sword is more overtly concerned with the total context and ramifications 
                                                          
46 Ibid., p. 193. 
47 Toril Moi, What is a Woman? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 124. 
48 Friedman, Psyche Reborn, p. 193. 
49 Spiritualist activity seems to have burgeoned during the First World War and continued in Britain into the 
1920s. During the Second World War, and especially in London, spiritualist activity was again extremely popular, 
as Dowding explains in his book, Many Mansions (London: New York Rider, 1943). Of course, the occult more 
generally had been gaining widespread interest among European intelligentsia from the late-nineteenth century 
onwards.   
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of this work. My reading of this novel will focus on a series of metaphors H.D. creates in order 
to explore associational consciousness; my purpose is to position these metaphors as important 
discursive markers within a theory of personalist textual sociability.   
Sword, published for the first time in 2007, has primarily been read by H.D. critics and 
scholars for its obvious spiritualist and occult themes, which for literary historians tie the text 
thematically to work by the modernist poet W. B. Yeats and pragmatist philosopher William 
James.50 Although taking the occult theme into account, my aim in this chapter is to read Sword 
as a repository of imagery which I can put into dialogue with Rosenblatt’s theory of aesthetic 
reading, and thus develop a discourse of personalist textual sociability. In this sense I echo 
Janice S. Robinson’s reading of H.D.’s spiritualist work, as being an analogy for a literary 
process – a position seconded by H.D.’s daughter, Perdita – wherein a séance is commensurable 
with a ‘discussion’, a mode of communication.51 Furthermore, my reading of Sword should be 
read in conjunction with Aaron Bibb’s, which links H.D.’s associative and paratactic methods 
to the genre of ‘paranoia-criticism’, whereby interpretive connections are sought in order to 
make sense of the whole gamut of personal experience, and nurture a feeling of harmony in 
place of unbearable conflict.52 
Sword is an intricate, generically hybrid text divided into two books: ‘Wintersleep’, set 
in contemporary London, and ‘Summerdream’, which meanders through historical periods 
essentially retelling the same relationship narrative recorded in ‘Wintersleep’, between the 
protagonist Delia Alton (H.D.) and Lord Howell (Dowding). The backdrop to Delia’s 
                                                          
50 See especially Suzanne Hobson, ‘Credulous Readers: H.D. and Psychic-Research Work’ in John Attridge (ed.), 
Incredible Modernism: Literature, Trust and Deception (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 51-65; Elizabeth 
Anderson, H.D. and Modernist Religious Imagination: Mysticism and Writing (London: Bloomsbury, 2013); 
Timothy Materer, Modernist Alchemy: Poetry and the Occult (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995). 
51 Janice S. Robinson, H.D.: The Life and Work of an American Poet (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), p. 
341. In her writing on William James, Rosenblatt makes no mention of his occult activities.  
52 Aaron Bibb, ‘Vision, Paranoia, and the Creative Power of Obsessive Interpretation’, Journal of Cultural and 
Religious Theory, 10 (2010): 99-116. ‘Paranoia’ in this essay refers to the way individuals like H.D. cannot cope 
with an actual event (such as war) and seek arcane meanings of the event which they can cope with.  
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spiritualist activity is that she is preparing notes to lecture on English literature in the U.S; 
indeed, she ‘was working on the lectures, during the time when the messages [from the airmen] 
were most compelling’.53 Having inherited an oak tripod table that belonged to the poet 
William Morris, Delia accords the table significance as it ‘taps’ out messages from the airmen 
(96).  
Morris becomes something of a spectre in Sword. Delia’s literary research for her 
lectures and her engagement with the messages mediated through Morris’s table seem to 
merge, so that the literary inquiry deviates from more traditional or scholarly forms and 
simultaneously the spiritualist messages take on an aesthetic, literary quality. Delia claims that 
in order to decipher the RAF messages, ‘it would need a perceptive ear and to a point, a person 
trained in rhythm, metre and musical notation’ – qualities traditionally associated with the close 
reading of poetry and which echo Rosenblatt’s use of the musical word ‘chime’ to describe 
these reverberations (30). On the other hand, Delia talks of being ‘spared lecturing on poetry 
in America. Whatever I said, would have been too old-fashioned […] I had heard personal 
reminiscences and anecdotes about [Algernon Charles] Swinburne, [Robert] Browning, [Dante 
Gabriel] Rossetti and William Morris’ (90). Writing in August 1947 to her former husband, 
Richard Aldington, H.D. thanks him for ‘all the Morris gossip’, and says she is glad she has 
‘time now to read and properly browse or “dream” over and into the period’.54 Her tone is 
cautious and is evidence of a desire to avoid an objectively matter-of-fact explication of 
literature – in this case, of the late Romantics with a strongly individual approach to their art – 
in favour of a more personal engagement, centred on capitalising on modes of ‘listening’ in 
both outer and ‘inner’ ears, represented by the musical notation and dreaming, respectively.  
                                                          
53 H.D., The Sword Went Out to Sea (Synthesis of a Dream), by Delia Alton, ed. Cynthia Hogue and Julie 
Vandivere (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2007), p. 35; p. 99. Further references to Sword are given 
in parentheses in the text. 
54 Caroline Zilboorg (ed.), Richard Aldington and H.D.: Their lives in letters 1918-1961 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2003), p. 274. 
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Delia takes the desire of the airmen to ‘convey something’ seriously, and begins to 
engage self-consciously in a particular mode of reading and interpretation that utilises aesthetic 
and associational stances in order to tease out the most from the messages she receives (92). 
While acknowledging that her reading material isn’t ‘pages of paper’, Delia pares back the 
reading process to its bare bones: ‘I did know that a single letter or group of letters or numbers, 
or numbers interspersed with letters, pauses and dashes could express what it would take “pages 
of paper” to do’ (93). It is at this point that remembrance of the lecture notes becomes 
significant. Having acknowledged the importance of rhythm and metre (and also rhyme), Delia 
says that it is ‘the tone of voice, the quality not necessarily the quantity of the words that matter’ 
(101). Later in the text, in ‘Summerdream’, the aesthetic stance is expressed by the metaphor 
of a drifting leaf. If a leaf ‘drifts and spins in the air, the answer [to a question – a point of 
inquiry] is, turn your question round and round, turn it over and over, before you make up your 
mind’ (180). Delia recognises that the material she reads requires a subtler stance than an 
excessively efferent one geared at extracting information. Her approach to her ‘literary’ 
material, firmly aesthetic, seems to seep into how she transacts with the airmen’s messages.  
Framing her spiritualist activities in the context of literary inquiry enables us to see 
Delia’s activity as an instance of aesthetic reading followed by expressed response and 
expressed interpretation (the text we in turn read). Her research process is one of negotiating 
textual sociability on a personalistic level: she is concerned with the sociability of her 
associations to create meaning. In this sense, Delia strikes out on her own to engage in 
something more personal than that which the lectures offer. One can agree with Friedman in 
saying that H.D.’s use of psychic phenomena in her art ‘in no sense identifies H.D. with those 
who equated the outpourings of a medium with art’.55 But one can also agree with her when 
she says that H.D. (and Delia) had to ‘decipher’ and ‘recast’ such material ‘in the consciously 
                                                          
55 Friedman, Psyche Reborn, p. 197. 
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controlled codes of art’.56 While the messages from the RAF are not in themselves art, in 
‘turning them over’ in her mind and then writing them in Sword, Delia is simultaneously 
aestheticising the material and eliding it with the other literary research she is doing, while also 
embedding her reading and interpretation into a self-consciously personal journey of 
exploration. Delia reports how the reading occurred, what techniques she engaged in to arrive 
at her interpretation, and the significance she accords to the process as part of a broader quest 
to stop the war, incarnated in the wise, alchemically-rhymed truth that ‘Love was eternal, hate 
was ephemeral. That is what I learned during my illness’ (49). Reading Delia’s personal 
account of her reading experiences offers us a different kind of window onto aesthetic 
experience than reading Rosenblatt; H.D. focuses the lens firmly on herself and in doing so 
subtly validates in a vulnerable way the efficacy of a personalistic understanding of literary 
experience.  
Stemming from an aesthetic stance to her reading material, Delia represents this 
learning process leading to wisdom by using three main images, all of which position 
associational, aesthetic thinking at their heart. Contemplating refugees from France escaping 
to Britain via a channel tunnel leads Delia to meditate on the metaphorical significance of 
tunnels as an exploratory medium (51). The ‘war was going on in the tunnels’, she writes: 
‘Some had been constructed fairly recently. It seems however, that nobody [except Delia] 
realized that these latter-day tunnels were built over a series or layer of extinct or “dead” 
tunnels’, and ‘under the “dead” tunnels, there were still others’ (52). Delia is not explicit about 
what these ‘dead’ tunnels are precisely, other than that somehow they are buried beneath the 
‘the underground’ in London and its ‘“shelter” life’ (53).  
The importance of the tunnels lies in their eventual point of access to a ‘bee-hive’, 
which is H.D.’s second image. Delia describes the ‘bee-hive’ as a repository for ‘all the 
                                                          
56 Ibid., p. 198. 
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treasures of the world’. Significantly, ‘there was a printing-press and a store of “lost” books. 
The press was used for re-printing and distributing manuscripts’ (53). The presence of ‘lost’ 
books may refer to those that were destroyed in the war to salvage paper or potentially to those 
that were refused publication due to paper shortages and so ‘lost’ in the sense of having never 
existed.57 Either way, their outward presence is not what preoccupies Delia; she is more 
interested in their inner capacity to heal and restore – in how they materialise or ‘re-print’ their 
lost treasure in her mind. The bee-hive consists of multiple rooms or cells of which Delia only 
concerns herself with one: ‘The light in the room was given out by the stones […] I was 
supposed to stay here till I got well’ (53). The presence of a dwelling place ‘at the very centre 
of the earth’, reachable through ‘dead tunnels’, and that somehow facilitates a healing process 
involving reading material, foregrounds the personal, private, almost incubatory nature of this 
experience (53). The tunnels represent a mental map that the individual journeys into, and yet 
the bee-hive with its reading material stresses the transactional, dynamic nature of this quest. 
The healing properties of the bee-hive intimate the restorative nature of Delia’s transaction 
with her reading material.   
Commensurable with the bee-hive and the tunnels leading to it is Delia’s insistence that 
‘life advances in a spiral’, encapsulated in the image of a spiral-shell (40-41), which is H.D.’s 
third image. By turns a spiral-shell and a carapax (akin to a tortoise’s shell), the image 
foreshadows Helen’s quest in Helen in Egypt (1961) to ‘re-integrate’ the soul, which resonates 
with H.D.’s broader modernist project of finding ways of rebuilding civilization in the 
aftermath of destruction.58 In this particular scene of H.D.’s epic poem, Theseus tells Helen to 
‘rest’ and to ‘disappear into the web, / the shell, re-integrate, / nor fear to recall’ the violence 
of war she has experienced.59 Simultaneously a ‘carapax enclosing the soul’ and a spiral, a 
                                                          
57 See H.D., Collected Poems 1912-1944, ed. Louis L. Martz (New York: New Directions, 1983), p. 518. 
58 H.D., Helen in Egypt (New York: New Directions, 1961), p. 170. 
59 Ibid. 
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meandering tunnel, Delia tells her readers that the shell is an analogy for ‘the soul’s progress’, 
perhaps echoing the sense of spiritual quest depicted in works such as John Bunyan’s The 
Pilgrim’s Progress.  
In their essay on metaphors for wisdom inquiry, Fraser and Hyland-Russell affirm the 
spiral nautilus shell as a ‘generative metaphor of wisdom’.60 According to these authors, the 
spiral nautilus shell ‘is constructed as a series of chambers that lead deeper into further 
chambers, spiralling around the inner self’, and as such, ‘can be a profound metaphor for the 
deepening awareness and integration of one’s personal, relational, and cultural stories’.61 
Importantly, while the spiral nautilus proceeds inward, the ‘chambers also open outward, 
connecting the inner creature with the surrounding sea’.62 This dialectic between the self and 
other (the sea) chimes with Delia’s concept of personality, whereby the more individual people 
become, ‘the more they will grow to resemble one another’ and thus ‘integrate’ (67). The 
symbiotic relationship between self and other in Sword prefigures my discussion in Chapter 3 
of relationships between people, or the place of diversity within unity which a theory of 
personalist textual sociability encourages. This theory’s particular vision of human relations 
accords with established personalist concepts of unity – such as Kireevsky’s sense that 
‘integral’ modes of knowing centred in the heart are conducive to fostering unity among people 
more generally.63 For now, it is sufficient to say that Delia’s understanding of aesthetic 
experience seems intimately tied to the kind of personal growth Rosenblatt was advocating in 
explicit terms. But how precisely does such growth occur? The bee-hive and the spiral-shell or 
carapax are figured as healing spaces where a person journeys inwards in order to integrate 
internally and externally. 
                                                          
60 Wilma Fraser and Tara Hyland-Russell, ‘Searching for Sophia: Adult Educators and Adult Learners as Wisdom 
Seekers’, New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education, 131 (2011): 25-34, p. 29. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Khomiakov and Kireevsky, On Spiritual Unity, p. 22. 
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The experience of being in the bee-hive cell transliterates into aesthetic transactions 
later in the text, which encourage Delia to pursue ‘traces of direction’, or associative networks 
spiralling around the ‘inner self’. It is at this point that H.D.’s language most explicitly weaves 
itself into a discourse of personalist textual sociability, allowing the previous three images to 
integrate themselves into the implications of pursuing ‘traces of direction’ – a process that 
journeys into the tunnels of the literary experience and spends time in the healing space of the 
bee-hive, with its repository of literary reverberations. The chapter ‘Traces of Direction’ shifts 
the setting from London to 1946 Lugano, Switzerland, where Delia is staying at the Pensione 
Ghirlanda (109). The theme of reading messages from dead airmen is carried over in spirit 
through Delia’s consistent transactional stance to her environment. Seated in the hotel drawing-
room, Delia begins to transact aesthetically with objects in her surroundings. Fragrances can 
be ‘apprehended’ but perhaps initially not ‘understood’ (109). Through associative links, ‘we 
can relate or compare this fragrance to others. It evokes emotions and we can accept or dismiss 
the scenes, the places, the rooms, the people that we associate with this flower’ (109-110). Such 
associations are fished from the ‘motes of memory’, which can sometimes be ‘unpredictable’ 
(113). As a homophone of ‘moat’, ‘mote’ evokes both the depth and the specificity of the 
memories sought after. A floral fragrance is not a ‘text’ in Rosenblatt’s sense of the word; what 
Delia (H.D.) does for us is to generalise the evocation, associational, and selective attention 
stages to other forms of aesthetic transaction that draw upon the reservoir or ‘moat’ of personal, 
‘mote’-like experiences. In other words, the strength of H.D.’s imagery is precisely in its 
nebulousness, refracted through the personality. Embedded into a discourse of personalist 
textual sociability, it permits learners, as Fraser and Hyland-Russell say, to engage closely with 
the process as they allow the metaphorical language to bring them closer to the personal 
experience of the aesthetic transaction. 
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From the fragrance of flowers Delia moves her attention to a table positioned near her 
with four square tiles affixed to the table top. Transacting with the artwork on the tiles ‘recalls’ 
a number of things in Delia’s mind (112-113). She ‘finds’ a ‘thread’ and follows it ‘through 
the labyrinth’, echoing the tunnels of earlier passages that lead to the regenerative bee-hive 
(113). As Friedman implies, this quest or journey through labyrinthine tunnels requires a 
different mental stance to an excessively efferent extraction of logical inferences from one 
experience to another. Echoing the psychoanalytic and astrological method, Friedman writes 
that ‘each seeker must leave behind for a time the rational thought processes of the conscious 
mind to let the spontaneous play of free association restore fragments of the unconscious’.64 
H.D. was undoubtedly influenced by Freud (see Chapter 4 and below), but in Sword she uses 
a principle of psychoanalytic therapy and astrological exploration – association – in order to 
organise her experiences, marshalling them to make sense of a particular stimulus with which 
she is currently in aesthetic transaction.  
The ‘play of free association’ is very much organised play rather than Rosenblatt’s 
disorganised ‘revery [sic]’, which is spoken of with contempt when it escapes warranted 
assertability.65 Akin to Rosenblatt’s commitment to selective attention, Delia talks of 
‘accepting’ or ‘dismissing’ various elements of association that come to mind in a given 
transaction. When Delia says of a connection, ‘It may seem a far cry’ (114), or, ‘historically, I 
may be quite wrong’ (116), this is not so much an embrace of pure subjective free-play, but a 
reflection on the different criteria of interpretation needed according to an aesthetic transaction 
undertaken. Delia recognises that the material she is dealing with is prompting the kind of 
experience Rosenblatt would claim is aesthetic or ‘literary’: the evocation of the aesthetic 
requires thought processes that use a different mindset to historicism. It is a preference for 
                                                          
64 Friedman, Psyche Reborn, p. 195. 
65 Rosenblatt, The Reader, the Text, the Poem, p. 29. 
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organising experience by ‘emotional time’ rather than ‘clock time’. In contrast to a diachronic 
historicism, Delia welcomes the far-flung ‘cry’ echoing or ‘chiming’ in the spiral nautilus sea-
shell, of a synchronic, associational dialogism between ‘personal, relational, and cultural 
stories’.66 In a sense, the cry heard in ‘emotional time’ rather than ‘clock time’ foreshadows 
the manifestation of ‘the Visitor’ in The Mystery who helps the individual to ‘veer round’ so 
that they are ‘uncanonically seated’ (see below). Moreover, H.D.’s preference for dream time 
over clock time resonates with Woolf’s distinction between ‘clock time’ and ‘emotional time’ 
in The Common Reader (1929).67 For both Woolf and H.D., who draw on the French 
philosopher, Henri Bergson, a central conviction seems to be that these two modes of time 
represent different ways of organising experiences: either by the ‘dry facts’ of ‘clock time’, or 
by the ‘moments of being’ that are more subjectively felt and meaningful to the self.68 Rather 
than ‘emotional’ or ‘dream’, I think the term ‘existential time’ seems to encapsulate both 
meanings more adequately, without suggesting that the intellect is void in such a framework. 
Existential time underscores the personal nature of the time in which experiences are 
connected.  
The second book of Sword pursues theses ‘traces of direction’ through a method Delia 
refers to as ‘pleated folds’: the Dowell-Delia relationship and the activity of transacting with 
material manifests or is assembled in different folds of time which are organised emotionally 
or personalistically rather than objectively. ‘Summerdream’ is therefore a ‘spiritual map’ of 
personalist textual sociability that contains ‘various layers of experience, different lives, if you 
will or manifestations of the same life’ (215). It is also a map that is ‘accordion-pleated – it 
was pleated anyway, yet laid flat’. The flatness of the pleats is significant because of its 
                                                          
66 Fraser and Hyland-Russell, ‘Searching for Sophia’, p. 29. 
67 For Woolf, see Virginia Woolf, The Common Reader (London: Hogarth Press, 1929), p. 189. For H.D., see 
H.D., ‘H.D. by Delia Alton’, The Iowa Review, 16 (1986): 180-221, p. 219.  
68 Atherton, Defining Literary Criticism, p. 106. See Bryony Randall, Modernism, Daily Time and Everyday Life 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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horizontal terrain that permits both writer and reader to crawl horizontally, like a crab, along 
various associational, spiral-shell echoes. ‘Historically’, we may be quite wrong in connecting 
‘various layers of experience’, but if the criteria have changed for an adequate ‘reading’, then 
these become important based on their ability to nurture or ‘consecrate’ and ‘concentrate’ the 
quest for personal and social transformation (215). The ‘pictures’ that surface through 
understanding the aesthetic experience ‘sometimes seem to be made up of unrelated segments 
[as in some astrological and psychoanalytic readings], yet they spell something’ (215). This is 
both ‘spell’ in the literacy sense but also in the magical, active sense of construing or moulding 
meaning. For Rosenblatt they would be one and the same thing, given her emphasis on the 
reader’s selective activity in making meaning.  
As a theory of personalist textual sociability is forming, it is worth pausing to 
underscore its central aspects. The main concept of the discourse is the importance of 
associational thinking in evoking a literary work of art from a text and in then ascertaining a 
text’s sociability, or mapping a landscape of further research based on the resonance of various 
experiential echoes, literary and non-literary, in a person’s ‘inner ear’. Rosenblatt’s language 
is more scientific in places, and can at times lead away from the personalist, imaginative 
journey of the process that holds learning (the quest for wisdom) at its heart. H.D., on the other 
hand, developed a personal praxis of questing after wisdom, based on the synthesis of various 
theoretical or philosophical frameworks, such as psychoanalysis, astrology, and spiritualism 
(to name a few). In her work from the Second World War, she deploys a range of images to 
communicate her investigative processes, many of which positioned, albeit elliptically, 
aesthetic experience at their heart. Transacting with verbal and visual stimuli (messages from 
dead pilots and pictures in a hotel drawing-room), H.D.’s protagonist, Delia Alton, journeys 
into a series of tunnels that lead her to a bee-hive or spiral-shell in which she traces various 
associations or directions the aesthetic experience is calling forth within her. As Fraser and 
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Hyland-Russell suggest, the richness of this imagery lies in its connection to learning processes, 
which for H.D. were conducted during a time of psychological and social upheaval. It is as if 
her imaginative language is deployed as a method of finding beauty and personal equilibrium 
at a time of constant threat of annihilation and anonymity. H.D.’s personalistic language 
therefore draws out the fragility and importance of the learning process and the aesthetic 
experience at the heart of it.  
The important move that both Rosenblatt and H.D. allow me to make is to allow the 
individual to legislate their own textual map based on recognising the validity of their unique 
personal experiences. It is in this sense that textual sociability is personalist; it cannot be created 
by another. That H.D.’s contribution is itself manifestly personal merely underscores the 
fundamental change which I am trying to highlight – a move away from finding sociability ‘out 
there’, in a broad context and which is typically authorised by somebody else, to finding it 
within, in transaction with a given text at a given moment, and thus, to anticipate the work of 
Peter Barry, evoking a deep context in existential time.69 
In the next section, I pursue the overall theme of personalist textual sociability by 
looking at case studies of individuals who are situated in quest and who engage in forms of 
personalist textual sociability as part of this quest. For H.D., The Mystery depicts an extended 
metaphor of a meeting between questors in a cathedral, which I read as a more fundamental 
metaphor for the literary experience and a process of learning. In both H.D.’s novel and in the 
work of Rosenblatt’s colleague, Gordon Pradl, personalist textual sociability tightly links 
textual associations with actual human relations, thus further underscoring the connections 
between literature and life highlighted in Chapter 1. For H.D., love between people is 
representative of an illuminating aesthetic experience, whereas for Pradl, democratic relations 
                                                          
69 On ‘broad’ and ‘deep’ contexts, see Peter Barry, Literature in Contexts (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2012), p. 26. 
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between students offer opportunities for learners to gain a better understanding of their own 
literary experiences, and thus of the possibilities for personalist textual sociability. 
 
Personalist Textual Sociability in Practice: Case Studies 
Engaging the Visitor in the Cathedral in The Mystery 
Referred to by H.D. as her ‘dear Prague story’, The Mystery is the stepping-stone between 
H.D.’s World War Two writing and her epic poem, Helen in Egypt (1960), in that this short 
novel continues themes explored previously in Majic Ring and Sword, while foreshadowing 
events in Helen.70 In the mid-late 1940s H.D. pursued historical romance as a genre in which 
she could explore relationships and experiences important to her, but in a way that removed 
them somewhat through a mode of ‘aesthetic distance’.71 In fact, this kind of layering implies 
the palimpsest – a concept which is particularly vital to H.D. and which will be explored in 
more detail in the next chapter. By distancing her experiences through embedding them in 
historical fiction, H.D. was not trying to detach herself from their intimacy in her life; but, as 
Rosenblatt believed, this mode of aesthetic distancing can allow the reader (or author) to 
effectively manage their experiences in a secure way, without becoming too emotionally 
involved, insecure, or distressed, and thus run the risk of not gaining anything at all by dwelling 
on them.72 As with other aspects of H.D.’s work and Rosenblatt’s thought, taken separately, 
this emphasis on aesthetic distance is not original to these thinkers; yet my task is to bring 
together multiple facets of their work and weave them into a theoretical intervention which 
addresses contemporary concerns in literary theory. In that sense, aesthetic distance is an 
important feature of their work.   
                                                          
70 Quoted in H.D., The Mystery, ed. Jane Augustine (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2010), p. 126. 
Further references to this text are given in parentheses in the main body. 
71 Louise M. Rosenblatt, ‘Pattern and Process – A Polemic’, The English Journal, 58 (1969): 1005-1012, p. 1007. 
72 Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 4th ed., p. 205. 
 110 
 
The historical romances of the Delia-Lord Howell dyad in the ‘Summerdream’ section 
of Sword materialise in The Mystery through the highly spiritualised meeting of the protagonist, 
Count Louis Saint-Germain (1696?-1784), and Elizabeth de Watteville. This Elizabeth is the 
fictional persona of the historical Elisabeth von Watteville (born 1754), granddaughter of 
Nikolaus Louis, Count von Zinzendorf (1700-1760), who was the founder of the Moravian 
Church or the ‘Moravian-Slavic Church’ (111). While a story about Zinzendorf and the 
Moravian Church echoes H.D.’s memoir of her Moravian childhood, The Gift, written in 
London from 1941-43, The Mystery transcends The Gift in using Moravianism to present a 
more substantial message about the capacity of love to be victorious over conflict. The story 
essentially relates Saint-Germain’s initiation into the Moravian ‘Mystery’, which is being 
investigated by Elizabeth and her cousin, Henry Dohna. Set just before Christmas on the eve 
of the French Revolution, the novel’s mood is tense: all three characters have retreated to 
Prague, and particularly to the Cathedral of St. Vitus (known for its healing properties), because 
they are in quest of insight that will allow them to proceed with their lives in a more fulfilled 
way.  
The significance of The Mystery in the context of this thesis is threefold, and each aspect 
will be explored in turn. Firstly, The Mystery is overtly concerned with the experience of being 
in quest, and the ways in which associations enhance this quest. Secondly, the novel continues 
a metaphor which repeatedly appears in H.D.’s work, and which I argue symbolises a specific 
mode of associational consciousness characterised by peaceful, egalitarian connections, and 
which can be folded into the overall development of personalist textual sociability. Finally, 
both the actual human relations in the novel, and the deeper metaphorisation process at work, 
lend themselves to a pedagogically inflected exploration of personalist textual sociability.  
Having stated that all three principal characters in the novel are situated in quest, the 
Cathedral of St. Vitus becomes a place of healing for Saint-Germain, who is disguised as 
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Brother Antonius and is working in ‘Pedagogy’ in the Castle complex as ‘consultant to the 
Castle Library’ (12) and ‘Keeper of the Archives’ (58). Echoing the regenerative space of the 
bee-hive in Sword, the Cathedral of St. Vitus becomes a place of healing when Saint-Germain 
experiences ‘the Visitor’ who causes him to ‘veer round’. As a Moravian, Elizabeth is part of 
the Jednota Bratrská, which is the Czech title for the Church, and which means ‘association’. 
A member of a loving association, Elizabeth moves into Saint-Germain’s life in the Cathedral 
and causes him to ‘veer round’ (21).  
 As a story set before Christmas, the character of the Visitor who moves into a human’s 
life is strongly connected to the Nativity or the Incarnation. By setting the story just before 
Christmas, H.D. echoes her earlier poem The Flowering of the Rod (written 1944), in which 
the woman’s transformation from the conflated Mary of Bethany / Mary Magdalene to the 
Virgin herself culminates in the Nativity and the adoration of the Magi at Epiphany – the 
coming of the visitors to the woman formerly tainted by the suspicion of conceiving out of 
wedlock, but who is now vindicated and in possession of the Messiah. In the same way that 
Mary is transformed with the help of multiple visitations in the poem, Saint-Germain in The 
Mystery is positioned as an ‘initiate’ or learner who, through a state of receptive consciousness, 
is transformed by encountering the Visitor in the temple or cathedral. 
 Yet while the novel depicts the actual act of two people meeting in a cathedral, it is 
important also to view the meeting in the cathedral on a more metaphorical level, as indicative 
of a specific mode of consciousness connected with existential time. While H.D. is keen to 
assert a particular mode of human association in her story, between Saint-Germain and 
Elizabeth (whom Saint-Germain believes to be the Holy Spirit), she also seems to link this 
actual encounter to an essential image in her wider work, which underscores her tendency to 
advocate the importance of associational thinking.  
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In H.D.’s work the image of a temple can manifest as different buildings (house, chapel, 
cathedral, shrine etc.), but their variety should not detract from the central effect.73 The temple 
is repeatedly invoked (in Paint it Today, Pilate’s Wife, Majic Ring, Bid Me to Live, and Helen 
in Egypt) as a meeting place for lovers or friends who come together to create a different kind 
of existence, often with a different appreciation of time, to one witnessed in the outside world, 
which is frequently characterised by conflict or violence.74 Janice Robinson’s work shows that 
according to H.D.’s imagism, which she developed from 1911 onwards but which she carried 
over into her later work in less obvious forms, the image of the temple is simultaneously a 
reference to human consciousness (tempora).75 The mode of human association played out 
inside the temple is therefore, in imagist aesthetics, also a specific kind of consciousness.  
As a metaphor for the literary experience, the meeting of two individuals in a temple 
represents an image of a particular form of associational consciousness, which organises 
experiences very much along the lines of the transactional literary experience. In other words, 
the meeting of lovers in the temple and its more underlying indication of associational 
consciousness favours existential time over clock time, mapping associations through the 
pleated folds of time, discovering and delineating these connections at the same time, and, most 
fundamentally, they are done so through concrete personalities.  
The aesthetics of H.D.’s imagism is characterised by a specific mode of association that 
mirrors the human relationships and the mode of consciousness they inaugurate. Robinson 
explains the way early critics of imagism understood its mechanics: May Sinclair, for example, 
wrote in 1915 that imagism  
                                                          
73 In H.D.’s papers at Yale there is also a drawing by H.D. of a small church edifice set apart. 
74 A similar phenomenon occurs in Rebecca West’s The Return of the Soldier (1918), in which a couple create a 
new world for themselves in a little house on Monkey island – a love which triumphs over war. As far as I know, 
H.D. was not influenced by West’s novel. Robinson does show, however, that H.D. may have responded to D. H. 
Lawrence’s The Man Who Died (1929) and Lady Chatterley’s Lover (1928), both of which focus on a passion 
between a man and a woman in a remote, secluded shelter.  
75 Robinson, H.D., p. 383.  
 113 
 
is not Symbolism…the Image is not a substitute; it does not stand for 
anything but itself. Presentation not Representation is the watchword of 
the school. The Image, I take it, […] is form and substance… And in 
no case is the Image a symbol of reality (the object); it is reality (the 
object) itself.76 
The mode of consciousness the lovers initiate in the temple is at the same time a reality for them 
in their physical and emotional union: the temple is tempora. H.D.’s images need to be read as 
presentations, as materialisations of an experience – in this case, the initiation of a new type of 
consciousness based on reconfigured associations between actual people. For Robinson, the 
feminism of H.D.’s imagism lies in its non-violent aesthetics: that one thing does not ‘stand 
for’ another thing (56). As ‘presentations of a situation’, H.D.’s images are existential and 
synchronistic: by presenting her experience in images, she moves away from ‘historical 
process’, because the aesthetics of imagism have a horizontal, egalitarian, or levelling dynamic, 
characterised by equality, rather than the vertical or hierarchical, substitutionary dynamic of 
older forms of metaphorical imagination and writing. Her imagist aesthetics prefigure the 
‘pleated folds’ of time in Sword, which are laid flat. It is important to see that what Robinson 
says about H.D.’s feminist aesthetics can also be applied to H.D.’s mode of thinking: a non-
violent associative consciousness permits the individual to map a landscape of textual 
sociability which is not forced from without, but somehow seems germane to the person in 
question, and is, therefore, deeply personalist.  
To take a concrete example, using the discourse I have developed above: in a previous 
piece of literary criticism I undertook I intuited and then analysed textual sociability within and 
between George Eliot’s Middlemarch and Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, in the 
                                                          
76 Quoted in ibid, p. 99, original emphasis. Subsequent references to this text are given in parentheses in the main 
body. 
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context of exploring the religious influences in the personal creativity of the literary hostess, 
Ottoline Morrell. Through a chiming in my inner ear, I focused on the similarities between the 
experiences and personalities of Dorothea Brooke and Ottoline, and on the existential situation 
of being depicted in art in Dorian Gray and in Ottoline’s memoirs and journals. H.D.’s 
metaphor of the temple as consciousness which inaugurates a new, peaceful mode of 
association between people richly expresses the way I brought texts together based on a revised 
understanding of context – away from a top-down, historically verifiable link between texts 
and individuals, toward an inner, more personalist and existential connective landscape. There 
was a meeting in the temple of my consciousness, between Dorothea Brooke, Dorian Gray, and 
Ottoline Morrell, in the context of a given experience which I argued was existentially similar. 
The value of H.D.’s metaphor is its ability to capture the personalist nature of this form of 
sociability: the association is characterised by a form of love – a peaceful, non-violent form of 
sociability which germinates in the tempora of the personal reader.  
By arguing that H.D.’s imagism was heavily influenced by her early Moravian 
upbringing, however, Robinson opens the path for further work dealing with H.D.’s interest in 
Moravian praxis and theology in relation to imagery. Consulting historical sources, Robinson 
glosses Moravianism as a ‘culture that is more attuned to love than to power’ (83). Members 
of the Church are part of a ‘community of shared experience, of shared symbolism, of a 
common language about the experience of life’ (83). Such ‘language’ is governed by the logic 
of ‘the imagination and passions rather than reason’ – a point which echoes Friedman’s 
comment about H.D.’s psychoanalytic and astrological modes of thinking (86). Effectively 
more attuned to existential time than clock time, Moravians believe, significantly, that a state 
of living in peace with others ‘depend[s] upon the creation of another world of consciousness’ 
to that governed by power, reason, and oppression (113). Recalling the image of two lovers 
meeting in a temple, in The Mystery H.D. frames the meeting in explicit pedagogical terms 
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because she is also alluding to her extended metaphor of the temple as consciousness. The 
‘veering round’ which Elizabeth initiates in the Cathedral is both an actual veering round, but 
also a more abstract one, concerned with a development in thought. In other words, I am 
suggesting that it is precisely the associational consciousness indicated in H.D.’s imagery that 
is particularly conducive to the kind of learning process symbolised by veering round. 
 There are two aspects to the veering round that propel Saint-Germain forward in his 
quest. The first is that he comes to realise the significance of the Visitor, and the pattern of 
events that have led to this transformation. As someone trained ‘to watch, to wait, to assemble 
the particulars to match like a trained worker in mosaic, the various fragments’, Saint-
Germain’s academic training and work in Pedagogy is used to effect in helping him to trace 
the directions which Elizabeth-as-Visitor has evoked in his mind (62). Yet if we take into 
account other encounters in temples in H.D.’s work, we can see that the location is also 
significant, and represents a performance of a hidden mental process. As an imagist aesthetic, 
Saint-Germain’s meeting with a Visitor in the Cathedral of St. Vitus enacts a mental process 
akin to personalist textual sociability. As a metaphor for the literary experience, the encounter 
with the Visitor in the temple or tempora encourages a process designed to enunciate the 
various links – the chiming of particular associations in the inner ear. Mapped onto Rosenblatt’s 
concepts, the Visitor can be those aspects of a literary experience that especially resonate with 
the reader. A reader transacts with a work and encounters multiple Visitors, which help him to 
veer round on a given topic personal to him. Although of course, the Visitor might also be an 
educational mentor who enters the temple of the literary experience with the reader. 
 That the Visitor might be a mentor of sorts is especially pertinent when we consider 
that H.D. used ‘veering round’ to describe her response to Freud’s involvement in her 
psychoanalysis in the 1930s.77 H.D. is lying on the analysand’s couch in Freud’s consulting 
                                                          
77 H.D., Tribute to Freud (New York: New Directions, 2012), p. 14. 
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room in Vienna, and, she says, ‘for myself, I veer round, uncanonically seated stark upright 
with my feet on the floor’. That ‘veering round’ and being ‘uncanonically seated’ are spoken 
in the same breath is significant. As a mode of transformation, veering round is inherently 
linked to a change in the status quo. Miranda B. Hickman has related H.D.’s feeling of being 
canonically displaced to her outsider position in literary history.78 But can we not also say that 
in the context of The Mystery and in light of the echo of Tribute to Freud, to ‘veer round’ and 
be ‘uncanonically seated’ is also to be grounded in a different orientation to historical process 
more generally? As a mentor, Freud helps H.D. to free associate using a psychoanalytic method 
to free herself of rational control and to organise her experiences in what seems to H.D. to be 
an ‘uncanonical’ way. This is both substantive, in terms of what becomes the focus of attention, 
and also an ethical move that displaces H.D.’s thinking from historical precedents.  
 Thus, The Mystery also affirms the relationship between personalist textual sociability 
and the overall, ethical direction of learning. Elizabeth and Henry are in Prague to research ‘the 
eternal pre-existing Plan to bring heaven on earth’, which was carried to the United States by 
their grandfather, Zinzendorf, in 1741 (132). As a Moravian born in the place (Bethlehem, PA) 
the Moravians consecrated on Christmas Eve 1741, H.D. layered her own quest to discover her 
heritage in that of the Moravian cousins in The Mystery. Opposed to conflict, violence, and 
war, H.D. and the Moravians orient veering round as a learning process by which the individual 
comes to appreciate the need for multi-ethnic identification and peace among different peoples 
(see Chapter 3 for more on pluralism): this is the essence of the ‘Mystery’.  
 Indeed, such a need for peaceful unity is strongly reminiscent of the wisdom found in 
passages of Isaiah in the Bible that connect a shelter edifice to associations among people based 
on love in a time of war. Bereft of their home by violence, the Israelites are compared to ‘a 
                                                          
78 Miranda B. Hickman, ‘“Uncanonically Seated”: H.D. and literary canons’ in Nephie J. Christodoulides and 
Polina Mackay (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to H.D. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 
9-22. 
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cottage in a vineyard, as a lodge in a garden of cucumbers’ (Isa. 1:8).79 And yet it is in such a 
situation that they become receptive to the promise of the Visitor: ‘there shall come forth a rod 
out of the stem of Jesse, and a Branch shall grow out of his roots’ (Isa. 11:1). By linking the 
arrival of the Visitor to a veering round to values based on peace and harmony, the underlying 
‘spirit’ pervading the process in Isaiah is one of ‘rest’ (Isa. 11:10). It is likely that H.D. was 
familiar with such Biblical passages, given that her Moravianism presented believers as a 
‘remnant’ who hold fast to true values.  
 If we recall the aesthetics of H.D.’s imagism, which are based on principles of non-
violence – eschewing substitution and ‘historical process’ in favour of a timeless presentation 
of synchronistic experiences – then the connection between the various modes of association 
she explores through her images and the learning outcomes at the end of the process seems 
intricately developed. The basis for connecting peoples and experiences as a learner 
‘uncanonically seated’ is mirrored in the learning transformation or veering round, centred on 
egalitarian or levelling principles of justice, peace, and rest.  
The Mystery develops the insights drawn from Sword because it is a story concerned 
with individuals situated in quest, who undergo some form of transformation. H.D.’s imagery, 
both in Sword and in The Mystery provides a necessary personalisation of Rosenblatt’s more 
abstract concepts concerning aesthetic reading and the literary experience. And yet, Rosenblatt 
is able to tease out the broader implications of H.D.’s intricate aesthetic work. But rather than 
returning to Rosenblatt for further instances of personalist textual sociability at work, I am 
going to focus on its applicability by turning briefly to the work of her colleague, Gordon Pradl.  
Pradl applies Rosenblatt’s transactional theory to thinking about the dynamics of 
classroom learning, where the instructor’s authority is of particular interest. Pradl continues the 
theme of egalitarian relationships between people while also defending the transactional 
                                                          
79 Biblical quotations are taken from the Authorized version. 
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literary experience from some negative aspects of various contextual and reader-response 
approaches, which for Pradl seemed to tower over literary theory during the early- to mid-
1990s. Pradl makes the necessary link between particular approaches to contexts and the 
political implications in actual classroom environments. Indeed, Pradl helps to crystallise the 
link between a certain way of knowing, which I have articulated as personalist textual 
sociability, and concrete politics between people – a theme which is developed more 
extensively in the next chapter.  
 
Democratic Learning, Literary Associations, and Contextualisms 
Gordon Pradl, whose work is the principal subject of this section, first met Rosenblatt in the 
mid-1960s when he took an MA in English Education at NYU, before moving to Harvard to 
undertake his doctorate. He moved back as staff to NYU for Rosenblatt’s final year before her 
retirement, in 1972. Pradl’s engagement with Rosenblatt’s work has been consistently focused 
on her interest in democracy; indeed, he extends our understanding of Rosenblatt at the same 
time as creating his own pedagogy based on her theories.80 Distancing her from reader-response 
theorists in the 1980s, Pradl has tried to show how her philosophy of transactional reading has 
an intricate relationship to how the teaching and learning of literature should proceed.  
His book, Literature for Democracy: Reading as a Social Act was published primarily 
for teachers of English in 1996, and builds explicitly on Rosenblatt’s work, especially 
Literature as Exploration, coinciding with the publication of its fifth edition in 1995. In this 
book, Pradl separates Rosenblatt from reader-response, shows how she anticipates the cultural 
critics emerging at the time; and finally, how her emphasis on the individual is nevertheless 
                                                          
80 For example, see Gordon M. Pradl, ‘Reading Literature in a Democracy: The Challenge of Louise Rosenblatt’ 
in John Clifford (ed.), The Experience of Reading: Louise Rosenblatt and Reader-Response Theory (Portsmouth, 
NH: Boynton/Cook, 1991), pp. 23-46; and Gordon M. Pradl, ‘Reading and Democracy: The Enduring Influence 
of Louise Rosenblatt’, The New Advocate, 9 (1996): 9-22. 
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embedded in a more profound discourse about the importance of negotiation, collaboration, 
and compromise among individuals constructing a democracy together. Drawing on my 
discussion in earlier sections of this chapter, I want to show how Pradl’s work can negotiate 
the varieties of contextualisms based on its indebtedness to the transactional theory of the 
literary work and the democratic framework underpinning this. Pradl helps to position 
personalist textual sociability as a form of contextualism which has greater potential to foster 
democratic relations among actual people. For now I shall take ‘democracy’ as self-evident, 
but in the next chapter I will examine in more detail Rosenblatt’s commitment to democracy 
and pluralism. 
 Methodologically, Pradl is confessional about his own struggles as a teacher: his book 
maintains a ‘personal angle to help other teachers of literature to reflect on their own 
practice’.81 In the words of the late-twentieth-century American philosopher of education and 
one-time student of Rosenblatt, Maxine Greene, Pradl moves from the ‘close to the distant, the 
particular to the general without the risk of losing [himself] in the large abstractions that are so 
often confused with certainties’ (see Chapter 4 for more detailed discussion of Greene’s 
work).82 Throughout his book, Pradl’s tone is gentle, honest, and self-reflective; by confessing 
vulnerability regarding his particular struggles as a teacher, he is relinquishing any claims to 
ultimate authority on the ‘distant’ subject of teaching and learning in English. Whereas 
Dressman’s and Webster’s observation about Rosenblatt’s Literature as Exploration was that 
her tone was more collegial than in her later work, Pradl’s collegiality is more evident than 
                                                          
81 Gordon M. Pradl, Literature for Democracy: Reading as a Social Act (Portsmouth, NH: Boynton / Cook, 1996), 
p. xi. Further references to this text are given in parentheses in the main body. 
82 Maxine Greene, Releasing the Imagination: Essays on Education, the Arts, and Social Change (San Francisco, 
CA: Jossey-Bass, 2000), p. 68. 
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both of Rosenblatt’s major books and indeed, he seems at times to be a more obviously 
personalistic thinker than Rosenblatt.83 
 Writing in the mid-1990s, Pradl was conscious of the rise of contextual approaches to 
literary study, which superseded deconstruction as an approach which was concerned to look 
at a text’s sociability in greater detail. Indeed, I would argue that at the institutional level, 
contextual approaches remain dominant as critical approaches, both in teaching and in 
research.84 And yet, as far as Pradl saw things: 
contextual approaches dominated by the teacher’s [or critic’s] display 
of knowledge can quickly yield a scale of reading adequacy, one that 
privileges those student [or academic] readers who have gathered the 
most information about the text. The rest are forced to drown in a sea 
of authoritatively positioned voices. (31) 
Pradl exposes the irony at the heart of some contextualist approaches to literary study, whereby 
‘liberating lectures [or conference papers]’ permeated by neo-Marxist historicism become 
teaching manoeuvres that are ‘seldom innocent or neutral’ (86). What he means by this is that 
while claiming to be radical and emancipatory, or at least politically committed to questioning 
the status quo, the teaching of literature may tend to reinforce traditional authoritative methods 
which are focused on the transmission of knowledge as a fixed body of information about the 
text, which will then be mirrored by the students in their assignments.  
Indeed, I have struggled with this problem of authority in my own teaching, particularly 
of theory, and at the time Pradl offered me personal advice to re-orient the teaching so that 
theory was felt to be needed by students after they had actually had a literary experience, rather 
                                                          
83 Mark Dressman and Joan Parker Webster, ‘Retracing Rosenblatt: “A Textual Archaeology”’, Research in the 
Teaching of English, 36 (2001): 110-45, p. 129. 
84 This is the premise of Peter Barry’s, Literature in Contexts. 
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than given to them as a packaged entity to apply to so-called ‘literary texts’ they were never in 
fact asked to experience as ‘literary’. The famous Brazilian philosopher of education, Paulo 
Freire, spoke of this kind of authority matrix as the ‘banking concept’ of education, whereby 
knowledge is ‘deposited’ by the powerful (those sanctioned to teach) in students’ minds.85 Of 
course, not all teaching inflected by cultural criticism would follow this model; critical literacy, 
for example, is a subtler way of engaging students with critical theory and historical themes.86 
But Pradl’s (and my own) experience of the pedagogies of traditional liberal arts departments 
led him to claim that the teaching of politically engaged literary studies is ‘seldom innocent or 
neutral’. 
It is important to stress that the focus here is on the institutional practice of literary 
studies rather than new developments in scholarship. Eric Hayot, for instance, has argued that 
any failure of contexualist approaches is not down to the ‘heady conceptual arena’, but rather 
to the ‘institutionalization of the period as the fundamental mode of literary study at every level 
of the profession’.87 Felski reiterates that ‘everything conspires to reinforce the idea that the 
original historical meaning of a text is its salient meaning and to devalue the credentials of 
scholars who wander across several periods rather than settling down in one’.88 Concerned with 
a text’s sociability, Felski criticises forms of contextualism for being ‘the functional equivalent 
of cultural relativism, quarantining difference, denying relatedness, and suspending – or less 
kindly, evading – the question of why past texts still matter and how they speak to us now’.89 
Yet Felski fails to make the crucial link between textual sociability and the actual experience 
                                                          
85 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (London: Penguin, 1996), p. 53. The 
so-called ‘marketization of higher education’ in the past twenty years has only inflamed the potency of Freire’s 
metaphor. 
86 See Misson and Morgan, Critical Literacy and the Aesthetic. 
87 Eric Hayot, ‘Against Periodization; or, On Institutional Time’, New Literary History, 42 (2011): 739-56, p. 740, 
original emphasis. 
88 Felski, ‘“Context Stinks!”’, p. 581. 
89 Ibid., p. 577. 
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of reading, particularly in the context of a reader’s reservoir of past literary and linguistic 
experiences. Felski and Hayot lend support to Pradl’s intuition that in their institutional 
manifestations, contextual approaches run the risk of presenting themselves as all-important 
and sometimes too inflexible regarding the varieties of the personal experience of literature, 
which may, as H.D. reminds us, be ‘uncanonically seated’ and thus at variance with acceptable 
contextual frameworks.90  
Moreover, Pradl senses the importance of the individual in Rosenblatt’s work, and this 
leads him to be honest about the difficulties and yet the necessity of creating democracy. He 
claims that most people are not ‘completely predisposed to democracy; someone is always 
playing their music too loudly and I go mad’ (6). Only by remembering that democracy is 
always in process (and thus never fully attained) can this unnaturalness be dealt with. Attuned 
to Rosenblatt’s existentialism, Pradl affirms that individuals are forever in a state of becoming, 
and, in literary studies, ‘literary response is not a search for final meaning’ (9). Rather, those 
involved (learners and educators) need to ‘prepare for the unexpected’ when minds ‘collide’ 
with texts in ‘open conversation’ (10). The implication here is that not only will students 
recognise the importance of Felski’s question of why past texts matter to us now, but that they 
will engage with this question in a personalistic way because the transactional literary 
experience prioritises the individual and his manifold experiences. Pradl helps to move the 
goalposts away from recognising textual sociability per se, towards valuing personalist textual 
sociability, with the individual learner brought into democratic conversation with others. Such 
conversations among students should involve ‘the reading experiences they have initiated for 
themselves’ (134, original emphasis). 
                                                          
90 I do not really include new historicism within this broader notion of ‘contextualism’. Consistent with Peter 
Barry’s manoeuvre in Literature in Contexts, ‘contextualism’ denotes a crude form of bolting texts to various 
historical moments. John Schad, for instance, has claimed that new historicism sometimes engaged in connecting 
‘un-like moments’ in history, and thus is less tied to facticity: John Schad and David Jonathan Y. Bayot, John 
Schad in Conversation (Manila: De La Salle University Publishing House, 2015), p. 12. 
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Also sensing some incongruity between particular literary approaches and how they are 
institutionalised in social discussion, the literary theorist Jane Tompkins (who read Rosenblatt) 
drew upon a table of distinctions made by Ludwig Fischer in order to illustrate another way of 
conceiving and practising reading as a social act:91 
Information Conversation 
intention attention 
on-line facts on-the-line presences 
aggressive receptive 
bits context 
addictive, as reality substitute satisfying 
persuasion common exploration 
finished, structured, ‘brilliant’ open, uncertain 
speed rhythm 
perfect form irregular deviation 
 
Tompkins reproduces this table in her article in order to highlight the consequences of a 
particular way of thinking about literary study. Although she does not connect these two 
paradigms to contextualisms, I think they accurately express the distinctions Pradl and Felski 
are making in their own ways. As with Rosenblatt’s aesthetic-efferent continuum, Fischer’s 
distinctions should also be viewed as two extremes, with mixed approaches predominating. 
Yet the stark contrasts help to theorise the practice of communicating literary research.  
The information paradigm, which seems descriptive of some forms of contextualism 
singled out for criticism by Felski and Pradl, may in fact foster attitudes and habits which are 
                                                          
91 Jane Tompkins, ‘Scenes from a Conference: Discovering the True Nature of Liberal Conversation’, Change, 
23 (1991): 6-8, p.7. Tompkins references Rosenblatt in her edited volume, Reader Response Criticism: From 
Formalism to Post-Structuralism (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. xxvi. 
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destructive to true learning and which seem anti-personalist. The conversation paradigm, on 
the other hand, seems more sensitive to the ways in which individuals create their own textual 
sociability in their reading, and privilege a mode of social discussion which allows for the 
necessary personalism inherent in such stances. To echo Rosenblatt’s transactional mode of 
literary criticism, the conversation paradigm would seem to invite some insight into the reading 
experience itself. And when H.D.’s practice is brought into the picture, we find that her various 
metaphors for literary experience and the associational consciousness at its heart – the pleated 
folds of time, the bee-hive centre for healing and regeneration, the spiral shell of exploration, 
and the cathedral of non-violent association – align with the essential spirit of the 
conversational paradigm. H.D.’s approach is tentative, exploratory, and allows for moments of 
‘irregular deviation’. Her modernist and existentialist impulse means that an uncertain end of 
something is to be valued rather than rejected in favour of a ‘finished’, ‘structured’, or 
‘brilliant’ conclusion.  
 If Pradl’s work has any shortcomings, then these lie in his tendency to accept 
Rosenblatt’s work in an uncritical fashion, as being finished and complete. However, his value 
lies in his ability to sense the core of Rosenblatt’s project, which brings the attention to her 
politics and her care for the individual. By bringing her theory into a present pedagogical 
context with reference to new forms of contextualisms, Pradl crystallises the link between ways 
of knowing literature and the institutional forms in which this knowing can happen, with direct 
consequences for actual human relations. Seen in a broader context of criticism by Felski, 
Hayot, and Tompkins, Pradl can be placed in a particular moment of literary theory which 
seeks to put the brakes on the acceleration of contextualist approaches without time for 
necessary critique. While not wishing to dispense with contextualisms altogether, these 
thinkers call for a revised focus for contextualism, away from external, authoritative sources, 
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towards a more internalised and personalistic attitude which would simultaneously revisit 
pedagogy.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to develop a theory of personalist textual sociability as an outcome of 
Rosenblatt’s and H.D.’s overarching commitment to the individual and his experience. By 
means of an analysis of Rosenblatt’s theory of aesthetic reading and her emphasis on the way 
a reader utilises his reservoir of past literary and non-literary experiences to construct meaning 
as an interpretant between signs and their referents, I have analysed the personalistic core of 
her vision of aesthetic reading, which intertwines literature and life as being a progressive 
pedagogical position attuned to thinking about wisdom. Turning to H.D.’s Sword, I further 
developed the personalistic nature of textual sociability by discussing some central metaphors 
in her work which I contend are in fact metaphors of reading that serve to extend and further 
personalise Rosenblatt’s more theoretical discourse. Most importantly, the personalistic nature 
of Sword creates a notion of existential time which allows people to think differently about 
experiences, whether aesthetic or non-aesthetic.  
 In The Mystery, H.D. creates a story of two individuals in quest, who come together in 
a temple edifice and veer round by their encounter. This veering round relates both to a manner 
of consciousness and to an attitude towards human relations more broadly. I have argued that 
H.D. continues her extended metaphor of the temple as tempora, thus creating a link between 
ways of thinking about literature and ways of envisaging human unity more generally, which 
will be the central focus of the following chapter. Moreover, by looking at the work of 
Rosenblatt’s colleague, Gordon Pradl, I have explicitly connected my discourse of personalist 
textual sociability to thinking about contexts in literary study and the institutionalisation of 
these approaches. Drawing on the work of more contemporary thinkers of contextualisms – 
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Felski, Hayot, and Tompkins – I have also showed how the potentially anti-personalistic nature 
of some forms of contextualisms impact the way people relate to each other in the institutional 
practice of literary studies. Yet rather than dispensing with context altogether, I have shown 
how personalist textual sociability represents a different vision of context – one which is 
centred in a person’s existential time and which emerges during the various stages of the 
transactional literary experience and its follow-up activities.  
 While this chapter has introduced the notion of history and contexts and applied them 
specifically to the dynamics of the literary experience, in the next chapter I look more 
specifically at the way Rosenblatt and H.D. conceive of imagination, and how such a 
conception impacts upon their vision of human relations. Chapter 3 is more concerned than this 
chapter about the individual’s relationship to other people, both in the literary experience and 
beyond it. In particular, I focus on my thinkers’ various ideas of an individual who seeks to 
articulate new possibilities for what it means to live a good life in community with others. By 
focusing on the role of the literary experience and the value of engaging in personalist textual 
sociability, new conclusions can be reached about perennial (and new) problems, and thus 
move us ever closer to wisdom, which is the topic of Chapter 4. 
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3. Literary Imagination and the Quest for Personal Connection 
 
This chapter explores the ways in which personalist textual sociability, and the transactional 
literary experience more generally, entails a particular conception of literary imagination and 
by extension, the capacity for personal connection with others in further spheres of life. In the 
previous chapter I drew attention to the ways personalist thought has sometimes sought to make 
a connection between a specific way of thinking and broader human relations. Ivan Kireevsky, 
who may be said to be an influence on Berdyaev’s Russian form of personalism, developed his 
concept of ‘integral knowledge’ as a pathway to sobornost, which is an untranslatable Russian 
term for unity among people.1 As Robert Bird and Boris Jakim acknowledge, since the 1840s 
Russian philosophy more broadly has often been concerned with seeking integral knowledge, 
or ‘knowledge as an organic, all-embracing unity that includes sensuous, intellectual, and 
mystical intuition’, in addition to advocating the nourishment of integral personality (tselnaya 
lichnost), ‘which is at once mystical, rational, and sensuous’.2 Importantly, the growth of 
integral knowledge and integral personality is centred on a vision of transformation within a 
community of other people – sobornost. It is this connection between integral knowledge, of 
which personalist textual sociability is an important part, and personal transformation within a 
broader human community, that is the subject of this chapter.  
 Although Rosenblatt and H.D. explore this connection between knowledge and society 
through different discourses, especially romanticism, modernism, and pluralism, it is ultimately 
their amenability to personalism which is able to connect their interest in imagination and 
human relations to integrative ways of knowing. Rosenblatt’s longstanding faith in the capacity 
of literary imagination to provide a means of identification between readers and characters at 
                                                          
1 See Aleksei Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevsky, On Spiritual Unity: A Slavophile Reader, trans. and ed. by Boris 
Jakim and Robert Bird (Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne Books, 1998). 
2 Ibid., p. 368. 
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the same time as broadening readers’ horizons by depicting unfamiliar experiences, derives 
from a distinctly romantic inheritance. Although she does not dwell extensively on Coleridge, 
it is clear that Rosenblatt is continuing the persistent conversation among literary thinkers about 
the importance of imagination and creative ways of envisaging oneself and one’s relation to 
others.3 The emphasis is on thinking in more holistic, integrative ways, which combine reason 
and emotion. H.D., on the other hand, approaches the subject of imagination via a modernist 
recapitulation of romantic sentiments concerning the possibility of personal connection in 
imagination – the ability to reach out to other personalities (characters) in the literary 
experience.  
 The first half of the chapter explores the various ways Rosenblatt and H.D. in turn 
approach the topic of literary imagination. Although they do not use the term ‘literary 
imagination’ as such, I have chosen to use literary imagination as an umbrella concept for the 
more diffuse ways in which my thinkers broach the topic. ‘Literary’ denotes a relation to the 
notion of aesthetic experience explored in the previous chapter, and the prevalence of 
personalist textual sociability within such an experience. What I am concerned to address is 
the possibilities of literary imagination during the transactional literary experience and the 
process of delineating a text’s sociability.  
 The second half of the chapter broadens out the discussion on imagination to encompass 
the quest for personal connection within a community of others. For Rosenblatt, this search for 
connection is centred in a vision of cultural pluralism, wherein individuals come together to 
create a society in which differences can thrive. Her emphasis is on diversity within unity, with 
more weight given to what people share rather than what separates them. H.D., on the other 
hand, offers a more obviously personalistic exploration of human connection by appearing to 
                                                          
3 For an up-to-date exploration of imagination and its Romantic inheritance refracted through a neuroscientific 
angle, see Iain McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western 
World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). 
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foreground physical attachment among characters in her work. H.D.’s vision reminds us that 
at some point the quest for connection with others needs to be more than an abstract idea – a 
concept of pluralism, for example – and yet with reference to literary imagination, H.D.’s 
vision of attachment is also realistic. Literary imagination cannot be asked to do work for us 
which it cannot perform. Nevertheless, intimacy within personalist textual sociability is 
externalised in a very personal form of connectivity among individual persons, forming the 
nucleus of community.  
 Finally, both thinkers define a role for the individual who sets about communicating 
new visions of personal connection. For Rosenblatt, Walt Whitman’s concept of the literatus 
provides her with a model of a writer who seeks to create new patterns of social behaviour. For 
H.D., the more ancient vocation of the scribe becomes a potent trope for the writer who seeks 
to console and reconstruct after the devastation of war. While Rosenblatt’s literatus is more 
obviously institutional – somebody who can work within the academy – H.D.’s scribe tests the 
limits of existing ideas about what a professional thinker may do and achieve. 
 
Literary Imagination 
Rosenblatt and Imaginative Participation in the Literary Experience 
Rosenblatt’s engagement with literary imagination, or imaginative participation in the literary 
experience, is threefold. Firstly, she extols the possibility and necessity of readers forming 
some form of emotional identification with personalities in literary texts. Yet she also 
recognises that the literary experience can broaden horizons by defamiliarising what a reader 
already knows or assumes about life. Finally, Rosenblatt emphasises the role of aesthetic 
distance in enabling students to layer their own experiences within those of fictional ones, 
thereby avoiding any embarrassment from having to talk explicitly about oneself, either in 
classroom discussion or in a piece of writing.  
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 Throughout Literature as Exploration Rosenblatt speaks passionately of encouraging 
students to identify with aspects of literature as a route to self-knowledge – to locate the self in 
others. Although Rosenblatt emphasised a reader’s capacity to identify with others in literature 
in her 1938 Literature as Exploration, her 1984 edition registers the desire in the 1960s to move 
away from ‘the over-intellectualized, pseudo-scientific and analytic educational emphases’, 
toward ‘the sensuous and emotional aspects of literary experience’ reflected at the time in calls 
for curricular ‘relevance’.4 She is intuitively feeling her way to Kireevsky’s position, desiring 
a more person-centred, holistic manner of learning. Rosenblatt states, perhaps unoriginally, 
that the ability to ‘identify with the experiences of others is a most precious human attribute’ 
and claims that as readers we ‘tend to “feel ourselves into,” to empathize with’, aspects of 
literature resonating in us (37). This is in line with a phrase of one of Rosenblatt’s students, 
that ‘often in books one comes across people like oneself or people with problems similar to 
one’s own’ (200). Seeing one’s own life experiences afresh through imaginative participation 
in fictional worlds, one might be led to ‘think and feel more clearly about them’, usually by 
discussing these with others in an indirect manner (200). That Rosenblatt re-capitulated a well-
known faith in literature’s potential to foster empathy is evidence that she found herself in an 
academic climate in which this message needed to be repeated; it is the reiteration, and how 
Rosenblatt wove this sentiment into her theory, which is important.  
These life experiences which literature might help us to think more clearly about may 
relate to the externals of someone’s life, such as a particular family experience. But Rosenblatt 
also stresses that a reader’s imaginative identification may be with a morphology of feeling, 
with ‘the structure of emotional relationships’ a given situation may ‘imply’: ‘the power of the 
work may reside in its underlying emotional structure, its configuration of human drives’ (41). 
                                                          
4 Louise M. Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 4th ed. (New York: MLA, 1983), p. ix. Further references to 
this text are given in parentheses in the main body. 
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For example, a young person experiencing difficulties negotiating parental authority may 
‘respond to a lot of things that might not be directly about parents and children, but that have 
a basic authority [sic]… versus acceptance or rejection of authority as the basic emotional 
pattern’.5 
 Rosenblatt’s commitment to encouraging learners to identify with characters and their 
experiences in literature is motivated by her belief that this can lead to a growth in self-
understanding, for ‘much that in life itself might seem disorganized and meaningless takes on 
order and significance when it comes under the organizing and vitalizing influence of the artist’ 
(42). The implication here is that by permitting people to explore literature with potential 
bridges to their past and present life experiences, individuals may discover that a particular 
work chimes with something in their lives, and part of the activity that follows the literary 
experience would seek to tease out in a more precise way the nature of such chiming or 
identification – the way in which this particular artist has, through their text, enabled a reader 
to evoke a work of art that speaks especially to aspects of that individual’s existential situation. 
There is therefore a correlation between the sociability of human experiences (a reader’s and a 
literary work’s) and the sociability of texts themselves – the way in which texts become 
existentially linked in a reader’s mind. It is in this sense that I refer to human sociability being 
an externalisation of personalist textual sociability. 
 In Literature as Exploration Rosenblatt is fairly intuitive about the way literature may 
engage a reader’s imagination. She is drawing upon her sympathy with romantic ideas about 
the potential potency of art to change people’s lives. As she recalled in 2001 about a 
conversation with her father around 1920: ‘I said Shelley points out that the poets are the 
legislators of mankind […] the poet develops our imagination and enables us to put ourselves 
                                                          
5 Gordon M. Pradl, ‘A Conversation with Louise M. Rosenblatt’, 1988, p. 23. Private papers. New York. 
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into the place of others’.6 In his ‘A Defence of Poetry’ (1821), Shelley claims that poets ‘are 
the institutors of laws and the founders of civil society, and the inventors of the arts of life, and 
the teachers who draw into a certain propinquity with the beautiful and the true that partial 
apprehension of the agencies of the invisible world which is called religion’.7 It is clear that 
Rosenblatt filtered Shelley’s quasi-religious vision of poetry and poets through her own 
philosophy, which asserted a secular democracy capable of embracing everyone; she focused 
on literature’s capacity to institute, found, and invent. Yet it is possible to sense Shelley behind 
Rosenblatt’s talk of the ‘vitalizing influence of the artist’, for Shelley also refers to the way 
poetry ‘awakens and enlarges the mind itself by rendering it the receptacle of a thousand 
unapprehended combinations of thought’.8 There is an emphasis here on what Rosenblatt refers 
to as ‘development’ – the way authors have the potential to educate readers. That Rosenblatt 
omits the ‘unacknowledged’ which Shelley places before ‘legislators’ only seems to underscore 
her optimism about the role of literature in society; on this model, it has definite educative 
potential.9 Rosenblatt came at romanticism from a further century of literary activity, in 
particular by studying the ‘art-for-art’s sake’ movement in Victorian England and the assertion 
of the special function of the artist; she was attuned to the ways in which readers responded to 
literary works in so far as their attitudes were moulded, challenged, and extended by what they 
read.   
Nevertheless, for Rosenblatt the romantic conception of poetry (for Rosenblatt always 
a metonym for literature more broadly) as inviting an experience was central to her 
understanding of imagination; it synchronised with her transactional approach. ‘Only if the 
reader turns his attention inward to his experience of “the journey itself,” will a poem happen’, 
                                                          
6 Garn Press, ‘Great Women Scholars Part Three: Louise Rosenblatt’ (August 5, 2015), 
http://garnpress.com/2015/great-women-scholars-part-three-louise-rosenblatt/ (accessed online, August 3, 2016). 
7 Percy Bysshe Shelley, The Selected Poems and Prose of Shelley (Ware: Wordsworth, 2002), p. 637. 
8 Ibid., p. 642. 
9 Ibid., p. 660. 
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she wrote.10 Quoting Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria (1817), Rosenblatt thereby affirms the 
link she sees between literary experience and imagination. By turning to ‘the journey itself’ not 
only will a literary work of art be evoked, but the imagination will be engaged, with potentially 
transformative potential.  
Elizabeth A. Flynn has claimed Rosenblatt as someone in the second half of the 
twentieth century who participated in an ‘ethical turn in literary theory’.11 What I believe she 
meant by this was that Rosenblatt was focused on the relationship between readers and texts in 
a way that foregrounded the transformative potential of such encounters – both in the personal 
sense (revising personal attitudes and beliefs) and also in the social (encouraging empathy 
towards others). However, it is also possible to position Rosenblatt as a forerunner of more 
cognitive investigations into the ways in which readers engage in literary imagination. 
Rosenblatt was aware of the cognitive turn in psychology and linguistics from the 1950s, but 
nevertheless transcended its focus by positioning her theory of reading within a prescriptive 
vision of human flourishing. She was not only interested in the ‘how’ of reading, but also in 
the ‘why’. 
Since the 1990s Text World Theory – the brainchild of Paul Werth – has sought to 
provide descriptive, methodological analyses in the discipline of linguistics of the ways in 
which individuals form and handle mental representations of language.12 Text World Theory 
is a contemporary product of the broader cognitive turn in the second half of the twentieth 
century. According to Joanna Gavins, Text World Theory is an experiential approach to 
language, recognising the various contexts in which language is used and the ways in which a 
                                                          
10 Louise M. Rosenblatt, The Reader, the Text, the Poem: The Transactional Theory of the Literary Work 
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1994), p. 28. 
11 Elizabeth A. Flynn, ‘Louise Rosenblatt and the Ethical Turn in Literary Theory’, College English, 70 (2007): 
52-69. 
12 Paul Werth, Text Worlds: Representing Conceptual Space in Discourse (London: Longman, 1999). 
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reader’s ‘experiential background’ intersects with the fictional world in the reading act.13 She 
talks of the way in which ‘text worlds’ – the various mental representations of our experience 
of language in a given reading act – can have an immersive effect on the individual: how ‘the 
emotional and physical responses of our text world experiences can induce, may reduce us to 
tears, provoke laughter, even start revolutions’.14  
Although Rosenblatt was aware of the cognitive turn and was interested in some of its 
concepts (see Chapter 2), she remained wedded to the transactional, Peircean and Deweyan 
conception of language cognition and knowledge because of its ethical implications. As 
Gordon Pradl has noted, whether it is reader-response or cognitive linguistics, reference to 
models of reading and language cognition may have a tendency to description, whereas 
Rosenblatt’s transactional model is prescriptive:  
not that that’s bad, it’s just that it sends you off on a different 
investigative agenda […] While, of course, the [transactional] model 
has construct validity – it relates to how people seem to behave in the 
world – more important [sic] it attempts to enact a value system even 
as it pretends to ‘scientifically’ capture how people really read.15 
The different ‘investigative agenda’ relates to the nature of the relationship among individuals 
and between readers and fictional worlds, and those who impact this dyad – academics, 
teachers, other students, friends and family.16 For Rosenblatt (and for Pradl), literary 
                                                          
13 Joanna Gavins, Text World Theory: An Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p. 8; Sven 
Strasen and Julia Vaeßen, ‘T-REX: Triggers of reader emotion and experientiality’, paper delivered at the 
University of Nottingham, June 2016. 
14 Ibid., p. 10. See also Sara Whiteley, ‘Text World Theory, real readers and emotional responses to The Remains 
of the Day’, Language and Literature, 20 (2011): 23-42, pp. 24-25. ‘Immersion’ is currently being theorised by 
Peter Stockwell: Peter Stockwell, ‘Immersion’, paper delivered at the University of Nottingham, June 2016. 
15 Gordon Pradl, ‘Rosenblatt File’, June 30 – July 5 1988. Private papers. New York. 
16 From within the field of cognitive linguistics, the work of Marcello Giovanelli and Jessica Mason in particular 
seeks to explore the contextual, institutional factors affecting how learners engage in fictional worlds. See their 
blog for up-to-date summaries of their insights: http://studyingfiction.wordpress.com.  
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imagination is ethical because it is transactional: it requires a particular stance toward the other, 
be it other people or one’s subject material. 
 Indeed, I would argue that Rosenblatt’s understanding and treatment of literary 
imagination is resolutely personalistic. While Rosenblatt invokes romanticism as a precursor to 
her transactional emphasis on literary experience, she also emphasises ‘the journey itself’ for 
its broader implications. By focusing on the experience of evoking a literary work from a text, 
and by encouraging personalist textual sociability in a literary experience, Rosenblatt’s theory 
offers scope for foregrounding specific encounters that can become objects of rational thought: 
in other words, she is interested in the connections readers make between personal experiences, 
fictional or non-fictional as the basis for re-evaluating worldviews and attitudes towards actual 
people in the ‘real world’.  
As such, Rosenblatt approximates Berdyaev’s reluctance to identify with romanticism 
wholeheartedly: ‘Romantics are, as a rule, preoccupied with the experiences and sensations 
which accompany that search rather than with the attainment of truth or meaning’.17 A 
personalist, rather than a purely romantic perspective, would therefore position literary 
imagination – the ‘journey itself’ – as a journey with a destination, which may indeed be 
provisional and tentative, but which nevertheless has a telos in mind: namely, the free and full 
growth of individual persons, which, of course, is still in line with the romanticism of somebody 
like Coleridge (see Chapter 1). 
 Rosenblatt’s interest is therefore profoundly pedagogical: literary imagination matters 
to her for its ability to educate. Indeed, she also turns her attention to the capacity of literature 
to defamiliarise readers’ existing ideas about life and about other people because this is crucial 
to the educational project.18 John Rouse, who was a doctoral student of Rosenblatt’s in the 
                                                          
17 Nicolas Berdyaev, Dream and Reality: An Essay in Autobiography, trans. Katharine Lampert (London: 
Geoffrey Bles, 1950), p. 107. 
18 See Viktor Shklovsky, Theory of Prose, trans. Benjamin Sher (London: Dalkey Archive Press, 2009), pp. 1-14. 
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1960s, explained in his 1983 essay for College English, ‘An Erotics of Teaching’, how 
Rosenblatt parted company with subjectivist reader-response theorists such as Norman Holland 
and David Bleich who seemed to privilege the private individual.19 Using H.D.’s experience 
with Freud as his starting point, Rouse shows how Holland (an H.D. critic) in fact deviates in 
his own work from the Freud-H.D. analyst / analysand relationship because he refuses to 
apprehend the importance of a transactional encounter between self and other; instead, for 
Holland (via Rouse), the self is encouraged to limit her horizon with an ‘identity theme’ she 
has located in the literary work, leading to an ‘esthetic of self-love’.20 According to Rouse, 
Holland especially limits the literary experience by trapping the self in her own past, whereas 
for Rosenblatt, the learner is expected to have his eyes set upon the present transaction and 
future possibilities. A reader’s location of his own experience in a literary work is a valuable 
and necessary stage in the learning process; but it does not need to end there. Indeed, for 
Rosenblatt and Rouse, the literary experience can supplement an individual’s experience, 
helping any ‘identity theme’ to be tempered, defamiliarised, and seen in new light through real 
engagement with other people’s experiences, fictional or real. In Rouse’s eyes, H.D.’s 
transactions with Freud, in which she discussed her dream experiences, enabled her to move 
on into the future and to attain a revised sense of values: for example, walking through the 
deserted streets of Vienna to work with Freud out of a sense of commitment in the face of fear 
(see Chapter 4 for more on H.D. and Freud).21  
So, on one level, additional experience is for Rosenblatt a default consequence of the 
theory of the literary transaction, which claims that the interface between reader and text results 
in a new experience, a Peircean intermingling of sign, referent, and interpretant. But on the 
more important level, such additional experiences may lead to growth in empathetic attitudes 
                                                          
19 John Rouse, ‘An Erotics of Teaching’, College English, 45 (1983): 535-48. 
20 Ibid., p. 537. 
21 Ibid., p. 535. 
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– what Suzanne Keen in her study, Empathy and the Novel (2007) – refers to as the ‘affective 
transaction across boundaries of time, culture, and location’.22 According to Rosenblatt, ‘books 
are a means of getting outside the limited cultural group into which the individual is born. They 
are, in a sense, elements of societies distant in time and space made personally available to the 
reader’ (192).23 Such discourse reminds us of H.D.’s concern for the pleated folds of time 
which are laid flat on the table, thus attaching to the ‘affective transaction across boundaries of 
time, culture, and location’ an ethical emphasis on levelling, on seeing the other on common 
ground. Positioning personalist textual sociability within a discourse of existential time frees 
the reader to engage in literary imagination and to open himself to its possible benefits in the 
form of empathy and the amplification of his insight into the human condition. We enter the 
literary experience like Saint-Germain in the Cathedral, waiting and expectant for the coming 
– the incarnation – of the Visitor.  
Evidently, not all books depict life in a remote place or time, so rather than a dualism 
of ‘here’ and ‘there’ and even one of ‘I’ and ‘them’, Rosenblatt’s general thrust is toward a 
continuum, entirely focused on the specific transaction between actual readers and actual texts. 
In her 1940 essay, ‘Moderns Among Masterpieces’, she declares the benefit of studying the 
‘classics’ to be in their ability to offer ‘new insights’ applicable to a reader’s ‘contemporary’ 
society.24 A reader should ideally be ‘alive in the truest sense, not cut off from the world about 
them, but aware of the conflicting currents of thought and feeling, the unsolved problems, the 
                                                          
22 Suzanne Keen, Empathy and the Novel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. xxv. 
23 For a contemporary exploration of third-person to first-person modes of reader-character empathy, see Marco 
Caracciolo, ‘Beyond Other Minds: Fictional Characters, Mental Stimulation, and “Unnatural” Experiences’, 
Journal of Narrative Theory, 44 (2014): 29-53. Carolina Fernandez-Quintanilla is also working on stages of reader 
empathy, creating a model of a reader’s perspective adoption, attribution of mental / emotional experience to the 
character, finally to a reader’s enactment or imaginative experience of a character’s emotions. Carolina Fernandez-
Quintanilla, ‘Experiencing fictional worlds through empathy with characters’, paper delivered at the University 
of Nottingham, June 2016. 
24 Louise M. Rosenblatt, ‘Moderns Among Masterpieces’, The English Leaflet, 39 (1940): 98-110, reprinted in 
Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, pp. 106-114, p. 108. 
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new visions struggling to be born’.25 Rosenblatt seems to advocate a dialogic relationship 
between self and other – not an utter and radical difference between reader and fictional world, 
or even between ‘classic’ and ‘contemporary’ – but rather a porous borderland with scope for 
identification as well as amplification. Rosenblatt deftly avoids polemic about the canon by re-
framing the debate from the perspective of actual readers: who are they? What will help them 
become the kind of readers she has in mind – sensitive, critical, and evaluative? 
As I explained in Chapter 2, to have a literary experience in the first place, there needs 
to be some kind of context in the reader’s ‘literary-experiential reservoir’ with which to make 
meaning with text; that ‘we can communicate’, wrote Rosenblatt, is ‘because of a common 
core of experience, even though there may be infinite personal variations’ (28). This in itself 
precludes an extreme othering; if a reader cannot ‘make anything’ of a text, like the Indian 
students Rosenblatt read about at a reservation school who were lost when given a Restoration 
comedy to read, then this is not a fault of the students – a moral failure to register the other 
(57). Rather, it is a fault of the educational establishment which has misunderstood the nature 
of the reading process and the literary experience. The ‘dead hand of the past’ is only such, in 
Rosenblatt’s eyes, if a ‘classic’ is deemed to be dead by criteria irrelevant to a particular reader 
or set of readers.26  
Instead, Rosenblatt envisages ‘the warm clasp of human companionship. Let us lead 
[our students]’, she wrote,  
to the literature of the past and of the present, as to the worlds of fellow 
men. From each we shall seek a work of art that will illuminate the 
question about ‘man’s relation to the world he lives in, man’s relation 
                                                          
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid., p. 114. 
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with the men among whom he lives, and, finally, man’s relation to 
himself’.27  
Invoking Somerset Maugham’s Philip Carey, literature is here framed as a means of offering 
self-knowledge and knowledge of others, as a way of working out a mode of living in the 
present that can accommodate the differences of others. The practical goal renders the 
transactional focus sympathetic, because it does not entail an extreme othering or difference, 
but a project of trying to share and understand.  
Furthermore, when Rosenblatt talks of the ways in which students identify their own 
experiences in literature, she claims that by maintaining aesthetic distance, they will be able to 
explore (in class or in writing) the relationship between self and other in a secure way, without 
the risk of direct self-exposure.28 ‘We know’, she wrote, ‘that the literary work provides 
“aesthetic distance” so that by participating in characters’ or personas’ emotions we may handle 
our own emotions without excessive pain or disturbance’.29 In her discussion of college girls 
talking about Ibsen’s Nora in A Doll’s House, for instance, Rosenblatt suggested that ‘some 
sort of identification with Nora had occurred. Yet the students felt free to show their feeling 
because ostensibly they were talking about Nora, not themselves’ (237). By concentrating on 
the ‘situation in the book’ rather than on an individual’s own explicit life experiences, it ‘merely 
makes it easier for the reader to bring his own inner problems into the open, and to face them 
or seek the help of others without the embarrassment of explicit self-revelation. Thus, he often 
reveals what he cannot or will not say about himself’ (205). The ‘wise teacher’ will not pretend 
to be a psychiatrist (à la Holland), but will in fact join in the process of exploration – ‘to be a 
complete human being in his relations with his students – bringing to bear in his work with 
them all of the sensitivities that he would bring to bear in his relations with people outside the 
                                                          
27 Ibid, original emphasis. 
28 Louise M. Rosenblatt, ‘Pattern and Process – A Polemic’, The English Journal, 58 (1969): 1005-1012, p. 1007. 
29 Ibid. 
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classroom’ (208). I think this is probably easier to say than to do, although given Rosenblatt’s 
methodology, she would have tried to be like this herself in her own classes.30  
What would make it easier, perhaps, to think through how we might frame aesthetic 
distance and put it into action in our writing and teaching, is some additional vocabulary, 
especially metaphors, which might clarify Rosenblatt’s use of aesthetic distance. Turning to 
H.D.’s appropriation of the palimpsest as a mode of consciousness will assist in this. Dwelling 
on aesthetic distance is important because it represents the adhesive bond between self and 
other in both Rosenblatt’s and H.D.’s work although, as I will show, H.D. adds some additional 
insights which contribute to a more rounded overall picture of the value of literary imagination. 
The quest for personal connection in the literary experience can frustrate as well as reward.  
 
H.D.’s Palimpsestuous Consciousness 
H.D. launched her career as a poet in the 1910s by invoking and evoking classical landscapes 
which form the backdrop for personal experience. Or rather, the landscapes of Sea Garden 
(1916) were in fact imagist presentations of her personal experience. In ‘Garden’, for example, 
the speaker calls to the wind to ‘rend open the heat, / cut apart the heat, / rend it to tatters’.31 
Recalling the approach of imagism which I explored in the previous chapter, the speaker is 
presenting rather than representing his / her experience. After this cry, the speaker explains that 
Fruit cannot drop  
through this thick air –  
fruit cannot fall into heat 
that presses up and blunts 
the points of pears 
                                                          
30 Rouse, ‘An Erotics of Teaching’, pp. 543-48. 
31 H.D., Collected Poems 1911-1944, ed. Louis L. Martz (New York: New Directions, 1983), p. 25. Immediate 
further references to this poem are also from this page.  
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and rounds the grapes. 
Although a logical explanation of why the speaker wishes the wind to ‘rend open the heat’, the 
explanation is itself marked by shifts in mood that indicate that this explanation is also a 
continuation of the speaker’s emotional experience. The dactylic rising and sudden falling at 
the end of the first three lines contrast with the quicker beat of iambs in the second half: 
repetition of consonants (‘presses’, ‘blunts’, ‘points’, ‘pears’, ‘rounds’, ‘grapes’) underscores 
the movement into a more consistent rhythm, as if the speaker is exasperated by the fact that 
‘fruit cannot drop’. Translated back into the experience of a person, one could say that the 
speaker is suffering a creative block, where creativity is stifled by the ‘heat’ that ‘presses’ and 
‘blunts’.32 Although depicted in the universal economy of imagism, genderless and abstracted 
into the landscape of timeless nature, the image is in fact deeply personal as well, revealing the 
immediacy of human experience. As Rosenblatt argued in Literature as Exploration, ‘even the 
literary work that seems most remote, an imagist poem or a fantasy, reveals new notes in the 
gamut of human experience’.33   
Although her body of work expanded over the decades to include prose set in the 
contemporary world, H.D. returned repeatedly to historical periods and timeless environments 
in which to tell her own story, and through which she gained some aesthetic distance between 
herself and her experiences. Her 1926 novel, Palimpsest, is a landmark in this development 
because of its explicitness in engaging aesthetic distance. Palimpsest is a volume or ‘triptych’ 
of three connected stories which H.D. believed tell the same story, even though they are 
narratives set in different times and locations.34 As Sarah Dillon has said in her work, The 
                                                          
32 Janice Robinson argues that H.D.’s imagist poems often reveal her struggles with Ezra Pound’s dominance over 
her early attempts at writing poetry. See H.D.: The Life and Work of an American Poet (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1982). 
33 Louise M. Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed. (New York: MLA, 1995), p. 6. 
34 See H.D., ‘H.D. by Delia Alton’, The Iowa Review, 16 (1986): 180-221. See also Deborah Kelly Kloepfer, 
‘Fishing the Murex up: Sense and Resonance in H.D.’s Palimpsest’, Contemporary Literature, 27 (1986): 553-
73, p. 556. 
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Palimpsest (2007), a palimpsest asks readers to work out how its stories, more or less visible, 
‘inhabit and encrypt each other’.35 In fact, in her chapter on H.D., Dillon prefers to talk of 
H.D.’s affinity with the ‘palimpsestuous’ rather than the palimpsest per se. The palimpsestuous 
intimates at an ‘incestuous’ relationship between stories, and yet, at one remove from 
‘incestuous’, palimpsestuous implies a protective distance between selves located in a text.36 
Importantly, the palimpsest and palimpsestuous are not concerned with textual sources; they 
are not ‘a metaphor of origin, influence, or filtration’.37 The context for palimpsestuous texts is 
instead one embedded in existential time. In constructing her own palimpsests, H.D. was 
moving into a palimpsestuous consciousness that could create her own context for a text: one 
based on emotional reverberations among a palimpsest’s stories. Her palimpsests are forms of 
personalist textual sociability.  
While H.D.’s interest in the palimpsest is closely related to her translation work (from 
Greek to English), translation is not the focus of my attention.38 Instead, I am interested in the 
way palimpsestuous consciousness opens a space for forming personal connections or 
attachments. Because of its resolutely personal nature, the literary experience creates a space – 
a temple (to echo Chapter 2) – in which readers may encounter the personalities of others, often 
in fiction, but also in poetry and other genres as well. By focusing on a little known early story 
by H.D. – ‘The Greek Boy’ (c. 1911) – against a backdrop of H.D.’s final epic poem Helen in 
Egypt (1961), I claim that attachment lies at the heart of H.D.’s palimpsestuous consciousness 
as a mode of learning. Layering her own story beneath those of other characters’, and depicting 
characters who do something similar, is not a manipulative stance – using others’ stories for 
one’s own purposes – to uncover an ‘identity theme’, to echo Holland. Instead, I see the 
                                                          
35 Sarah Dillon, The Palimpsest: Literature, Criticism, Theory (London: Continuum, 2007), p. 108. 
36 Ibid., p. 5. 
37 Ibid., p. 85. 
38 See Eileen Gregory, H.D. and Hellenism: Classic Lines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) for 
more on H.D. and translation. 
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palimpsestuous as a form of attachment and intimacy, of dwelling in the story and life of another 
in order to touch and be touched by them. In this sense, the palimpsestuous extends Rosenblatt’s 
vision of literary imagination because it is more overtly concerned with the nature of personal 
connection – the way in which a reader may imagine and thus focus on the personality of the 
other, while also permitting himself to be opened by difference in the fictional. As Rosenblatt 
argued, literary imagination is twofold: it permits self-knowledge, but it also entails 
defamiliarisation, or the need to reassess oneself and others in light of new experiences 
characterised by degrees of difference or otherness.  
Moreover, the palimpsestuous in H.D.’s work can legitimately feed into recent work 
analysing H.D.’s occult orientation, especially in the late 1940s and 1950s. Scholars now 
recognise that H.D. believed in reincarnation, even if she could not recall her own past selves.39 
But as Matte Robinson has said, the important point in this belief was its capacity for H.D. to 
understand relationships: ‘Her remembering has to do with finding a community, with seeing 
her various circles as repeating patterns’.40 H.D.’s remembering was indeed romantic, although 
as I shall show in my later discussion of The Walls Do Not Fall, it was also modernist. ‘The 
romantic idea of man’, write David Roberts and Peter Murphy, ‘springs from the sense of our 
irreducible embeddedness in a particular humanity’.41 Romanticism seeks to remember the past 
in order to ‘recover a living relation to tradition’.42 By thinking according to existential time 
and traversing across the pleated folds of history, H.D. sought alternative presentations of her 
experience which she believed could connect her to others who were no longer alive: ‘the 
universal is thus realized in and through particularity’ – an act which is engineered by ‘the 
                                                          
39 Matte Robinson, The Astral H.D.: Occult and Religious Sources and Contexts for H.D.’s Poetry and Prose 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2016), p. 17. 
40 Ibid., p. 20, original emphasis.  
41 David Roberts and Peter Murphy, The Dialectic of Romanticism (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 4. 
42 Ibid., p. 3. 
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synthesizing powers of the productive imagination’.43 H.D. imagined a synthesis of universal 
human experience in the particularity of personal analogues, and thereby in this instance 
identifies more easily with romanticism than Rosenblatt, who focused on its concern with the 
‘journey’ and ultimately transcended romanticism’s understanding of the role of aesthetic 
experience, because she sought an institutional telos for it.  
I believe that Janice Robinson was along the right lines in 1982 when she connected the 
palimpsest to a form of consciousness – a way of processing experience.44 During her visit to 
Egypt in 1923, H.D. came into contact with symbols on the temple wall – hieroglyphs through 
which she read the story of her own life: 
The substance of H.D.’s discovery was that her most deeply felt 
personal experiences were recurring realities of human experience. 
Everything that had happened to her had happened before, in other 
cultures, in other times. This substantiation – the objective existence of 
hieroglyphs – brought her personal experience within the domain of the 
impersonal […] These life energies, translated by the mind into visual 
images, exist outside the individual self; they are collective images of a 
culture.45 
Robinson is simply mirroring what Roberts and Murphy say about the universal and the 
particular, although she emphasises the release to be had by layering personal experience in 
what seems more impersonal; one avoids the embarrassment of self-exposure at the same time 
as connecting oneself to a wider culture. Yet Dillon’s term ‘palimpsestuous’ makes sense when 
describing H.D.’s stance, because it is the spirit of the palimpsest that matters rather than the 
                                                          
43 Ibid., p. 4. 
44 Robinson, H.D, p. 56. 
45 Ibid., pp. 367-68. 
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artefact itself. In themselves, hieroglyphs are not intrinsically palimpsests (though they may be 
accidentally so): to be a palimpsest an original or older text needs to seep through visibly into 
a newer text written over it. H.D.’s consciousness was palimpsestuous because she 
superimposed otherwise disconnected experiences on otherwise disconnected texts.  
It is the desire to superimpose that becomes palimpsestuous in H.D.’s work. And the 
link is based on an existential connection devised by H.D. herself: texts become ‘points of 
[experiential] location’.46 As H.D.’s literary executor, Norman Holmes Pearson, said: ‘one is 
swept up into a knowledge of one’s identity by the similarities of other lives and other races’.47 
In ‘H.D. by Delia Alton’, H.D. explained her method in White Rose and the Red, which draws 
parallels between her experience and that of the Pre-Raphaelite model, Elizabeth Siddall:  
something of my early search, my first expression or urge toward 
expression in art, finds a parallel in the life of Rossetti and Elizabeth 
Siddall. So, as a very subtle emotional exercise, I go over and over the 
ground, find relationships or parallels between my own emotional 
starvation and hers, between a swift flowering soon to be cut down, in 
her case, by death, in mine, by a complete break after War I, with the 
group of artists described in Madrigal [Bid Me to Live].48  
In articulating a palimpsestuous relationship between Elizabeth Siddall’s Pre-Raphaelite story 
and her own, H.D. is veering round (as in The Mystery) in an experiential meeting with her 
subject material, allowing her understanding of herself to be transformed by the transaction or 
experience. Although in time and place the stories may not ‘relate to one another’, H.D. feels 
compelled imaginatively to ‘jump from one psychological dilemma to another, across the 
                                                          
46 Ibid., p. 72. 
47 L. S. Dembo (ed.), ‘Norman Holmes Pearson on H.D.: An Interview’, Contemporary Literature 10 (1969): 435-
46, p. 441. 
48 H.D., ‘H.D. by Delia Alton’, p. 194. 
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years’.49 From her experience of loss and separation, she finds a companion in Elizabeth, whose 
experience mirrors H.D.’s, but who also retains some detachment from H.D.’s own self. The 
distance, made aesthetic in her work, between self and other is thus a healing one for H.D. 
(though it cannot be for Elizabeth, other than through her fictional legacy in H.D.’s writing). 
That Elizabeth is a Pre-Raphaelite is significant in so far as she is part of the Morris circle, 
explored in Chapter 2. H.D. came into possession of a table William Morris owned, and it was 
on this table that she received the messages from the dead RAF airmen in London during World 
War Two. Morris’s table was a cause of both her self-identified vocation as a wise woman, but 
also an indirect cause of her abandonment by Hugh Dowding, who repudiated her messages. It 
is this sense of ‘emotional starvation’ which enabled H.D. to connect herself to Elizabeth, as 
well as her rejection by Ezra Pound during her early years in London – a feeling of abandonment 
by a man she once trusted. 
Later, in Helen in Egypt, H.D. also depicts a woman (Helen) whose story resembles her 
own in a palimpsestuous manner. Helen ‘achieves the difficult task of translating a symbol in 
time, into timeless-time or hieroglyph or ancient Egyptian time. She knows the script, she says, 
but we judge that this is intuitive or emotional knowledge’.50 Helen’s stance is aesthetic; like 
Delia in Sword, Helen sensuously follows her traces of emotional direction among the pleated 
folds of time. This is a ‘difficult task’: the text in front of us may not be obviously 
palimpsestuous or call forth palimpsestuous consciousness in a reader; the external fictional 
world may seem somewhat removed from a reader’s familiar environment and experiences – 
their discourse world, to echo Text World Theory. In other words, there may seem to be little 
scope for personalist textual sociability. But delineating any links evoked, especially at a work’s 
emotional core (recall Rosenblatt’s example of authority struggle), may permit the ‘symbol in 
                                                          
49 Ibid., p. 204. 
50 H.D., Helen in Egypt (New York: New Directions, 1961), p. 13. Further quotations from this text are given in 
parentheses in the main body. 
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time’ (the text) to connect to ‘timeless-time’ or to more universal experiential points of location. 
Gazing into a crystal-text, ‘the crystal will reflect the past / and that present-in-the-past’ (204). 
H.D. is positing a clear link between integrative knowledge (or what she calls ‘intuitive or 
emotional knowledge’) and sociability – the ability to connect to others through palimpsestuous 
consciousness.  
Going over the lives of others, we come to understand in an aesthetic sense that ‘life 
manifests through us; we are its various forms: Helen, Iseult, Persephone, and Circe are the 
same girl’.51 While these women are particular to H.D.’s situation, it is important to see that 
people – male and female, real and fictional – are brought together through the reader’s location 
of a similar experience, emotion, attitude, or resemblance; it is a reader’s sense of sociability 
which achieves the connections. The work of art ‘is our experience […] stripped of our ego or 
personal identity’, says Robinson.52 According to Pearson, H.D. could write poems ‘better and 
more frankly about herself using [Greek myth] than she could if she simply said, “I, I, I.” To 
say “Helen” is really to free oneself’.53 To say ‘Helen’ is to be released from starting all over 
again, ‘because what she had to say at this time had been said before, quite well, by [the Greek 
poet]’.54 So there is a slight tension in H.D.’s practice due to her interest in both the experience 
and the person: in her apprehension of the otherness of someone else’s experience, and yet also 
in her recognition that she herself also has a claim upon the experience, recognising that ‘life 
manifests through us’. Differences and otherness are worked through by meeting at the point 
of recognition; unless the recognition – the identification – occurs (which at the very least 
happens at the level of transactional language cognition), there can be no appreciation of 
otherness, still less greater self-knowledge regarding one’s own life experiences. 
                                                          
51 Robinson, ‘H.D.’, p. 426. 
52 Ibid., p. 361. 
53 Demo, ‘Norman Holmes Pearson’, p. 441. 
54 Robinson, ‘H.D.’, p. 102. 
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 Whereas Rosenblatt’s context is learning situations in English studies, in which 
learning is not only assumed but a required and measurable outcome of such study, H.D. is freer 
to explore other outcomes of engagement between self and other in the literary experience. 
While her palimpsestuous consciousness is concerned with how individuals process and make 
sense of their experience by engaging with other people’s, Dillon’s comment that 
‘palimpsestuous’ is one remove from ‘incestuous’ is instructive for another aspect of H.D.’s 
interest in the palimpsestuous, and which complicates the nature of learning to be had from 
identification.  
In superimposing her own experience upon that of others, and by exploring the ways 
her characters transact with one another via aesthetic experience, H.D. points toward attachment 
as both a valuable goal of such experience and also a different conception of imaginative 
growth, one which is at once more personal and also more viscerally social than Rosenblatt’s. 
‘Helen’ enables H.D. to tell her own story with protective distance, but it also enables her to 
superimpose herself onto Helen in a form of emotional and possibly proto-physical, almost 
incestuous attachment. Helen was H.D.’s mother’s name, and calling herself Helen not only 
enabled H.D. to deal with personal experiences, but it also offered her a space or womb she 
could enter in which to re-connect passionately with the great ‘sea-mother’ (300).55  
As Robinson insists, H.D.’s attachment to the mother figure was shared and stimulated 
by her contact with D. H. Lawrence around 1915-16 – the period covered in Paint it Today and 
recalled in Bid Me to Live (1960). In this novel, Julia (the H.D. character) tells Rico (Lawrence): 
‘I need a great-mother as much as you do’.56 H.D. had been moved by the ‘mother poems’ in 
                                                          
55 See Susan Stanford Friedman, Psyche Reborn: The Emergence of H.D. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1981), pp. 229-272, for a feminist reading of Helen. Since the 1980s feminist theory has explored the ways 
in which ‘gynotexts’ are often concerned with the mother figure, thus emphasising the pre-Oedipal stage of 
growth, where the mother and the semiotic are more significant than the father and the symbolic order. See 
Deborah Kelly Kloepfer, The Unspeakable Mother: Forbidden Discourse in Jean Rhys and H.D. (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1989).   
56 H.D., Bid Me to Live (New York: New Directions, 1984), p. 182. 
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Lawrence’s Amores (1916), which evoked the death of his mother, Lydia, in 1910.57 By the late 
1950s, it seems that in H.D.’s mind, Bid Me to Live (the Julia-Rico story of decades ago) and 
Helen were intimately connected; when the book jacket of a (Classically reminiscent) seascape 
came for Bid Me to Live, she wrote: ‘I greet the Sea. The Sea encompasses me, encompasses 
my Book. The Sea envelopes me. The Sea is a “jacket,” a folder around me, around my Book’.58 
H.D. invokes the Sea (capitalised as a proper noun) for its uterine qualities, enfolding her in 
love in its specific incarnation within the pages of her story. 
 Ignited by the work of John Bowlby (and D. D. Winnicott) in the late 1960s, 
psychologists have sought to explain the centrality of attachment in human lives.59 Although 
they recognise that different cultures have different visions of what attachment means, 
psychologists agree on the universal ‘potential to become attached in particular ways in 
particular contexts’.60 Attachment may have connotations of dependence, and we talk of 
becoming ‘too attached’ or ‘clingy’ towards someone. And of course, it is also possible to 
become attached to something or someone unhealthy. But in this context, to become attached 
to another in the literary experience is something that, potential ethical risks aside, should be 
encouraged.  
Although not conspicuously drawing on the psychological school of attachment theory, 
Valentine Cunningham’s chapter, ‘Touching Reading’, in Reading After Theory (2002), 
nevertheless speaks of the way in which readers can become attached to characters and 
experiences evoked in fictional worlds, perhaps allowing the metaphorical jackets of specific 
books to enfold them. His vision is important because of the educative potential he attaches to 
                                                          
57 Robinson, H.D., p. 109. 
58 Quoted in ibid., p. 358. 
59 Fred Rothbaum et al., ‘Attachment, Learning, and Coping: The Interplay of Cultural Similarities and 
Differences’ in Michele J. Gelfand et al. (eds), Advances in Culture and Psychology: Volume 1 (Oxford University 
Press Scholarship Online), pp. 1-85. 
60 Ibid., p. 5. 
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this form of personal, experiential attachment to literature. According to Cunningham: ‘the 
reading begins in close bodily contact, which turns into close mental and emotional contact 
with text, a sequence of contacts in which the reading result is a scene of complex whole-person 
ethical instruction, deeply rooted in rationality but particularly in emotionality’.61 
Cunningham’s discourse is distinctive and highly charged with Christian imagery, which tends 
to imbue emotional attachment in the literary experience with a spiritual aura. Cunningham’s 
discourse seems to resonate with Kireevsky’s concept of integral knowledge and the rationality 
that comes from the heart. Cunningham combines whole-person engagement with a literary 
work with an emphasis on transformation, or ‘ethical instruction’. Perhaps he is suggesting, like 
Kireevsky, that a different kind of knowledge or consciousness is required (integral knowledge) 
in order to re-orient oneself to the social world – to be re-instructed. 
But Cunningham’s implicit debt to particularly Protestant conceptions of Scripture 
reading also complicates the nature of the attachment desired: he speaks of ‘a body of text, and 
the text as body, the body of the other, the text as other, to be consumed, ingested, in a memorial 
act, an act of personal reception and reflection, an inward event which is also an outward-facing 
act, an act of testimony, of worldly witness’.62 But this suggests that the text is a metaphorical 
body that no longer merely envelopes a reader through adhesive attachment, but can be 
problematically (because it is only a metaphor) ingested by the reader who is then transformed, 
as in the Eucharist, into an effective, transforming witness in the real world. There are problems 
with equating, even metaphorically, text-as-word with bodies, and thus claiming for ordinary 
textual engagement modes of attachment usually reserved for actual bodily, interpersonal 
contact. As I will now show, H.D.’s story, ‘The Greek Boy’, draws out these tensions, even in 
its simplicity. ‘The Greek Boy’ underscores the tensions regarding attachment and aesthetic 
                                                          
61 Valentine Cunningham, Reading After Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 147. 
62 Ibid., p. 148. 
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experience because the artistic medium concerned is sculpture – an art form which both 
encourages physical engagement at the same time as underscoring its lack of plasticity and thus 
its separation from us as living human beings. Cunningham’s claim that reading can transform 
readers is not at issue; attachment theorists also believe that modes of attachment are crucial for 
learning and development.63 The problem is concerned with the consequences of eliding 
reading texts with actual embodied interpersonal contact and attachment, or with that which 
would push palimpsestuous consciousness and literary imagination beyond its reasonable 
boundaries if the material to be engaged with is restricted to printed text.  
‘The Greek Boy’, still unpublished, is very simple in its plot: a schoolboy (Tommy) we 
assume to be an immigrant or at least a guest in London, is staying with his uncle (Harry) and 
they are visiting The British Museum. Harry leaves Tommy alone in the museum while he goes 
to the bank. At this point Tommy engages with the statues when one of them, the Greek boy, 
comes alive and starts talking to Tommy. The remainder of the story concerns what they say to 
each other, until Tommy returns to his uncle and they go home.  
 Tommy’s isolation is established from the outset: ‘I’m lonely’ are Tommy’s first words, 
which are repeated in the second paragraph.64 An immigrant, Tommy is dejected in London – 
an ‘old’ city in which all he sees is ‘dry and dull’ (2). Harry tells Tommy that they must see a 
room full of ‘broken old stained marble things’ – the fragments that Tommy finds hard to value 
in their incomplete status (1, 2). Once Harry leaves for the bank, Tommy is left to transact with 
the art by himself, when ‘a slender ray filtered through the skylight. It touched the graceful 
figure of one of the Greek Boys on horseback’ (2). Here the ray of light that physically touches 
the Greek boy initiates Tommy’s meaningful engagement with the work. At the moment 
                                                          
63 Rothbaum et al., ‘Attachment, Learning, and Coping’. 
64 H.D., ‘The Greek Boy’ (c. 1911), p. 1. H.D. Papers, Yale University. Further references to this text are given 
in parentheses in the main body. 
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Tommy repeats to himself, ‘I’m cold – dear me – I’m lonely’, the Greek boy appears and asks 
Tommy why he is lonely (3).  
H.D. focuses more on Tommy’s thoughts of the Greek boy than on the boy’s thoughts 
of Tommy. Initially, all Tommy can see is the otherness of the boy – his feminine figure and 
different dress – ‘with only half his clothes on’ (3-4). They talk about bathing in winter and 
what is ‘sensible’ or not, thus moving into the merits of particular learned judgments. The Greek 
boy sees Tommy’s loneliness differently: ‘Are not your father and mother the great State?’ (5). 
When the Greek boy thinks that Tommy is a ‘barbarian’ because he is not Athenian or Spartan, 
‘something blazed in Tommy’s cheeks, – his eyes flamed’ (5). Having connected with the boy 
by listening to him, Tommy’s responses lead him to wrestle with the boy, so that ‘in a moment 
he was lying at the feet of the Greek boy. He couldn’t tell how it had happened’ (5). When the 
Greek boy questions what he knows about the physical contact of wrestling, Tommy is 
‘discomforted’ (6). He is jolted into consciousness, defamiliarised, by being asked to think 
reflexively about his learning from the physical contact with what is ostensibly a statue (an 
artwork). Tommy and the Greek boy compare notes about their particular learning communities 
and how what these know and teach is able to render a living space ‘wonderful’ (6). So 
enamoured by Tommy, the Greek boy whisks him away, out of the Museum, to the Elders 
where Tommy is invited to share what he knows – to dialogue with the Greek teachers. At the 
moment when they reach out to touch him, Tommy is woken by his uncle (8). The touch that 
the Elders were about to bestow upon Tommy is translated to his uncle’s touch, which suggests 
perhaps that Tommy’s deeply involved transaction with the Greek boy has changed how he 
sees the possibilities for contact in his own world, which is no longer a lonely and isolating 
place, but one redolent with potential learning rooted in warm attachment.  
 By focusing on Tommy’s experiential journey, ‘The Greek Boy’ can be read as 
reinforcing Cunningham’s vision of ‘touching reading’, or the ways in which fictional or 
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aesthetic worlds can reach out to us and we to them. But the fantasy genre in which ‘The Greek 
Boy’ can be placed complicates this because to all intents and purposes, Tommy does actually 
engage in physical contact with the boy, and this actual touching is the basis for growth in 
learning. On one level, Tommy adopts a palimpsestuous consciousness, in which he is able to 
insert his own situation in that of a fragment from the past; he actually engages in an aesthetic 
transaction. On another level, though, the palimpsestuous thrives on attachment because it 
pushes the realistic boundaries of aesthetic experience: it is no longer a purely psychological or 
even affective process, but an actual bodily one as well. 
 The central issue at stake is how far can literary imagination foster personal connection 
with others within the transactional literary experience? There seems to be something deeply 
attractive about literary imagination which makes some thinkers, including Rosenblatt, extol its 
virtues. The attraction lies in the contemplative, sensuous, and affective way in which some 
works of literature can engage our attention and help us feel more integrated as people. 
Literature enables readers to experience at their own pace, to indulge in pauses, retreats, and 
speculations in a way that other kinds of art do not. Perhaps we become attracted to specific 
characters, or to a vivified historical milieu, or to a particular experience which is depicted. The 
transactional theory foregrounds a person’s sensuous engagement with such elements because 
of their potential to increase a person’s self-knowledge while also broadening their insight into 
what it means to be human (as well as myriad of more specific themes which are unique to the 
reader in question).  
And yet, by foregrounding the possibility and desirability of attachment between readers 
and literature, H.D. helps to expose the limits of literary imagination. As with Tommy, we are 
sometimes aware of the inertness of literature (as with sculpture in the Museum) as well as its 
capacity to animate our imaginations. Perhaps we only sense ‘the dead hand of the past’ (to 
echo Rosenblatt, emphasising the irony of a dead touch). Such ‘inertness’ may even occur 
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because a reader is too attached to a fictional element, so that the object of his desire becomes 
unobtainable. By highlighting the relationship between the palimpsestuous and attachment, 
H.D. foregrounds its capacity to thwart as well as warm.  
Drawing on Leo Bersani’s concept of ‘self-shattering jouissance’ – a concept also 
developed by Lacan – Anita Phillips has argued that ‘any intense experience – sex, art, even 
fleeting, momentary perceptions like the effect of inhaling the scent of a flower – can lead to 
an overpowering, self-shattering emotion’.65  The palimpsestuous may well enable us to see 
some books like jackets which can enfold us in a womb-like manner, ushering us into a blissful 
state of attachment which can console us in our loneliness, but there is also a sense in which 
there may be felt an irreconcilable gulf between reader and literary work, when we are reminded 
that what we have become attached to in the fictional world is not as reciprocal as we may 
imagine. The literary work will always be somewhat ungraspable, almost petrified like the 
Greek boy in The British Museum, and we might only realise this at the self-shattering tipping 
point of a deeply engaging aesthetic experience. Cunningham’s metaphor of ‘touching reading’, 
therefore, needs to be qualified by emphasising that the physical artefact of a book is no 
substitute for connecting with actual people, and that even fictional characters and situations 
may prove tantalisingly unreal at the point of self-shattering jouissance. Literary imagination 
has its important function and pleasures, but it is not the whole story; it should not be made to 
over-reach itself.  
I now go on to argue that Rosenblatt’s interest in cultural pluralism represents a potential 
solution to the limits of literary imagination. If readers are ultimately limited in the extent to 
which they may connect with other personalities in literature (because they are imagined, and 
because the book is not a person either), they have an important role in trying to connect with 
real people in the classroom, and in the wider society as well.  
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Re-envisioning Human Relations 
Rosenblatt, Cultural Pluralism, and a Wiser America 
This section on cultural pluralism constitutes an important shift in the arc of the overall thesis, 
whereby the attention is focused more outwardly, away from the imaginative life of the 
individual, towards the individual’s relationship to society. Chapter 4 then continues and 
deepens this outward focus by viewing the individual more extensively within an educational 
context. Rosenblatt’s political commitment to democracy forms the bedrock for her 
transactional theory, yet her theory also argues that literary experiences, and especially literary 
imagination, can feed back into the development of democracy. There is thus a kind of 
ecosystem in Rosenblatt’s work – a cycle from democracy to literature and back to democracy: 
democracy and the transactional literary experience seem to be mutually reinforcing. Cultural 
pluralism is simply one of Rosenblatt’s more focused attempts to state the way in which literary 
imagination can serve democracy. Human differences are considered, but the goal is to find 
ways of connecting people and building a society in which people can live together in greater 
harmony. Rosenblatt further crystallises the link between integrative modes of knowing and 
forms of personal connection or sociability, but she expresses this link through the practical 
realm of politics. 
Weaving through Rosenblatt’s writing from the 1940s to her death is a profound 
preoccupation with human relations, and particularly how different groups in American society 
might negotiate their differences and establish a ground of unity from which to nurture the 
individualities of all. For Rosenblatt, imaginative participation in the literary experience was 
always a means for individuals to understand others in society beyond the literary work, to 
enter into conversation with them about their way of life, their values, and their vision of what 
a good life could be. And as we have seen by looking at H.D.’s work, such attention directed 
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beyond the literary work may well be a blessed release from the pain of experiencing the limits 
of literary imagination.  
Although the social aspect of literary experience has important classroom implications, 
such as decentred teaching and reoriented learning outcomes (see Chapters 1 and 2), what I 
wish to do now is to show how Rosenblatt’s integration of cultural pluralism as a paradigm of 
human relations can speak more widely to the work of literary critics as well as student learners. 
The project of a wiser America – a more humane, liberated, and creative society – was to be 
fuelled by the re-imagining of literary-critical writers as Whitmanian literati: individuals with 
a responsibility to image forth forms of productive human conversation about the big questions 
of how to live together in a land of increasing cultural difference. The preoccupation with the 
literatus then extends in the next section, to H.D.’s vision of the writer’s role in The Walls Do 
Not Fall. To grasp how Rosenblatt appropriated Horace Kallen’s concept of cultural pluralism, 
it is necessary to proceed at this point chronologically.  
 After the end of the Second World War Rosenblatt acted as editor for a special issue of 
The English Journal, dedicated to discussing ethnic relations in the United States and 
sponsored by the National Conference of Christians and Jews.66 In the wake of the atomic 
bomb and an urgent need to assess the ‘basic moral problems of our age’, Rosenblatt 
established this journal issue as a platform for airing views in the context of English studies, 
which she aligned under the banner of ‘cultural pluralism’ – a term coined by the philosopher 
Horace Kallen in 1915, but which continued to be used throughout the twentieth century, 
particularly in the last third.67 Although Kallen wrote an article for Rosenblatt’s issue, entitled 
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‘Of the American Spirit’, his theory of cultural pluralism is discussed here only obliquely.68 
But his idea is in fact very simple, and, as Rosenblatt’s husband, Sidney Ratner, wrote in 1984, 
it primarily aimed to supplant the assimilationist, White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) 
model of Americanisation popular in the 1910s, encapsulated in the metaphor of the ‘melting 
pot’.69 Between 1890 and 1914 around 75 per cent of immigrants arriving in the United States, 
mostly via Ellis Island in New York, came from southern and eastern Europe and as such, 
challenged the assumed homogeneity of American identity for those whose roots went back far 
longer into the early Republic or colonial past.70  
Ratner’s discussion of Kallen’s theory is more instructive in this instance than turning 
to Kallen himself, given that Ratner’s article and the points he selected for discussion are deeply 
imbricated in Rosenblatt’s own thinking and vice versa. According to Ratner, therefore, at the 
heart of Kallen’s theory is a concern for the individual, and that the individual should be 
allowed and given the resources to develop freely and fully. Democracy was believed to be the 
political system most adept at safeguarding conditions in which the individual could develop. 
But in order for democracy to flourish, different cultural groups in America needed to work 
together, largely through conversation, toward creating the conditions of unity in which 
diversity could grow. The new metaphor became one of an ‘orchestration’ of ‘differents’, 
retaining their distinctiveness, but playing to the tune of American democracy.71  
As in Randolph Bourne’s progressive vision of a ‘Trans-national America’ (1916), 
Rosenblatt’s cultural pluralism seeks the active creation of something distinctly American – 
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something to which, say, immigrant Italians, Ukrainians, and Poles all might agree to work 
towards with more established communities such as the English and Dutch, in order that their 
Catholicism, Uniatism, or Congregationalism, say, might flourish. For in her foreword to this 
issue of The English Journal, Rosenblatt cautioned against ‘the existence of utterly distinct 
cultures in America rather than a single but pluralistic American culture, including a broad 
range of individual and group differences within its framework’.72 Differences were not 
permitted to be so ‘utterly distinct’ as to preclude the creation of a society in which all might 
coexist. 
As the century progressed, Rosenblatt re-invoked her vision of cultural pluralism in the 
light of different social movements, using slightly different vocabulary, particularly in the wake 
of civil rights and the emergence of ‘ethnicity’ as a sociological term in the 1970s, and finally, 
‘multiculturalism’ in the 1990s. Gordon Pradl has informed me that Rosenblatt’s student 
demographics at NYU (at least in the mid-1960s) were fairly homogenous (i.e. white), and due 
to Rosenblatt’s exacting standards, she never had a large cohort of doctoral students.73 Pradl 
suggests that ‘her ideas could be seen as progressively helping the student revolution (including 
diversity) but her academic writing and teaching were before the dramatic changes that 
occurred in the late sixties’.74 It was only after her retirement in 1972 that Rosenblatt seemed 
to speak more consistently and openly about progressive politics. Her tendency in the 1980s 
and 1990s in her interviews was to emphasise her politics, but perhaps overestimating the 
practical impact on her academic work of this activity earlier in her career.  
The most significant publication of this early post-retirement period is Rosenblatt’s 
1978 article for Yale Review, entitled ‘Whitman’s Democratic Vistas and the New “Ethnicity”’, 
which was also republished in 2005 in Making Meaning with Texts. In her 1982 interview for 
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Columbia University, Rosenblatt explained that in the mid-1970s, she perceived a condition in 
American society similar to that which Walt Whitman experienced a century earlier, after the 
Civil War.75 In discussing Whitman’s answer to the problem of how to reconcile the individual 
with the aggregate, Rosenblatt turned to Kallen’s cultural pluralism and argued that it provided 
the model for dialoguing about ‘political and social morality’.76 Questioning the implications 
of the term ‘ethnicity’, Rosenblatt asked whether there ‘is […] room for the new ethnicity in 
Whitman’s view of the state as an aggregate whose prime justification is that it creates the 
stable environment within which the individual can freely and fully develop?’77 Or, focusing 
more explicitly on the recent interest in personal roots, Rosenblatt also asked: ‘Does 
[Whitman’s] concern for individuals joined in the solidarity of American nationality rule out 
the current quest for a narrower solidarity based on ethnic roots and ethnic memories?’78 
Essentially, Rosenblatt advances the cause of pluralism in her unwavering faith in democracy 
as the unitive force embracing diverse Americans. Taking Whitman’s cue, Rosenblatt honours 
an individual’s right to ethnic and cultural identification and self-creation; but she also urges 
that cultural cross-pollination is also a healthy and positive trait in Americans.  
If it is true that literary imagination proves insubstantial as a holistic vehicle of 
attachment to other people, Rosenblatt  highlights the other facet of the transactional literary 
experience, whereby readers discuss their literary experiences with one another and with an 
instructor. It is in the social aspect of literary discussion that individuals may recover what is 
sometimes lost in the private reading experience. In other words, the isolated reader is unable 
to connect with others in such a way as to foster democracy and pluralism; only in conversation 
can this difficulty be surmounted. The stress on collaborative reading and imaginative 
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exploration also further crystallises the significance of the institutional context; the English 
degree becomes a crucial mechanism for not only coping with the limitations of private literary 
imagination, but also for rationalising the use of group conversations structured around 
programmes of learning.  
While Kallen and Whitman provided intellectual sources for Rosenblatt’s thinking on 
human relations, her own family experience surely explains the enthusiasm with which she 
entered into their thinking. For instance, she was influenced by her parents’ response to the Ku 
Klux Klan (KKK) who were active in Lakewood, New Jersey, in the 1910s.79 Understanding 
that the KKK was antipathetic toward Catholics, the secular Rosenblatts mingled with local 
Catholic society in order to show solidarity – in order to offer support in warding off threats to 
a stable, pluralistic society. Louise’s father, Samuel Rosenblatt, was subsequently successful 
in getting town officials to pass an ordinance that anybody could march along the town’s streets 
as long as their heads were not covered. According to Rosenblatt’s son, Jonathan, the difference 
between the U.S. and Tsarist Russia, from whence Samuel and Jennie emigrated, lay in the fact 
that in the U.S. democracy was seen as ‘an arena for political activity and political action in 
the open, public square’.80 The private was tested out in the public sphere, so that in turn, an 
individual’s personal life could develop freely and fully. Samuel and Jennie, unlike other 
immigrants, chose to make a complete break with their Russian-Jewish roots:  
They didn’t have the family ties that enriched, and sometimes bound, 
the lives of other young, first-generation immigrants. Their ‘structural 
situation’ […] was wholly different and distinct from many other 
immigrants. And their personal ideology evidently meant they shucked 
off the garb of religion and ‘old country’ and ‘old country’s language’ 
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that made, for example, the Lower East Side in New York City 
interesting and quaint to some outside it, rich and tradition-infused to 
others who lived within it.81 
In coming to understand why Rosenblatt adhered so strongly to cultural pluralism as a 
pathway to democracy, it is important to see it as an operative, experiential reality in her family 
life – an ideology which enabled the Rosenblatts to become Americans, not in the WASP sense 
of the word, as assimilation, but rather, as individuals with their personal histories who wished 
to create a society bigger than any group to which they may have felt allegiance. In this respect, 
Rosenblatt differs from contemporary multiculturalist theorists such as the British political 
theorist Bhikhu Parekh, in that she tends to see ethnic self-containment as a danger to American 
democracy, whereas Parekh sees monocultural enclaves within a broader multicultural society 
in a fairly neutral, even positive light.82 Invoking Whitman, Rosenblatt says that the individual 
is more than his ethnic label: ‘He must be free [like Rosenblatt’s parents] to make his own 
choices, to seek out his own friends, to enter freely into other associations, other groups’.83 It 
is in the ‘aggressive withdrawal’ of groups in which lies ‘the danger of an intensification of 
differences, the danger of competition, of separatism, of conflict’.84  
Towards the end of the century, this belief in cultural pluralism remained strong, 
particularly among liberals, and Rosenblatt self-consciously distinguishes it from 
multiculturalism, which she sees as ‘too limited because [students] should also be helped [via 
literary imagination] to value other backgrounds’.85 The confidence with which she then says, 
‘of course the unity [which binds society together] is democracy’, belies her unwavering belief 
                                                          
81 Ibid., July 14, 2015. 
82 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2000). 
83 Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, p. 152.  
84 Ibid., pp. 153-54. See also Kallen’s stance in Cultural Pluralism, p. 55. 
85 Eugene F. Provenzo Jr., ‘Louise Rosenblatt Interview’, School of Education, University of Miami. 14 March 
1999. http://www.education.miami.edu/ep/rosenblatt/ (accessed online, June 17, 2015). 
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in the sovereignty of the individual and the appositeness of democracy to safeguard such 
sovereignty, against the erosion by enclaves. This amounts to an assumption that naturally, the 
individual should not only be free to make his own choices, often opposed to his ‘group’, but 
that, again like Rosenblatt’s parents, he probably wants to as well, which poses a problem.  
Rosenblatt’s faith in the unifying potential of democracy and her ideology of cultural 
pluralism may strike us as somewhat naïve and at variance with her parallel commitment to the 
growth of individual persons. That she tends to assume that people are part of one or another 
group is just one symptom of her tendency towards generalisation in this area. People are more 
complicated and may have different and conflicting allegiances, while a discourse of American 
possibility and newness – the desire to create a ‘distinctively American spirit’, to recall 
Bourne’s phrase – may appear as a threat to the immigrant and their children who may already 
feel lost, displaced, and suffering a crisis of identity.86  
In which case, the value of literary imagination is paradoxically reinforced; it can be 
used to remedy the failures of that which is meant to alleviate its shortcomings. Literary 
imagination can help individuals to crystallise a symbolic sense of their primary world – the 
‘world’ they first experienced in life – before branching out to engage others. As Seamus 
Heaney put it: ‘If you have a strong first world and a strong set of relationships, then in some 
part of you, you are always free; you can walk the world because you know where you belong, 
you have some place to come back to’.87  And yet some people may struggle even to cognise a 
sense of their ‘first world’. Although not identical to immigrants in America, and with 
important differences, as an transnational adoptee I have nevertheless found myself facing two 
worlds, the old and the new, and yet I am still not really sure what my ‘first world’ is. I might 
experience a sense of what Betty Jean Lifton has referred to as ‘cosmic loneliness’ among 
                                                          
86 Bourne, ‘Trans-national America’. 
87 Seamus Heaney, speech at Magherafelt Civic Reception, January 1996. 
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adoptees, or a ‘genealogical bewilderment’ which can manifest as insecurity with regard to 
precisely the kind of pluralism Rosenblatt advocates.88 For those unsure of even belonging to 
a particular culture in the first place, literary imagination can offer a way of constructing a 
sense of self which addresses feelings of loneliness and bewilderment, before then beginning 
to engage with difference from a more secure position.89  
Thus, while cultural pluralism may be an ideal in principle, in practice a more flexible 
approach to navigating human relations may be necessary, consistent with the personalism 
underlying this thesis, which aims, where possible, to be sensitive to the distinctive situations 
of each person. As I mentioned in the main introduction to the thesis, Rosenblatt’s humanistic 
reification of democracy as the principal civilising force in America in fact raises questions 
about the manner in which human welfare can also be objectivised as an abstract concept, to 
which actual individuals may become enslaved. According to a personalist framework, the 
literary experience cannot, à la Rosenblatt and Pradl, serve both democracy and the human; 
one is always subordinated to the other. Personalists like Berdyaev invoke Jesus’s words that 
the Sabbath was in fact made for man rather than the other way round, that man is made for the 
Sabbath (which the Pharisees propounded); what is meant by this is that concepts which 
organise society in some way should be managed so that they serve actual people.90 With 
Rosenblatt, the danger is that learners are put in the service of an abstract vision of democracy 
and cultural pluralism, which seems to be at odds with the kind of personalism implicit in her 
emphasis on an individual experience of literature. Rosenblatt envisages citizens as well as 
                                                          
88 Betty Jean Lifton, Journey of the Adopted Self: A Quest for Wholeness (New York: Basic Books, 1994), p. 47; 
p. 68. See H. J. Sants, ‘Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents’, British Journal of 
Medical Psychology, 37 (1964): 133-41.  
89 Nancy Newton Verrier’s famous work, The Primal Wound: Understanding the Adopted Child (London: BAAF, 
2009) offers rich insight into the adoptee’s quest for selfhood. Colleagues in Leeds who run reading groups for 
refugees report a similar phenomenon, whereby literary experiences can help displaced persons work through 
their experience of dislocation.  
90 Nicolas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, trans. Natalie Duddington (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1945), p. 107. 
 164 
 
individual human beings, which, as the nineteenth-century Russian thinker Vladimir Solovyov 
wrote, is detrimental to the latter: for ‘as soon as we put alongside of the natural primary basis 
of all rights an artificial one, citizenship, there open up wide possibilities of declaring this or 
that group of men to be in a special position as citizens, or rather, as not-citizens, and of 
depriving them of all human rights under the pretext that those rights belong to citizens only’.91 
Isaiah Berlin reiterated a similar point in the 1950s by turning to the thought of the nineteenth-
century Russian thinker, Aleksandr Herzen. Herzen may well in fact have influenced Berdyaev 
in his antipathy towards abstract concepts of humanity in general. What Berlin (via the thought 
of Herzen) emphasises and brings into the twentieth century, however, is the persistent danger 
of concentrating on remote ideas about the human at the expense of attention and care for the 
concrete, existential human.92 To echo my Introduction, it signals a preference for personalism 
over humanism as a framework for articulating literary experience.  
Rather than extolling the virtues of an idea of democracy or cultural pluralism, what 
seems more fruitful is to encourage ways of relating to others which are provoked through 
sharing literary experiences, debating the complexities of human behaviour with an openness 
to ambiguity. Rather than ‘indoctrinat[ing] openly the basic concepts of a democratic system’, 
we can strengthen Rosenblatt’s interest in imaginative participation in the experiences of others 
as a way of fostering, not a democratic system, but a personalist care for actual, concrete human 
beings – a care which escapes the confines of any political system.93 Indeed, this seems to me 
to capture the spirit of Rosenblatt’s thought. What she cares most about is the ability of 
individuals to grow in self-knowledge as well as the capacity to relate to others in healthy ways. 
                                                          
91 Vladimir Solovyov, A Solovyov Anthology, ed. S. L. Frank (London: Saint Austin Press, 2001), p. 52, original 
emphasis. 
92 Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994), pp. 86-87. Both Herzen and Berlin approach 
the critique of abstractions from a non-Christian perspective, however.  
93 On indoctrination, see Gordon M. Pradl, Literature for Democracy: Reading as a Social Act (Portsmouth, NH: 
Boynton / Cook, 1996), p. 87. I am also aware that even the word ‘care’ can be problematic; a state’s ‘care system’, 
for example, can be anything but caring. 
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How this is achieved in the literature classroom is really an open question; Rosenblatt offers 
some pointers by couching literary discussion in terms of cultural pluralism and democracy, 
but we might be on safer ground if we relegate the political to a less intrusive space, allowing 
more emphatically for the unpredictability of the (inter)personal in the classroom. 
In fact, as with the need to recognise the limitations of literary imagination, there is a 
correlative need to appreciate the limits of reaching personal connection, both between people, 
and within the individual herself, relating the various parts of her life into a sense of 
‘wholeness’, as Lifton says. Part of a reconfigured literary studies would therefore entail 
encouraging openness in coping with the limitations of oneself and also of others, which in 
Chapter 4 I shall show is one of the identified hallmarks of wisdom. 
A more personalist way in which Rosenblatt suggests literary studies can promote the 
negotiation of human relations and differences within a greater unity, however, is by invoking, 
along with her husband, Whitman’s vision of the literatus. In his 1984 article Ratner references 
Rosenblatt’s Whitman article, in which she expressed the importance of the ‘humanistic 
writer’, or ‘literatus’ who, ‘through their words, their writings, their learning, would foster a 
healthy moral substratum for our national life, permeating the American mentality’.94 The 
concept of the literatus ‘articulates our present-day need for writers, scholars, scientists, 
professional people, and political leaders, who will do more than express our disillusionments, 
intensify our alienation, or dwell on our separateness’.95 For Whitman, the literatus has a quasi-
religious function – ‘the priest departs, the divine literatus comes’.96 Reading Whitman one 
realises how far Rosenblatt stripped the literatus of his manifestly quasi-religious function.97 
                                                          
94 Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, p. 146. Ratner, ‘Horace M. Kallen’, p. 198. 
95 Ibid., p. 155. 
96 Walt Whitman, Democratic Vistas (Washington, DC: Smith and McDougal, 1871), p. 6. 
97 For a thoughtful reading of Whitman’s original text, which discusses his vision of democracy and literature’s 
role in fostering this, see Chapter 7 in Stephen John Mack, The Pragmatic Whitman: Reimagining American 
Democracy (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 2002), pp. 135-59. 
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Rosenblatt’s literatus need not have faith in God; rather, consistent with her humanism, her 
literatus, who can be a writer and thinker of any sort, must elevate the individual to the highest 
point in so far that he or she contributes to the nourishment of a democracy in which that 
elevation can happen. Rosenblatt’s literatus brings people together based on mutual respect for 
the individuality of all. Unlike some of the writers Rosenblatt studied for her PhD on art for 
art’s sake, the literatus does not range himself against society as a radical different – as 
somehow better than ordinary people. The literatus should embrace an expansiveness and 
generosity of spirit, perhaps most obvious in a nineteenth-century writer such as George Eliot 
or Tolstoy, than in a modern or modernist sense – although, as I will show, I think H.D. (among 
others) is an exception here.98 In some ways, Rosenblatt is indirectly extending a discourse of  
nineteenth-century ‘intelligentsia’ – a Russian term for people who are not intellectuals, but 
rather ‘a dedicated order, almost a secular priesthood’ who are concerned with communicating 
ways of being as much as ideas.99 She is also extending her commitment to a generalist vision 
of literary studies, whereby to be engaged with literature is to be engaged with socially relevant 
matters (see Chapter 2).  
There are, of course, a number of risks with advocating the activity of a Whitmanian 
literatus, chief of which is incurring the accusation of elitism. In the previous chapter I 
discussed Rosenblatt’s tendency to carve out an aristocracy of particularly sensitive individuals 
who may be especially receptive to engaging in literary experiences. However, I tried to qualify 
this tendency by framing it within a broader personalistic vision which necessarily entails a 
tendency to believe in an aristocracy of individuals equipped with specific gifts. 
Acknowledging Whitman’s own personalism – ‘his mystic sense of the individual’ – 
                                                          
98 The memoirs and unpublished journals (held in The British Library) of Lady Ottoline Morrell are an important 
source of insight into the ways in which specific modernists (such as Katherine Mansfield, Mark Gertler, and 
Virginia Woolf) self-identified as different to non-artistic or non-intellectual people. See also Miranda Seymour, 
Ottoline Morrell: Life on the Grand Scale (London: Faber and Faber, 2008).  
99 Berlin, Russian Thinkers, p. 117. 
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Rosenblatt sees the literatus as being somebody who has developed his particular gifts and 
talents in such a way that he can share these with others by way of contributions to the wider 
society.100 No longer a priest, the literatus is simply one person speaking to another; there are 
no pretensions to superiority. While Rosenblatt is fairly unconcerned about the manner in 
which such contributions might materialise, her central effort is to place responsibility on 
thoughtful people to engage with one another and to set forth new visions of society as well as 
critiques of the status quo.  
I now turn to H.D.’s poem, The Walls Do Not Fall, and read it as an exploration of the 
role of the literatus. Although H.D.’s vocabulary is different to Rosenblatt’s, her vision of the 
scribe accords with a number of the central qualities of the literatus. In particular, H.D.’s scribe 
engages in a palimpsestuous reconstruction of values as part of a broader modernist quest. By 
looking to the past and experiencing it imaginatively, the scribe may discover values which 
have been lost and re-inscribe them for a contemporary audience. In other words, H.D.’s vision 
of the scribe crystallises the link between literary imagination, personal connection, and the 
literatus, which have been explored in this chapter thus far. It also moves us closer to the theme 
of wisdom, which is the subject of the final chapter.  
 
‘Searching the Old Highways’: The Walls Do Not Fall 
In ‘H.D. by Delia Alton’ (written 1949-50), H.D. wrote that her war trilogy of poems, of which 
The Walls Do Not Fall (written 1942) is the first, ‘belong[s] to the rhythm and vibration of the 
experience recorded in The Sword Went Out to Sea’.101 I take this sentiment to mean that The 
Walls Do Not Fall is a poem about a particular kind of consciousness – one which apprehends 
new possibilities and is intimately concerned with art and its relationship to the past. In Sword, 
                                                          
100 Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, p. 144. 
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the emphasis is on finding ways of expressing the need to follow ‘traces of direction’ in 
aesthetic experience. In The Walls Do Not Fall, the focus is on delineating the role of the one 
who undertakes such activity.  
In a 1943 letter to Pearson, H.D. explained that this poem concerned the ‘protection of 
the scribe’.102 She spoke of ‘our PROFESSION’ – literature – as if to defend it against 
accusations of being ‘pathetic’ (31 (original emphasis), 32). Almost echoing Shelley, H.D. tells 
Pearson that ‘the “writer” is the original rune-maker, the majic-maker [sic], his words are 
sacred – that is what it is’ (32). H.D. explains that she and Bryher (her partner) were provoked 
by a letter in the literary review journal, Life and Letters Today (1928-50), from a girl who 
questioned the vocation of the writer ‘in the future world-reconstruction’ once the war ended 
(32). In response, The Walls Do Not Fall is offered (to Pearson) as a modern-day defence of 
literature, and of the role of the writer more broadly. H.D. even hints that her focus is 
philosophical (or theoretical), thus extending the remit of the writer to include the setting forth 
of ideas as well as aesthetic visions; indeed, the two are intricately linked for H.D. However, 
in her poem she focuses on the way in which the ‘scribe’ is linked to Hermes, Ancient-of-Days, 
and Ancient Wisdom and therefore the scribe’s primary function is to bring forth ‘things new 
and old’ (33, original italics). Where Sword sets up the notion of ‘pleated folds’ and the 
importance of entering into existential time in order to traverse history for ‘traces of direction’, 
The Walls Do Not Fall foregrounds the scribe’s vocation in society as one who undertakes this 
existential activity of negotiating between the old and the new, to present ideas in an 
aesthetically vivid manner which justifies the role of art in society. In short, H.D.’s scribe, like 
Rosenblatt’s literatus, is an individual invested with the task of highlighting and formulating 
new ways for people to connect with one another. 
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 The poem begins by setting the scene: railings are taken from London squares to be 
turned into armaments, and the bombs or ‘incidents’ leave edifices spliced open so that what 
was once sealed now becomes open to view. Comparing the situation to Pompeii, the speaker 
asserts that ‘we know the crack of volcanic fissure […] pressure on heart, lungs, the brain / 
about to burst its brittle case / (what the skull can endure!)’.103 H.D.’s alliteration (‘brain’, 
‘burst’, ‘brittle’, ‘bewilderment’, ‘bedevilment’, ‘bone-frame’, ‘burnt’) contributes to her 
project of stressing the way in which human beings have been plundered internally; ‘yet the 
frame held’ (511). Existing structures, such as the railings which fence in neat squares, have 
been removed and it is in this condition that ‘Spirit announces the Presence’ in an apocalyptic 
dystopia where only the frames of human beings survive (510).  
 It is in such an environment that the value of literature can be undermined: ‘charms are 
not, they said, grace’ (511). A poet’s rhythm has become ‘the devil’s hymn’ and the poet is 
told ‘your stylus is dipped in corrosive sublimate’ (512). The general question people are asking 
seems to be whether writers can ‘scratch out / indelible ink of the palimpsest of past 
misadventure’ (512). In other words: what can be salvaged and turned into a vision of hope? Is 
not the palimpsest of the past steeped in ‘misadventure’? And so, as in a Greek play, a response 
is made to the call: the stylus is turned into a healing caduceus (the staff of Hermes) which, 
‘evoking the dead, / it brings life to the living’ (512). As with the Biblical Jonah who was 
trapped inside the stomach of a whale, the speaker in this poem finds the intransigence of being 
in an ‘indigestible, hard, ungiving’ situation a time for ‘living within’, in which ‘you beget, 
self-out-of-self, / selfless, / that pearl-of-great-price’ (513, 514). Stringing her words together 
in an alchemical, mnemonic fashion emphasises the transformative state of being forced into a 
more existential, inward state of being out of which comes the pearl of great price – a gospel 
of peace.  
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 H.D.’s address to those who question the value of the scribe becomes more defensive 
as the poem proceeds: ‘if you do not even understand what words say, / how can you expect to 
pass judgement / on what words conceal?’ (517). The speaker seems to be suggesting that 
people who disparage the role of the writer in a time of war have in some way forgotten how 
to read and make meaning. Books have been taken away and used for the war effort, to be 
turned into cartridge cases (518). The ‘fight for life’ which justifies the removal of books is 
presented as an irony, for it is books, and the ability to read and make meaning with texts that 
is what will give us real life: for ‘we take [books] with us / beyond death’ – they are ‘indelibly 
/ stamped on the atmosphere somewhere, / forever’ (518-19). Being ‘stamped on the 
atmosphere’ is a way of turning the efficiency of war on its head: the stamp of bureaucracy is 
turned into a mark of Ancient Wisdom which lives in the atmosphere – a nebulous region which 
cannot be contained or specified and thus pinned down; it belongs to everyone, everywhere.  
 Moreover, H.D. is honest about the trials of writers; in spite of the important function 
she attributes to them, they are beset by difficulties: ‘we, the latter-day twice-born, / have our 
bad moments when // dragging the forlorn / husk of self after us, // we are forced to confess to 
/ malaise and embarrassment’ (521). ‘Too old to be useful’ and yet ‘not old enough to be dead’, 
H.D. affirms one special responsibility which belongs to the writer in spite of his difficulties: 
‘we are the keepers of the secret, / the carriers, the spinners // of the rare intangible thread / that 
binds all humanity // to ancient wisdom, / to antiquity’ (523). ‘Carrying’ and ‘spinning’: these 
are the dual activities involved when turning a vision of human relations into a communicable 
piece of ‘wisdom’. Carrying recognises the burden of the writer – the original impulse or idea 
or commitment which sets the writer off on his task of spinning. Spinning, on the other hand, 
evokes the activity of writing creatively, of setting forth an integrated vision of some aspect of 
life which is connected to the past and yet is resolutely intended for the present. Importantly, 
spinning intimates at a synthetic activity rather than an analytic one.  
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 In his ‘A Defence of Poetry’, Shelley begins by positing a distinction between analysis 
and synthesis, which he frames as reason and imagination. Both are aspects of the mind: the 
former consists of ‘contemplating the relations borne by one thought to another’, and the latter 
‘as mind acting upon those thoughts so as to colour them with its own light’ and then 
‘composing’ new thoughts from the initial ones, ‘each containing within itself the principle of 
its integrity’.104 Imagination seems to be the more essential aspect of mind presented here: 
reason to imagination is ‘as the shadow to the substance’.105 Shelley’s advocacy for the 
importance of imagination can be placed within a broader picture of this romantic binary of 
‘reason’ and ‘feeling’, which I touched upon earlier in the chapter and in Chapter 2. In Russia, 
Kireevsky advocated ‘integral thought’ as a way of reconciling reason and emotion, and 
Shelley also suggests that it is imagination that conceives of thoughts which contain a principle 
of integrity and synthesis. The ‘integral’ is a synthetic orientation which fuses emotion and 
reason, resulting in a rationalism of the heart. I showed how Kireevsky’s philosophy influenced 
Berdyaev’s personalism, and thus how integral thinking could be reasonably placed as a central 
quality of personalism. In The Walls Do Not Fall, H.D. seems to be re-invoking romantic 
conceptions of creative activity centred on the imagination, which combines rationality and 
feeling; her vision is personalistic because she values the imaginative activity of individual 
scribes or writers.  
 By re-invoking romanticism, H.D. was herself setting forth her modernist project of 
bringing out of her mind things old and new; she was taking the lead in the kind of activity she 
advocated in her poetry. As Roberts and Murphy write, ‘to be modern was not to be cut off 
from the past by an irreversible break […] To be modern was to accept and to think together 
the creativity of imitation, in the form of renaissances, and the rich continuity of civilization’.106 
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Both romanticism and modernism, then, draw their ‘self-understanding from the quest to 
recover a living relation to tradition’, in H.D.’s case, of the vocation of the writer in society.107 
The ‘way of inspiration / is always open’, H.D. claims, wherein inspiration, which might be 
contiguous with imagination, ‘explains symbols of the past / in to-day’s imagery’ (526). 
Inspiration ‘merges the distant future / with most distant antiquity, // states economically / in a 
simple dream-equation // the most profound philosophy, / discloses the alchemist’s secret’ 
(526). Of course, H.D.’s own poetry, especially the poetry of the 1940s and later, is not at all 
‘simple’ and, some may argue, not even ‘economical’. Indeed, the language of economy seems 
to jar with what the speaker in the poem said earlier about the need for poetry to transcend 
facile pretensions to utility. However, it seems that in this portion of the poem, H.D. is 
attempting to be just in claiming that ‘the way of inspiration’ is ‘open to everyone’. That is, if 
people revise their attitudes towards literature and philosophy and become more receptive to 
the powers of imagination, then the way of inspiration may become more apparent.  
 Part of the problem, it seems, is that ordinary people (or people who do not identify as 
artistic or intellectual) do not always realise that their own experiences matter – that they are 
active in the carrying and spinning processes outlined before: ‘no comment can alter spiritual 
realities / (you say) or again, // what new light can you possibly / throw upon them?’ asks an 
unidentified critic (539). And then H.D.’s speaker begins to explain: 
my mind (yours), 
your way of thought (mine), 
 
each has its peculiar intricate map, 
threads weave over and under 
 
the jungle-growth  
                                                          
107 Ibid., p. 3. 
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of biological aptitudes, 
 
inherited tendencies, 
the intellectual effort 
 
of the whole race, 
its tide and ebb; 
 
but my mind (yours) 
has its peculiar ego-centric  
 
personal approach 
to the eternal realities, 
 
and differs from every other 
in minute particulars, 
 
as the vein-paths on any leaf 
differ from those of every other leaf 
 
in the forest, as every snow-flake 
has its particular star, coral or prism shape. (539-40) 
This passage, rich in imagery pertinent to palimpsestuous consciousness, is notable for its 
explicit personalistic angle. When H.D. wrote to Pearson that her poem was in many ways an 
exercise in philosophy, it is a passage like this which confirms her supposition, for it is as much 
theory as poetry. The speaker homes in on the ‘personal approach / to the eternal realities’ 
which each one of us is able to access by the way of inspiration (imagination). H.D.’s task in 
this section of the poem seems to be to explain how the individual relates to the universal. 
Earlier in the chapter I wrote of the way the universal manifests in the particular, and H.D. 
affirms this belief by offering multiple images which position the specific and the general. Her 
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approach is poetic; we need not subscribe to beliefs in racial inheritance in order to benefit 
from her language.  
Firstly, the poem highlights the existence of ‘eternal realities’ which seem contiguous 
with the earlier ‘spiritual realities’. What is eternal are certain human experiences and 
emotions. For H.D., the inalterability of spiritual realities seems connected with the prevalence 
of war, which is driven home as a recurring reality in human existence. Secondly, the poem 
draws attention to the intellectual configuration of each person as being unique. Each of us has 
a ‘peculiar intricate map’ where ‘threads weave over and under / the jungle-growth / of 
biological aptitudes’. Not only does the modern writer undertake to ‘spin’ new visions of 
human experience for a contemporary audience, but each writer himself is peculiarly spun, 
even biologically: there are various threads which are interwoven and which the mind has to 
assess – to work with or against. Despite our uniqueness, the emphasis is placed on sharing, as 
it is in Rosenblatt’s commitment to cultural pluralism. Human separateness needs to be 
overcome by seeking and recognising moments of identification and understanding with others. 
Affirming our personal configuration in a deeper way would then enable us to discern in which 
way we might contribute that unique insight into issues which concern others as well. Then, 
adopting a synthetic way of thinking, the writer who engages her imagination may be able 
successfully to undertake the original task which was questioned by the unnamed critic in the 
poem: ‘This search for historical parallels, / research into psychic affinities’ (539).  
 While H.D. is not specific about the role of reading literature in her defence of the 
writer, it seems that, like Rosenblatt’s literatus, her writer or scribe is a multi-functional being 
who can draw on philosophy as much as art in order to contribute to this important research 
into what draws humans together. Moreover, the emphasis on parallels and affinities can be 
explained, I think, in light of the way H.D. perceived the war to divide and isolate people from 
one another. Her insistence on the efficacy of the temple as a meeting place for lovers who 
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inaugurate existential time over clock time is linked to this drive towards synthesis and unity. 
And, as a metaphor for consciousness (the temple is also tempora), the link is clear: there is a 
particular way of thinking, of approaching the ‘eternal realities’, the ‘historical parallels’, and 
the ‘psychic affinities’ (unspecified though these are), which is conducive towards re-
construction – working out how the human race is to live together after what has seemed like 
cosmic destruction. Importantly, it is the personalist angle in H.D.’s vision which, like 
Rosenblatt’s, focuses our attention on the nature of this new kind of thinking. Finally, while 
H.D.’s poem concentrates on the effects of war, her ideas about the scribe hold value for times 
of peace as well. The value of H.D.’s work is simply that she was able to re-discover and 
reaffirm the ways in which the individual is connected to the universal; from a time of war, she 
was able to communicate a vision of the scribe which is for peacetime as well. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to crystallise the link between transactional literary experience and 
what I have termed ‘personal connection’, to denote imaginative attachment to others in the 
literary experience as well as thought brought to bear upon human relations in society more 
generally. I have argued that Rosenblatt and H.D. offer a suitably personalistic understanding 
of imagination which connects ways of thinking and feeling and actual relationships. The 
function of personalist textual sociability lies in its amenability to conceive of imagination as 
offering potential increase in self-knowledge as well as broadening an individual’s existential 
horizons by encountering difference.  
Furthermore, I have described the way in which a learner might carry out such 
imaginative work in terms of ‘aesthetic distance’ (Rosenblatt) and ‘palimpsestuous 
consciousness’ (H.D.). Both denote an attempt to layer one’s personal experience within 
another’s while still accommodating differences in specific forms of experience. H.D., 
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however, reminds us that literary imagination has its limits; the attachment that can form 
between a reader and a fictional entity may be powerful, but it is never a substitute for actual 
connection between real people. This is partly why Rosenblatt was also interested in cultural 
pluralism as a way of defining ideal human relations in American society. Literary imagination 
was never an end in itself for her; it needed to serve the cultivation of democratic citizens who 
could cope with an increasingly pluralistic America. However, I have also cautioned using 
democracy and cultural pluralism as the justification for teaching English or engaging with 
literature, as this objectivises the human and undermines the personalism latent in the dynamics 
of the transactional literary experience.  
Rosenblatt’s invocation of the Whitmanian literatus was her way of creating a role for 
the individual who seeks to present new images of human relations for the creation of a 
pluralistic America. Literary imagination is thus put in the service of an important social 
function; yet attention to the concrete human should always be foregrounded, whether this a 
fictional persona or other people in the interpretive project. H.D., on the other hand, engages 
in a romantic and modernist exploration of the vocation of the scribe – the individual who 
enters upon the way of inspiration in order to re-interpret historical parallels, psychic affinities, 
and eternal realities in accordance with his own specific, personal way of thinking and feeling. 
In other words, this chapter has shown that the literatus and the scribe, or the thinker and the 
writer, need to approach literary imagination in a way that utilises personalist textual sociability 
as a way of framing their personal vision. Their own particular mapping of texts, or their own 
particular approach to existing materials, is the soil out of which distinctive research can grow 
which can actively speak to issues which may concern all of humanity via the medium of 
personal exploration.  
However, this chapter has not addressed the nature of these eternal realities. The 
implication is that the literatus and the scribe are engaged in spinning their personal approach 
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to Ancient Wisdom. But what is wisdom? The final chapter explores what it means to be in 
quest of wisdom in contemporary literary studies. 
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4. Literary Studies and the Quest for Wisdom 
 
Throughout this thesis I have spoken of ‘being in quest of wisdom’, but have refrained from 
theorising this term until now. In this chapter I explore in turn the concepts of ‘quest’ and 
‘wisdom’, and their value as educational frameworks for learning in literary studies. At this 
stage in the thesis, I draw more vigorously on the work of other thinkers to help theorise the 
quest for wisdom and the role of the transactional literary experience within this. While this 
thesis has always positioned H.D. and Rosenblatt as its principal thinkers whose thought has 
enabled me to delineate the intersections between relevant anthropologies, philosophies, and 
sociologies (Chapters 1-3), in this final chapter I turn more extensively to the work of 
educationalists and philosophers whose work resonates with this literary pair in order to arrive 
at a tentative but germane understanding of being in quest of wisdom.  
The goal of this chapter is to fold a vision of being in quest of wisdom in literary studies 
into three existing areas of literary theory which circulate this concept but, I argue, have not 
addressed the pedagogical angle sufficiently, especially when wisdom is positioned as a valid 
learning objective. These areas of literary theory – the new literary humanism, affect, and ethics 
– are rightly interconnected, yet my argument is that my theory of the quest for wisdom via 
transactional literary experiences can offer pathways for synthesising these conversations in a 
particularly purposeful way, by couching the synthesis in a broader pedagogical framework, 
and, indeed, mission.  
To speak of a ‘mission’ is to maintain Theory’s historical emphasis on critique and 
activism, intersecting philosophy and the actualities of concrete human experience. Indeed, this 
chapter is perhaps the most philosophical of all the chapters: instead of extended close readings 
of primary texts, there is a more sustained effort at analysing and synthesising concepts, in 
making connections and in drawing out implications for literary theory. In the conclusion to 
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the thesis, I go on to offer some further ideas as to how the quest for wisdom and the literary 
experience may be further enriched and applied. I shall now turn to the concept of ‘quest’, and 
stress its transformative potential by drawing on the work of two New York thinkers connected 
to Rosenblatt – the existentialist thinker, Maxine Greene, and her colleague, Jack Mezirow.  
 
Transaction, Transformation, and Quest: Rosenblatt, Greene, Mezirow 
Rosenblatt and the Role of the Language Arts Teacher 
In Chapter 2 I argued that Rosenblatt’s position in Literature as Exploration was essentially 
generalist, in the sense of positing a broad diet of literary experiences which, through classroom 
discussion and reflection, may assist individual learners’ concentration on emotional and 
intellectual issues with which they happen to be especially preoccupied. It is worth 
remembering that Literature as Exploration was originally entitled Literature and Human 
Values, but was changed by Rosenblatt before its first publication because she worried it would 
seem ‘too stuffy’ and would in fact work against her by connoting character indoctrination, 
which she tried to combat through her emphasis on democratic testing and selecting of values.1 
In spite of this decision in the 1930s, in the 1950s and 1960s Rosenblatt designed a course at 
NYU entitled ‘Literature and the Crisis in Values’, which invokes her earlier essay from the 
1940s entitled ‘Enriching Values in Reading’ (1949), in which confusion among apparently 
conflicting values could be addressed directly through the reading and study of (particularly 
nineteenth and twentieth-century prose) literature, which prompted such consideration through 
its sensitive and complex portrayal of human experiences.2 By the mid-1980s, however, 
Rosenblatt wrote articles which directly address the role of the instructor in the language arts, 
                                                          
1 Louise Rosenblatt, The Reminiscences of Louise Michelle Rosenblatt. 2 vols. Interview with Ed Erwin. New 
York: Columbia University Oral History Research Office. 22, 24 June and 13 and 15 July 1982, p. 133; p. 156. 
2 Ibid., p. 242. See also Louise M. Rosenblatt, ‘Enriching Values in Reading’ in William S. Gray (ed.), Reading 
in an Age of Mass Communication (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), pp. 19-38. 
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framed as a generalist practice of helping students critically select values by which to live and 
make sense of their lives. It is at this point that she comes nearest to linking her transactional 
theory to the quest for wisdom, although in Literature as Exploration the emphasis on the 
contexts in which each reader is situated in the literary transaction is certainly in tune with 
these later articulations of value formation.  
 In her essay, ‘Language, Literature, and Values’ (1984), Rosenblatt tackled the value 
of the language arts in helping young people to come to terms with their agency in the world, 
with their responsibility and duty to choose among values by which to live. This essay 
foreshadows her more explicit evaluation of the language arts teacher’s role set forth in her 
response to an article by George Henry for English Education which covered developments in 
English education departments. By 1986 the journal was under the editorship of Gordon Pradl, 
and it is Rosenblatt’s (longer) draft essay to which I turn in this analysis. Pradl was instrumental 
in Chapter 2 in developing Rosenblatt’s ideas about democracy within the context of classroom 
discussion about people’s literary experiences. The emphasis on ‘language arts’ – a term which 
is unusual in British university English departments – is capitalised by Rosenblatt and Pradl 
because of its more encompassing remit. Indeed, in these two essays Rosenblatt is at pains to 
move away from English programmes focused exclusively on traditionally ‘literary’ areas, 
such as formalist analysis, textual scholarship, and literary and intellectual history. Starting 
from her transactional theory of human being in the world (see Chapter 1), Rosenblatt 
recapitulates her belief that the ‘literary’ only comes into existence when a predominantly 
aesthetic stance is adopted by a reader to evoke a work of art from the text. Therefore, it is the 
role of literary studies (conceived as part of the wider language arts) to oversee people’s entire 
life in language, not simply with texts traditionally called ‘Literature’, although, as I have noted 
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throughout this thesis, Rosenblatt tended to prioritise texts which she believed could most 
successfully increase students’ capacity to have deeper literary experiences.3  
Rooted in her central philosophical commitment to the value of the individual, 
Rosenblatt values ‘the individual reader’s search for a personal sense of priorities that will 
guide sound choices in values in a changing world’.4 As I explored in Chapter 1, the emphasis 
on choice springs from her transactional view of existence, which involves ‘selective attention’ 
to phenomena in consciousness. Meanwhile, Rosenblatt’s pragmatist inheritance from Dewey 
is visible in her insistence that the weighing of values be considered in light of their possible 
impact on ‘actual human lives’.5 Rosenblatt justifies this ‘basis of value judgment’ because of 
her view of literature, which she believes offers the potential to experience aspects of human 
experience in emotionally coloured ways, and thus apply reason out of a matrix of feeling.  
Quoting Dewey’s Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Rosenblatt explains that 
‘rationality… is not a force to evoke against impulse and habit. It is the attainment of a working 
harmony among diverse desires’.6 In Literature as Exploration (reissued in 1983), moreover, 
Rosenblatt again invoked Dewey by saying ‘that in actual life constructive thinking usually 
starts as a result of some conflict or discomfort, or when habitual behavior is impeded and a 
choice of new paths of behavior must be made. Such thinking, therefore, grows out of some 
sort of tension and is colored by it’.7 The transactional literary experience, which privileges the 
aesthetic in encouraging the emotional experience out of which ‘constructive thinking’ may 
grow, is therefore central to Rosenblatt’s wider vision of value selection among the young 
                                                          
3 See Charles Gerrard, ‘The Literary and the Ethical: Difference as Definition’ in Elizabeth Beaumont Bissell 
(ed.), The Question of Literature: The Place of the Literary in Contemporary Theory (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2002), pp. 19-47 for a distinction between ‘literature’ and ‘Literature’, the latter denoting 
something canonical.  
4 Louise M. Rosenblatt, ‘Language, Literature, and Values’ in Stephen N. Tchudi (ed.), Language, Schooling, and 
Society (Upper Montclair, NJ: Boynton / Cook, 1984), pp. 64-80, p. 78.  
5 Ibid., p. 78.  
6 Ibid., p. 74. 
7 Louise M. Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 4th ed. (New York: MLA, 1983), p. 226. 
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people of America. It is central because of its embodiment of rationality mixed with emotion 
– the crucial ingredients in ‘constructive thinking’. While not using the language of the 
nineteenth-century Russian Slavophile thinker, Ivan Kireevsky, Rosenblatt approximates 
Kireevsky’s intuition about a ‘rationality of the heart’, which signals an emphasis on integrality 
in thought.  
Importantly, Kireevsky’s intuition about thought found a correlate in the Russian term, 
tselnaya lichnost, or ‘integral personality’.8 In other words, Kireevsky’s thought, which as I 
have said before, in some ways prefigures Berdyaev’s personalism, highlights a link between 
a way of thinking which connects emotion and reason, to the ongoing creation of an integral 
personality, and thus underscores the transformative potential of combining reason and 
emotion. As I shall argue, to understand wisdom as fundamentally existential and thus 
concerned with the subject opens possibilities for personal and social renewal, a sense of 
‘wholeness’ which is liberating rather than restrictive. Yet as Rosenblatt articulates her fusion 
of emotion and reason, following Dewey, the personalistic angle is somewhat subdued.  
Rosenblatt then demonstrates how the complexities attending selectivity might work 
through students’ responses to James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. Students 
are invited (by the pressures of the work but also by the teacher) to  
join Stephen in his adolescent trying-on of one role after another […] 
They share with him the tension between positive values – the appeal 
of the order and mystery and power of the church and the appeal of the 
fullblooded life of the senses and the imagination – and between the 
camaraderie of his nationalist fellow-students and his desire to be free 
of all circumscribing allegiances. He must choose between things that 
                                                          
8 Aleksei Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevsky, On Spiritual Unity: A Slavophile Reader, trans. and eds. Boris Jakim 
and Robert Bird (Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne Books, 1998), p. 368. 
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have positive value for him; he must decide what is most important for 
one of his temperaments and talents.9 
Rosenblatt’s commitment to the individual’s experience is evident in her romantic phrasing of 
‘temperaments and talents’ and her almost Lawrencian allusion to ‘the fullblooded life of the 
senses and the imagination’. Importantly, the example illustrates Rosenblatt’s belief in the 
complexity of value selection, in that one must often choose between apparently equally 
positive values. This conundrum requires careful reflection and conversation with others whom 
one trusts, savouring the emotional situation in which such values are considered.10 In these 
phrases, Rosenblatt’s language is bordering on the language of wisdom, of making choices and 
reflecting on matters which may seem equally positive and thus ‘right’. 
 Rosenblatt believes that the process of deliberation is something in which the language 
arts teacher can play a positive role. The instructor must firstly recognise that most of his 
students will not go on to become specialists in English, but that they will leave the university 
and make their way in America’s democratic society.11 They must also recognise that the 
profession of teaching English ‘is dedicated to helping individual human beings, from the 
beginning to adulthood, to enter as fully as possible into the potentialities of language. Our aim 
is to help them acquire the capacity through language to organize their sense of their worlds, 
to communicate it to others, and to participate in the experiences and ideas of others’.12 
Through an extended metaphor of the language arts teacher as a medical general practitioner, 
Rosenblatt reiterates her central commitments: to the individual human being, to his 
transactional experience of language, to his quest for meaning, and to the furthering of a society 
                                                          
9 Rosenblatt, ‘Language, Literature, and Values’, p. 73. 
10 Rosenblatt’s emphasis on trust is part and parcel of her personalistic approach, removing barriers to the free 
exchange of ideas. See Louise M. Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed. (New York: MLA, 1995), p. 67. 
11 Louise M. Rosenblatt, untitled, draft manuscript, p. 7. Papers of Gordon Morrell Pradl, New York. Thanks are 
due to Gordon Pradl for allowing me access to these private papers. 
12 Ibid., p. 8.  
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in which people try and understand each other and thus co-operate. Rosenblatt talks of being 
centred ‘on the health of human beings’, which ties in with her emphasis on the difficulty of 
selecting among positive values as well as sifting the negative from the positive.13 Instructors 
help students to balance emotion with rationality, and to enliven thinking by drawing students 
back to the emotional colouring of the literary experience. 
Rosenblatt is most focused on a vision of quest, however, when she summarises the 
role of the ‘language education specialist’, who, imbibing the fundamental philosophical 
understanding of transactional, dynamic being in the world, for learners views ‘speaking, 
listening, reading, writing as ways of acquiring a sense of their own identity and an 
understanding of the humanity of other personalities and their worlds’.14 Repeated use of the 
word ‘world’ also intimates at the more technical understanding of ‘world’ which later Text 
World Theory thinkers made (see Chapter 3), in which readers actively enter into and help 
construct fictional worlds which collide with their existing discourse world – a world made up 
of various language systems and symbolic forms of communication. This is an expansive view 
of English studies, and must be seen as the logical end of Rosenblatt’s original transactional 
position, as I shall further explore in the Conclusion. When the transactional view of language 
and experience undermines foundational assumptions about what ‘literature’ is, the direction 
in which literary studies moves deals more fundamentally with helping people develop their 
sensitivity to language and the ways in which different people use language to articulate their 
worlds and the values latent in those worlds. Literary studies may also, Rosenblatt argues, 
develop sensitivity to other ‘personalities’. As I explored in Chapter 3, literary imagination and 
a palimpsestuous way of handling the literary experience are means by which individuals enter 
experientially into the lives of others and form degrees of attachment to others.  
                                                          
13 Ibid., p. 9.  
14 Ibid., p. 11. 
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In the hands of Rosenblatt’s one-time student, Maxine Greene (1917-2014), however, 
talk of ‘acquiring a sense of [students’] own identity and an understanding of the humanity of 
other personalities and their worlds’ takes on a decidedly more explicitly existentialist stance, 
and ‘quest’ is used repeatedly to denote the quality of becoming which arts education should 
be directed towards. Drawing, among other sources, on the existentialist philosopher Mary 
Warnock’s Imagination (1978), Greene believes that education is fundamentally designed to 
eliminate boredom and to help the learner to realise that one has ‘not come to the end of what 
is worth having’.15 It is from this purpose that being in quest comes into its own. 
 
Greene and the Need to ‘Chart the Lived Landscape’ 
In 2001 Greene and Rosenblatt appeared publicly together at the Great Women Scholars 
conference in Manhattan, and New York is a city to which both thinkers were immensely 
attached – a place redolent with possibility, for becoming, for the new.16 Greene spoke after 
Rosenblatt and payed tribute to her for being such an inspiration, as a woman and as a thinker.17 
Greene studied at Barnard College in the 1930s while Rosenblatt was working there as an 
instructor in English, and Greene took Rosenblatt’s course on pre-Elizabethan dramatics – 
Greene’s only course in English. ‘It was the day of New Criticism’, she said, ‘and I thought 
they’d spoil literature for me so I was exempted from taking courses’.18 Greene went on to 
become a professor of philosophy at Teachers College and over her long career specialised in 
                                                          
15 Quoted in Maxine Greene, Releasing the Imagination: Essays on Education, the Arts, and Social Change (San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2000), p. 92. Subsequent references this to this text are given in parentheses in the 
main body. 
16 This is especially evident in Rosenblatt’s editorial articles for The Barnard Bulletin between 1923 and 1924, 
but also surfaces in interviews given in the 1980s and 1990s. 
17 Garn Press, ‘Great Women Scholars Part Two: Maxine Greene’ (August 5, 2015), 
http://garnpress.com/2015/great-women-scholars-part-two-maxine-greene/ (accessed online, August 3, 2016). 
18 Ibid. Greene is perhaps anticipating the real heyday of formalism, which was during the 1950s. However, at 
Barnard the influence of I. A. Richards’s Practical Criticism (1929) was already felt.  
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aesthetics and philosophy of education, in how aesthetic experience transforms education, 
particularly for young people.  
The 2001 New York City conference was significant because Greene and Rosenblatt 
spoke as two elderly people whose work in philosophy had played an intensely personal role in 
their lives. Conscious of the attacks on the World Trade Center ten days earlier, Greene spoke 
openly of quest, explaining how it ‘has been deeply personal, that of a woman trying to affirm 
the feminine, the wife and mother and friend, while reaching, always reaching beyond the limits 
imposed by the obligation to a woman’s life’.19 She tried to remain hopeful in the face of 
darkness.  
Greene’s vision of quest heavily impacted her philosophy of education, and her main 
achievement was to underscore the relationships between imagination, quest, and social change. 
Greene actively reprises the social vision and transformative potential of the quest for wisdom. 
As an existentialist, Greene’s core commitment was to becoming, to the possible, to the not-
yet: ‘we live our lives and make our choices and, by so doing, we create (and recreate) our 
selves’.20   
 Although Greene was much broader in her interests than Rosenblatt, Greene 
nevertheless published in College English on multiple occasions throughout her career.21 And 
yet while coming so close to Rosenblatt’s domain it is puzzling that, to the best of my 
knowledge, she never once referenced or wrote of Rosenblatt’s work, in spite of her interest in 
almost identical themes – in how readers personally engage with literature in a quest for 
meaning. This is partly to do with difference in approach: Rosenblatt’s writing is analytical and 
responsive to movements specific to her discipline of literary studies; Greene’s, on the other 
                                                          
19 Garn Press, ‘Great Women Scholars Part Two: Maxine Greene’. 
20 Maxine Greene, ‘Language, Literature, and the Release of Meaning’, College English, 41 (1979): 123-35, p. 
131. 
21 For example, see Maxine Greene, ‘Aesthetics, Criticism, and the Work of Literary Art’, College English, 30 
(1968): 60-66. 
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hand, is more exploratory, cyclical, and reminiscent of some European styles of philosophy, 
particularly twentieth-century French existentialism. Greene rarely devotes lengthy passages to 
discussing the theory or philosophy of a thinker; instead she weaves disconnected fragments 
into her own tapestry of thought; she is the organiser of her sources and they can only be 
‘explained’ by reference to Maxine the person – to her organisation of her experiences. In this 
sense she is personalistic. Berdyaev’s existential insight encapsulates Greene’s approach: ‘It is 
the concrete person, not the epistemological subject or the abstract universal mind, who takes 
cognisance of and meditates on the object of knowledge, philosophical or otherwise’.22 
Such a ‘concrete’ approach is especially evident in Greene’s landmark book of essays, 
Releasing the Imagination: Essays on Education, the Arts, and Social Change (1995). In a 1979 
essay for College English Greene wrote of her concern about ‘encounters with imaginative 
literature as they advance the search for meaning that goes on throughout life’, and this theme 
is fully explored in Releasing the Imagination, by combining personal reflections with literary 
criticism and philosophical speculation.23 Like Rosenblatt, Greene also saw her students as 
individuals in quest, yet said so much more explicitly (14). As learners in institutions of 
education, students are to be seen ‘as distinctive, questioning persons – persons in the process 
of defining themselves’ (13, my emphasis). As ‘questioning’ persons, learning must proceed 
‘from the vantage point of her or his lived situation, that is, in accord with a distinctive point of 
view and interest’ (31). The trouble is that learners, and young learners in particular, may often 
feel inhibited from realising their quests and launching off on a journey of exploration, just as 
they may be reluctant to divulge personal responses to literature. Teachers and those in authority 
have to help students to overcome their silences, and to forge lines of consistency across the 
different stages of education (25). Greene speaks of seeking ‘shocks of awareness’ and 
                                                          
22 Nicolas Berdyaev, Dream and Reality: An Essay in Autobiography, trans. Katharine Lampert (London: 
Geoffrey Bles, 1950), p. 104. 
23 Greene, ‘Language, Literature, and the Release of Meaning’, p. 133. 
 188 
 
initiations into ‘uneasy participation in the human community’s unending quest’ (151). 
Imagination, so precious to Greene, is the key by which people can, in an echo of Dewey, break 
through the ‘inertia of habit’ (21).  
New possibilities can emerge if a breakthrough occurs – when ‘a person chooses to view 
herself or himself in the midst of things, as beginner or learner or explorer, and has the 
imagination to envisage new things emerging, more and more begins to seem possible’ (22). 
Greene colours this perspective by quoting Emily Dickinson’s  poem: ‘The Possible’s slow fuse 
is lit / By the Imagination’. For Greene, the possible’s slow fuse is lit especially by a form of 
imagination which brings the human person into communion with others, which can help him 
to join others in their quests. ‘Imagination may be a new way of decentering ourselves’, she 
writes, ‘of breaking out of the confinements of privatism and self-regard into a space where we 
can come face to face with others and call out, “Here we are”’ (31).  
Like Rosenblatt, Greene also sees imaginative participation in the experiences of others, 
especially in the aesthetic experience, as a way of both enhancing one’s own life by possibly 
gaining in self-knowledge, and also of making the lives of others more tolerable through 
empathic resonance, of simply being able to communicate, ‘Here we are’, and then being heard. 
Greene parallels my discussion of literary imagination in Chapter 3 and enlarges it into a 
broader concern with what it means to be in quest in an educational institution. The quests 
undertaken by learners eventually bring them out of their own activity to appear ‘before others, 
speaking their own voices, and trying as they do to bring into being a common world’ (68). In 
this sentiment we find an echo of Rosenblatt’s appropriation of the literatus and H.D.’s vision 
of the scribe (see Chapter 3), as someone who actively seeks to engage with the experiences of 
others, to find some way of articulating threads of commonality that might be the basis for the 
possible. This by no means diminishes the emphasis on the personalistic way of knowing 
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operational in the literary experience; it in fact enhances emphasis on the individual by 
encouraging others to appreciate the personality and experiences of others.  
Moreover, for Greene, the implication of foregrounding an individual’s experiential 
vantage point at any given time is that he or she should be permitted to cultivate their own 
‘language’ for communicating their quest. Some people may  
find articulation through imagery; others, through body movement; still 
others, through musical sound. Mastery of a range of languages is 
necessary if communication is to take place beyond small enclosures 
within the culture; without multiple languages, it is extremely difficult 
to chart the lived landscape, thematizing experience over time. (57-58) 
This assertion is typical of Greene’s interdisciplinary, multi-modal approach which pervaded 
her entire career, always encouraging different art forms to communicate with each other. 
Although Greene tends to focus on children’s experiences of the arts, her vision can easily be 
applied to adults in various learning contexts, whether at university-level for the awarding of 
degrees, or in adult continuing education.  
In fact, one of Greene’s colleagues, Jack Mezirow, partially built on Greene’s existential 
emphasis on people’s quest for meaning – the desire to ‘thematize experience over time’ – 
within the specific context of adult learning. Mezirow, also New York-based, began from the 
need to reach out to the possible, to see oneself as always becoming, and developed this idea 
into a substantial theory of transformative learning. Where transformation is implicit, even 
aestheticised, in Greene’s work, it becomes explicit and matter-of-fact in Mezirow’s, and 
subsequent transformative learning theorists have nuanced Mezirow’s own work. Their ideas 
provide some further themes and terms which I find applicable to conceiving Rosenblatt’s 
transactional approach in terms of a quest for wisdom. 
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Mezirow and Transformative Learning 
By the mid-1970s, Greene’s existential approach to aesthetic education was having an impact 
elsewhere at Teachers College, and Jack Mezirow (1923-2014) was beginning to formulate his 
hugely influential philosophy of ‘transformative learning’ for adult learners, at the heart of 
which is a ‘perspective transformation’ that leads to increased personal and social change.24 
Mezirow began to think about transformative learning for adults in the context of women’s re-
entry programmes in the United States, and so from the very beginning his theory was 
distinctive for its feminine and feminist rationale.25 In 2000 Mezirow defined transformative 
learning as  
the process by which we transform our taken-for-granted frames of 
reference (meaning perspectives, habits of mind, mind-sets) to make 
them more inclusive, discriminating, open, emotionally capable of 
change, and reflective so that they may generate beliefs and opinions 
that will prove more true or justified to guide action.26 
With regard to women’s re-entry programmes, Mezirow was fascinated by the way in which 
women were encouraged by the programme to question taken-for-granted perspectives about 
their nature and role in private and public life, and ultimately, to take control of their lives in a 
more vital way. His philosophy was grounded in humanistic faith in the potential of the 
individual to self-actualise, in the Maslovian sense, or to individuate, in the Jungian sense – 
                                                          
24 Peter Willis, ‘An Existential Approach to Transformative Learning’ in Handbook of Transformative Learning, 
ed. Edward W. Taylor and Patricia Cranton (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2012), pp. 212-27, p. 214; p. 222. 
25 Lisa M. Baumgartner, ‘Mezirow’s Theory of Transformative Learning from 1975 to the Present’ in Handbook 
of Transformative Learning, pp. 99-115, p. 105. 
26 Jack Mezirow, ‘Learning to Think Like an Adult: Core Concepts of Transformation Theory’ in Handbook of 
Transformative Learning, pp. 73-95, p. 76. 
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ideas which essentially dignify the person with the ability and right to grow to their full 
potential.27  
Judging by Rosenblatt’s references in the various editions of Literature as Exploration, 
it is clear that Mezirow and Rosenblatt were influenced by similar theorists regarding human 
development.28 Rosenblatt cites Carl Rogers’s seminal text, On Becoming a Person (1961), 
Jerome Bruner’s On Knowing (1962), and Gordon Allport’s Pattern and Growth in Personality 
(1961).29 These humanistic theorists influenced Rosenblatt organically rather than 
systematically, and are evident in her emphasis on the uniqueness of the individual, resistance 
to strict psychoanalytic and also behaviourist explanations of human behaviour, and finally, on 
the constructive nature of personality. Mezirow follows his sources of inspiration more closely, 
however, in his explicit concern with the process of personal change and growth.  
Mezirow’s approach was also inspired by the work of the Frankfurt cultural theorists, 
who, when combined in his thought, injected a strain of cultural critique into the process of 
perspective transformation, in coming to question hegemonic ideologies and the ways in which 
what seems ‘normal’ may in fact be oppressive for human flourishing.30 It is interesting to note, 
and perhaps instructive, that Rosenblatt was also insistent on the need to critique dominant 
values in society, but repeatedly emphasised caution and in the 1990s critiqued ‘cultural 
theorists’ – some of whom were influenced by the Frankfurt theorists – for inadvertently 
                                                          
27 Patricia Cranton and Edward W. Taylor, ‘Transformative Learning Theory: Seeking a More Unified Theory’ 
in Handbook of Transformative Learning, pp. 3-20, p. 6. 
28 In her 1999 interview at Miami, Rosenblatt also invokes Maslow’s hierarchy of needs in order to justify her 
political activity in ensuring children have various needs met before they can read meaningfully. Eugene F. 
Provenzo Jr., ‘Louise Rosenblatt Interview’, School of Education, University of Miami. 14 March 1999. 
http://www.education.miami.edu/ep/rosenblatt/ (accessed online, June 17 2015).  
29 However, Rosenblatt criticised the way in which the Project English programmes of the 1960s applied Bruner’s 
‘spiral curriculum’, because they failed to moderate the inherently analytic nature of the spiral approach, drawn 
as it was from methods in mathematics and science. See Louise M. Rosenblatt, ‘Pattern and Process – A Polemic’, 
The English Journal, 58 (1969): 1005-1012, p. 1006. 
30 Ibid., p. 7. Critical theory’s importance for transformational learning has been explored by Stephen D. 
Brookfield. See ‘Critical Theory and Transformational Learning’ in Handbook of Transformative Learning, pp. 
131-46. 
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communicating the idea that all of Western culture was negative.31 Again, the emphasis should 
be on selectivity, and even selecting among positive values encountered in literature.  
 Since Mezirow’s seminal text in the field, Transformative Dimensions of Adult 
Learning (1991), subsequent theorists of transformative learning have sought to enrich the 
vision by thinking about ‘soul work’ and an existential ‘appreciative life stance’.32 The goal in 
these newer approaches is to question the power and role of rationality in effecting a perspective 
transformation. For Dirkx, spirituality and ideas of the soul and unconscious processes are just 
as important as intellectual, conceptual shifts, and for Willis, essential changes need not have 
to occur primarily in knowledge, but rather, in a transformed ‘appreciative life stance’ – a 
quality of being newly interested and affectively moved by the world. These newer 
contributions are also supposed to emphasise the social aspect of transformative learning; as 
Cranton and Taylor observe, transformative learning is about ‘individuals moving toward a 
better understanding of the self by engaging with others’ and with their lives and 
preoccupations.33 For Mezirow, especially in his later work, the appreciation of the ‘affective 
quality and poetry of human experience’, in oneself and in others, is founded upon interpersonal 
aesthetic experiences – a clear link to Greene’s position which weaves the arts and personal and 
social quest together. In Mezirow’s words: ‘Art, music, and dance are alternative languages. 
Intuition, imagination, and dreams are other ways of making meaning. Inspiration, empathy, 
and transcendence are central to self-knowledge and to drawing attention to the affective quality 
and poetry of human experience’.34 As for Greene, so for Mezirow: ‘making meaning’ is the 
central quality of quest, but for Mezirow, this is tied to a specific and tangible transformation, 
                                                          
31 See Gordon M. Pradl, Literature for Democracy: Reading as a Social Act (Portsmouth, NH: Boynton / Cook, 
1996), pp. 85-87. 
32 See John M. Dirkx, ‘Nurturing Soul Work: A Jungian Approach to Transformative Learning’ in Handbook of 
Transformative Learning, pp. 116-30, and Willis, ‘An Existential Approach’ in Handbook of Transformative 
Learning. 
33 Cranton and Taylor, ‘Seeking a More Unified Theory’, p. 8. 
34 Mezirow, ‘Learning to Think Like an Adult’, p. 75. 
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whether this is in conceptual insight, or in terms of transmuting habits of being, a greater 
receptiveness to the ‘poetry of human experience’, or a deepening dialogic relation between 
self and other. Finally, this process can be ‘epochal’ and triggered by a profound state of 
unsettlement or it can be more ‘incremental’ and gradual.35  
In the context of literary studies, the distinction between epochal and incremental 
change is not too important; what seems fruitful is to incorporate the fundamental sentiments 
and commitments of transformative learning and its care for adults in education. The great merit 
of transformative learning theory is its increasing commitment to spiritual and affective 
accounts of perspective transformation and broader personal and social change. Rosenblatt’s 
emphasis on the importance of helping individuals to choose among values by which to live 
and make meaning in their lives can be transmuted into a more flexible, perhaps more open-
ended project in transformative learning, whereby an ‘appreciative life stance’ connotes a more 
obviously affective, existential reconfiguration of general orientation to the world.  
The existential quality of transformative learning is therefore most apparent in its 
emphasis on shifts and changes in consciousness, especially when this is directed by a 
Frankfurt-inspired sensitivity to dominant discourses and resistance to engrained patterns of 
thinking and behaving. Greene and Mezirow draw out the need to see any shift in values as part 
of a more holistic, existential quest for meaning, for ‘thematizing experience over time’. They 
remind us that personal and social change is a complex process, yet also affirm the power of 
the arts more generally in aiding the process of becoming.  
What troubles me about Greene’s and Mezirow’s humanistic approach, however, is their 
tendency to subscribe too uncritically to humanistic theories of personality, which only see a 
positive trajectory. Greene’s existentialism seems to be devoid of emphasising some of the 
                                                          
35 Ibid, p. 86. See also Elizabeth J. Tisdell, ‘Themes and Variations of Transformative Learning: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives that Transform’ in Handbook of Transformative Learning, pp. 21-36, p. 31. 
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apparent contradictions, tensions, and insoluble paradoxes which sometimes characterise 
human experience, not to mention the problem of evil with which philosophers such as Hannah 
Arendt and Berdyaev grappled, albeit from different religious standpoints. A personalist 
framework, as opposed to a humanist one, would perhaps be more willing to impose limits on 
programmes of learning and models of psychology which seem unduly optimistic about 
capacity for ‘progress’ or ‘development’. More humane and realistic would seem to be a 
philosophy which welcomes into the forefront of consciousness and critical debate the 
difficulties and challenges of life, and the evil which human experience, both past and present, 
knows to be present as a pain-inducing, debilitating reality, often disguised as a ‘good’. The 
transactional literary experience seems supremely able to allow learners the spaces in which to 
enter aesthetically vivified explorations of ethics (see below), where ‘good’ and ‘evil’ can be 
discussed not only as abstract concepts, but as experiences which happen to concrete human 
beings.  
It will be helpful now to turn to H.D., and to give an overview of how quest was 
imbricated in her various artistic and intellectual endeavours. H.D. in many ways embodies but 
also personalises discussion on quest. As Rosenblatt herself intuited, sometimes the best way 
of communicating the quality of being in quest and its affective pull is to root it in concrete 
example, as she did with Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus. H.D. also supports Greene’s and Mezirow’s 
notion about different languages assisting in the individual’s quest for meaning.  
 
H.D. in Quest 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that H.D.’s entire career was concerned with quest. Her 
disappointment with Ezra Pound in 1908 (when he left America for Europe, and effectively 
dissolved their engagement) and her subsequent emigration to England in 1911 encouraged 
H.D. to think of her art as a form of self-recuperation. As Janice S. Robinson explains, H.D.’s 
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early poetry in London became a way of processing what had happened to her: ‘she became an 
artist and created a world of her own – a world in which her mind was in control of her 
experience’.36 The breakup of her marriage to Richard Aldington in the 1910s, along with the 
stillbirth of her baby in 1915 and the break with D. H. Lawrence in November 1917, formed 
the personal matrix that resulted in decades of quest to understand what had happened to her in 
such a short space of time, and to create a new identity.  
The events of the 1910s were endlessly recycled in her autobiographical prose of the 
1920s. Of course, these personal events were interconnected with the First World War, and 
H.D.’s work after 1918 bears the broader modernist hallmark of questing after a new world in 
the wake of cosmic destruction, a reaching forth toward a conciliatory settlement. As Susan 
Stanford Friedman has said, ‘the war embodied the violent decay of the old order; its 
meaninglessness challenged Western belief in the superiority of its religions, institutions, 
sciences, and technologies’.37 This disintegration inspired ‘a literature centred on quest, art 
whose new forms and themes were consistent with the search for new patterns of meaning’.38 
H.D. gathered the fragments of her own psyche in part by gathering fragments from lost 
religious thought. In 1916 Berdyaev was writing about the need for Europeans to rediscover a 
deeper, more cosmic basis to life than the worldviews and attitudes of the nineteenth century: 
‘a deeper consciousness is possible only upon a religious basis’, he wrote; ‘the world 
catastrophe ought to enable a religious deepening of life’.39 In her writing after 1918, H.D. 
became increasingly interested in the intersections between different, unorthodox discourses, 
in particular the psychoanalytic and the occult, and these were harnessed in H.D.’s ongoing 
                                                          
36 Janice S. Robinson, H.D.: The Life and Work of an American Poet (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), p. 
59. 
37 Susan Stanford Friedman, Psyche Reborn: The Emergence of H.D. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1981), p. 3.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Nikolai Berdyaev, ‘The Cosmic and the Sociological World-Sense’ (1916), trans. Stephen S. Janos (2002), 
http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/berd_lib/1916_235.html (accessed online, August 1, 2016). 
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quest, which gradually began to chime with Berdyaev’s focus on the religious or spiritual as a 
touchstone for creating new life after the war.40  
I will return to various historical moments in which H.D. was developing her quest, but 
it is important to sense the potential universality of H.D.’s quest – that which can inspire quests 
today, in different cultural and historical moments. This will be done partly by alluding to the 
philosophical dimension of H.D.’s quest, and by evaluating the ways in which she handled 
various discourses. This involves a focus on her methodology, which, as in the previous 
chapters, enables cross-referencing to Rosenblatt and others.  
  
Jolted Out of the Mundane 
Foremost among H.D.’s early post-war pieces of writing is her 1919 essay, Notes on Thought 
and Vision, which was written on the Scilly Isles. H.D. had retreated to a cottage with her 
companion, Bryher, and the goal was to recover from the trauma of giving birth to Perdita 
earlier in the year and her battle with the 1918 Influenza Pandemic at the same time.41 Notes on 
Thought and Vision is uncharacteristically straightforward in prose style for H.D.; the later 
meditations on consciousness, such as Majic Ring, are far more elliptical and intricate. Her 
central goal in this essay, however, is to articulate a mode of consciousness which can create 
new visions. She calls this the ‘over-mind’, and it essentially involves the brain connecting with 
the lower ‘love regions’, or the womb (if you are a woman). Independently each centre carries 
on its own being in the world, but the over-mind is superior because it somehow joins the two. 
H.D.’s concept of the over-mind seems to gesture at a level of consciousness beyond the 
intellect, and yet which is more substantial than intuition.  
                                                          
40 The relationship between psychoanalysis and the occult in H.D.’s work is the main subject of Friedman’s Psyche 
Reborn. See also Elizabeth Anderson, H.D. and Modernist Religious Imagination: Mysticism and Writing 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
41 See Barbara Guest, Herself Defined: The Poet H.D. and Her World (London: Collins, 1985), pp. 118-20. 
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H.D. insists that the over-mind is arrived at through an intensely felt experience: ‘The 
swing from normal consciousness to abnormal consciousness is accompanied by grinding 
discomfort of mental agony’.42 There is a latent existential quality to Notes on Thought and 
Vision, and H.D. references this early text in her much later writing on her experiences with the 
existential psychoanalyst, Erich Heydt, in the 1950s. The over-mind is so important to H.D. 
because it is a means of coming out of, sometimes in agony, mundane routine and a limited 
vision of the world. It is reminiscent of Heidegger’s concept of ‘thrownness’, of coming to 
consciousness of being somehow in the midst of free existence, which is at the same time 
orchestrated by the self who is thrower as well as thrown.  
One must be careful therefore not to ‘bury one’s talent carefully in a napkin’ and thus 
avoid what can only be described as a form of awakening (17). H.D. writes that  
our minds, all of our minds, are like dull little houses, built more or less 
alike – a dull little city with rows of little detached villas […] Each 
comfortable little home shelters a comfortable little soul – and a wall at 
the back shuts out completely any communication with the world 
beyond. Man’s chief concern is keeping his little house warm and 
making his little wall strong. (40-41) 
As with Greene, the great challenge is to jolt or ‘throw’ oneself into quest: to become aware of 
the limiting way of living when one’s ‘chief concern is keeping his little house warm and 
making his little wall strong’.43 This is an uncomfortable experience, but H.D. presents art as a 
means of being jolted into the over-mind and onto the path of seeing the world in a new way; 
the over-mind turns human consciousness into a ‘receiving centre for dots and dashes’, which 
                                                          
42 H.D., Notes on Thought and Vision (London: Peter Owen, 1988), p. 19. Subsequent references this to this text 
are given in parentheses in the main body. 
43 On the perceived uniformity of suburbia, see a later criticism by Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its 
Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), p. 486. 
 198 
 
could potentially ‘direct lightning, flashes of electric power to slash across and destroy the 
world of dead murky thought’ (27). The mention of a ‘wall’ that divides modes of consciousness 
also foreshadows H.D.’s explorations in World War Two into the brain’s ‘blue-light 
consciousness’, to which she gave the metaphor of a spliced room, or the removal of a dividing 
wall, which is in line with contemporary neuroscientific research regarding the workings of 
dreams, in which a partition in the brain effectively dissolves.44 Ultimately, although it is true 
that H.D. (like other modernists) detested suburbia – she was either a city-centre dweller or a 
remote country person – the metaphor of the middle-class suburban house (‘villa’) is simply an 
indication of the ubiquity of being closed off to higher forms of vision.45  
H.D.’s language therefore deliberately focuses on aspects of Western civilisation which 
the war has helped to expose as decayed; it has effectively ‘slashed’ and ‘destroyed’ all that 
was ‘murky’ and suffocating before. In this sense H.D. is suggesting that there is a certain kind 
of suffering that is beneficial, and the war has helped her to grasp this in a very personal way. 
‘To accept life’, wrote H.D., ‘is dangerous’, yet ‘it is also dangerous not to accept life’ (39). In 
the recurring symbol of the serpent with the thistle, H.D. sees the path to life (the thistle) through 
the biting experiences of death (the serpent).46 The war has questioned all former ways of 
thinking and living – all former values – and H.D. now believes that it is positively dangerous 
to try and avoid suffering and the new lease of life it may bring in its wake.  
From 1919 onwards, H.D.’s sense of quest was founded upon the necessity to be jolted 
out of deadening patterns of thinking and living, toward the possibility of the new, transacting 
                                                          
44 See H.D., Within the Walls and What do I Love, ed. Annette Debo (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 
2014), p. 120. 
45 On modernists and the masses, see John Carey’s controversial The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and 
Prejudice Among the Literary Intelligentsia, 1880-1939 (London: Faber and Faber, 1992). D. H. Lawrence’s 
poetry can also be antagonistic towards suburbia.  
46 For an analysis of this symbol, see Nephie J. Christodoulides, ‘Introduction’ in H.D., Magic Mirror, 
Compassionate Friendship, Thorn Thicket: A Tribute to Erich Heydt, ed. Nephie J. Christodoulides (Victoria, BC: 
ELS Editions, 2012), pp. xxiii-xxxvii, p. xxxvi. 
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with art in the process. ‘Dots and dashes’, like Rosenblatt’s textual symbols, are transformed in 
the right consciousness of men and women who have brought their intellects into dialogue with 
their love regions – an affective transition aimed at discovering new vistas. Mingled in this 
position of H.D.’s is a mixture of (an at-present) unconscious existentialist commitment to 
authenticity or the rejection of prescribed ways of living, and a romantic allegiance to individual 
subjective experience and alternative identities, particularly for women.47 
 
Digging Down to Re-affirm 
By 1933, when she began psychoanalysis with Sigmund Freud in Vienna, H.D. felt she needed 
to be jolted out of a state of malaise and drifting. Her analysis with Freud is explored in her 
memoir, Tribute to Freud, part of which she wrote during her creative renaissance in the Second 
World War: 
We had come together to substantiate something. I did not know what. 
There was something that was beating in my brain; I do not say my 
heart – my brain. I wanted it to be let out. I wanted to free myself of 
repetitive thoughts and experiences […] You might say that I had – yes, 
I had something that I specifically owned. I owned myself. I did not 
really, of course. My family, my friends, and my circumstances owned 
me.48 
H.D.’s focus is on consciousness, with ways of thinking and seeing the world – with her ‘brain’ 
– and it is in this arena that she struggles for mastery over the subtle influences of family, 
                                                          
47 See Cassandra Laity, H.D. and the Victorian Fin de Siècle: Gender, Modernism, Decadence (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) for an analysis of H.D.’s recuperation of romantic tropes to counter the male 
modernist thrust represented especially by Pound. On existentialist authenticity (in Heidegger), see Warnock, 
Existentialist Ethics, pp. 14-15. 
48 H.D., Tribute to Freud (New York: New Directions, 2012), p. 13, original emphasis. Subsequent references this 
to this text are given in parentheses in the main body. 
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friends, and circumstances. In this sense H.D. is reaching toward the kind of independence and 
choosing activity that Rosenblatt tried to instil in her students and in which Mezirow framed 
his women’s re-entry programmes. H.D.’s learning framework, however, is carried out in the 
paradigm of psychoanalysis rather than the literature classroom; although as we have seen, an 
emphasis on the existential quality of transformative learning opens up rather than closes down 
conversations between these different domains of transformation.  
H.D. consulted with Freud because she believed he could help her to disentangle herself, 
something which she hoped would unblock her and help her to resume her quest, to become 
Psyche reborn. Of course, the paradox is that the analysis itself was part of the overarching 
quest, which suggests that there are always different layers of quest and that it is a dynamic 
thing. H.D. sought to deepen the level of quest: ‘I wanted to dig down and dig out, root out my 
personal weeds, strengthen my purpose, reaffirm my beliefs, canalize my energies’ (91). For 
H.D. this was a very active process. She and Freud referred to their work together as ‘researches, 
our “studies”’ (93). Echoing her earlier theory sketched out in Notes on Thought and Vision, 
H.D. came to see her work with Freud as something much more encompassing than a strict 
psychoanalytic transaction, and this is part of her more general revisionist activity, making 
Freud’s theories work for her, rather than allowing herself to be bent towards Freud’s theories.49  
Between them, H.D. and Freud explored her dreams and experiences in a manner which 
H.D. believed was aesthetic, using a sort of over-mind consciousness to receive the ‘dots and 
dashes’ of her dream material and Freud’s associative thinking. According to H.D., a memory 
of a ‘fragment of a dream-picture is actual, is real, is like a work of art or is a work of art’ (29). 
The fragmentary and the scattered are brought together under a particular kind of consciousness, 
which, ‘apparently unrelated, were often found to be part of a special layer or stratum of thought 
                                                          
49 It is possible that Freud in fact questioned some of his own theories, especially about women, during and after 
his work with H.D. See Robinson, H.D., pp. 278-81.  
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and memory, therefore to belong together’ (14).  Moreover, dreams can ‘be as varied as the 
books we read, the pictures we look at, or the people we meet’ (35). H.D. is framing her active 
research with Freud as a practical attempt to find meaning in the infinitely varied reading 
material we encounter in our lives.  
Reminiscent of the much later linguistic turn, with Freud’s help H.D. came to see 
reading as an activity fundamental to our day-to-day existence, whether we pick up a book or 
not. As in The Sword Went Out to Sea and Within the Walls, aesthetic experience can happen 
with any kind of material – a position explored by Proust, for instance, in his famous tea and 
madeleines experience in Swann’s Way (1913). The key is to adopt the correct stance – a process 
that will help the person to move out of denuding consciousness to something more wide awake.  
And so H.D. brought notebooks and old manuscripts with her to Vienna, and in her hotel room 
would often prepare, against Freud’s wishes, for her early evening ‘hour’.  
Indeed, the ‘hour’ took on an almost mystical significance, recalling a religious 
meditation or invocation – something that was reprised much later in Hermetic Definition 
(1961). In preparation for this hour (5-6 PM, six days a week), H.D. described how ‘sorting 
books, manuscripts, note-books, I felt as if I were indeed making ready for a last voyage out’ 
(154). Is the ‘last’ supposed to represent the last time H.D. would ever make an intellectual 
quest or voyage, or is it in fact an indication of a final preparatory stage, which once completed 
would then enable her to ‘cruise’ at her own pace, and at her own depth (153)? H.D.’s hours 
with Freud conducting their research enabled her to move on from the period of drifting which 
predated this, as well as equipping her with a discourse with which to frame her subsequent 
quest. She was able to dig down into her psyche and in doing so, was encouraged to re-affirm 
and possibly revise what mattered to her. 
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Languages for Thematising Experience Over Time 
After H.D. finished her consultations with Freud, she supplemented the insights of 
psychoanalysis with discourses and practices drawn from the occult: astrology, numerology, 
Tarot, and spiritualism (later the Kabbalah also became significant). These acted as multiple 
languages for helping her to thematise experience over time. Such ventures in the 1940s into 
non-traditional forms of spiritual experience aimed to help H.D. understand her role in a time 
of extreme stress and conflict. She assimilated them into her own thinking and creatively 
adapted them for her artistic ends. In a sense, she personalised these discourses into a personalist 
quest. 
Whereas the First World War startled her and rendered her mostly passive for its 
duration, the Second World War ignited perhaps the most consistently creative period of H.D.’s 
life, of which she was, for the most part, fully in control. As Friedman writes: ‘on the deepest 
level, the destruction of war made acute her need to find meaning embedded in the harsh 
realities of a nightmarish existence’.50 And yet H.D.’s war experiences of the 1940s must not 
be considered exceptional, for  
the underlying motivations for the expansion of H.D.’s esoteric search 
from the Tarot of the twenties to the invocations of the fifties were the 
same cluster of reasons that brought her to Freud: the search for a 
direction in a ‘drifting’ century; the need to fortify herself for the 
impending war; the quest to avoid the destruction wrought by ‘racial 
separateness’ by linking the personal dream with the myths of everyone, 
everywhere; the desire to explore and confirm beliefs; and the hope that 
                                                          
50 Friedman, Psyche Reborn, p. 170. 
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such knowledge would ‘canalize’ her energies into the visionary 
experiences of her art.51 
Although in this thesis I have focused particularly on H.D.’s writing from the period of the 
Second World War, this cluster of prose pieces and poetry must be seen as a particularly clear 
crystallisation of tendencies that had been in motion many years before, and would be further 
explored once the war finished.  
The Second World War isolated H.D. and frequently kept her cooped up with Bryher in 
their Lowndes Square flat.52 During this time, H.D. dug deeply into her inner world at the same 
time as being receptive to spiritual influences in the wider world: from the racial separatism of 
the Nazis to the broader day-to-day experiences of people losing their homes, suffering injury, 
and who were constantly at risk of or actually experiencing bereavement, as in her poems, ‘May 
1943’ and ‘Christmas 1944’. In the post-war trilogy of historical romances – White Rose and 
the Red, The Sword Went Out to Sea, and The Mystery – H.D. worked at trying to communicate 
how she understood the value of the war and suffering for her ongoing quest. Dowding and her 
Eurasian medium, Arthur Bhaduri, helped her in her spiritualist work, receiving messages from 
dead airmen, while reflection on her own childhood roots and ancestral mystical influences 
helped her to move beyond human differences to a focus on what people share. Meanwhile, 
drawing astrological natal charts for herself and her friends and family assisted H.D. in 
expressing her commitment to a web of personal relations, past and present, reflected in the 
motions and influences of planets upon one another.53  
By the 1950s, the various different discourses – psychoanalysis, astrology, occultism, 
spiritualism, and others – were seamlessly interwoven. In fact, rather than so many separate 
languages, these knowledge discourses became one single tapestry into which H.D. wove her 
                                                          
51 Ibid., p. 176. 
52 Guest, Herself Defined, p. 253. 
53 Friedman, Psyche Reborn, p. 166. 
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life. It is the personalist way in which H.D. handled these languages which makes her example 
so potent for considering the quest for wisdom. These languages emphasise the creative, literary 
dimension of her quest. H.D.’s next and final stage of research work with Erich Heydt in 
Switzerland therefore took on a different colouring to her work with Freud, some twenty years 
earlier. She was more independent, more self-aware of her abilities, and she was able to draw 
upon multiple languages for thematising experience over time. Her approach became more 
consciously existential, and thus more personal.   
  
Encounters with Existentialism 
From 1946 until just before her death, in 1961, H.D. lived almost entirely in Switzerland, firstly 
alternating between hotels in Lausanne and Lugano, and then as a resident in a nursing home 
in Küsnacht, near Zurich. It was at Küsnacht that she met the existential psychoanalyst Erich 
Heydt. In the mid-late-1950s H.D. wrote a series of memoirs and a roman à clef about her work 
with Heydt, on whom she even developed a romantic attachment.54  
Heydt departed from the strict Freudian method by adopting an existential approach 
drawn from Heidegger. Existential psychoanalysis diverged from the Freudian method by its 
rejection of a strictly empirical, biological, and diagnostic approach to the human psyche. For 
example, Ludwig Binswanger – another Swiss existential analyst – also drew on Heidegger’s 
work in order to develop an approach to analysis which tried to understand the existential 
dynamics of the patient, and to be interested in the manifest content of dreams as pertaining to 
reconfigurations of unconscious imagery valuable in themselves.55 Moreover, the living 
arrangements at H.D.’s nursing homes were highly suited to an existential approach, allowing 
the analyst to take an anthropological interest in the individuals living there full-time. They 
                                                          
54 Christodoulides, ‘Introduction’, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv. 
55 See the chapter on Binswanger in Martin Halliwell, Romantic Science and the Experience of Self (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1999), pp. 110-55. 
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meant that H.D.’s ‘hours’ with Heydt took on the character of afternoon tea: as much a general 
chit-chat as a doctor-patient consultation.  
H.D.’s memoir, Compassionate Friendship, explores how Heydt’s existentialism 
affected her relations with him and the development of her own thought. From her notebooks 
we know that H.D. read Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1943), and wrote: ‘Certain fact, man 
exists, life is lived and especially “when life is lived in some special & revealing way which is 
different from mere existence”’.56 This special and revealing way of living seems to be 
connected to a realisation of the ‘uniqueness’ of the individual, and possibly his ‘loneliness’ 
also – something which would have chimed with H.D.’s existing romantic inclinations (215). 
 H.D.’s experiences with Heydt not only helped her to go deeper into her past, but they 
also helped her to live perhaps the most intensely thus far in her life. Devouring the novelist 
Ellen Glasgow’s autobiography, The Woman Within (1954), H.D. affirmed that ‘our lives begin, 
some of them, when we are 60’ (86). Although Glasgow’s biography is of a different genre to 
Sartre’s text, the point is that H.D. was consciously imbibing an existentialist outlook on life, 
focusing on individuals’ choices and capacity for freedom. Heydt often told H.D. when her 
writing was ‘existentialist’, and this is most apparent in her memoir of Ezra Pound – End to 
Torment – written in 1958. However, H.D.’s language in this text is often ambiguous; we are 
never sure whether she agrees with this appellation. It is better to speak of H.D.’s encounters 
with (French) existentialism; she never bought into Sartre’s philosophy wholesale, yet in the 
broader meaning of the term which this thesis has conveyed throughout, H.D.’s work, especially 
from the 1920s, is undoubtedly sympathetic to existentialism.  
 So although H.D. ‘had finally succeeded, within the limits of human understanding, to 
get her story written’, life at Küsnacht represented yet another unfolding in what became the 
H.D. Legend. As she wrote to Norman Holmes Pearson in 1951, in particular about Sword, ‘as 
                                                          
56 H.D., Magic Mirror, p. 215. Subsequent references this to this text are given in parentheses in the main body. 
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a record and a record I could not have done, if I had not persisted, even at Küsnacht, on 
REMEMBERING. For me, it was so important, my own LEGEND. Then, to get well and re-
create it’.57 By the early 1950s H.D.’s conception of her quest as the development of her Legend 
was tinted with, if not exactly saturated by, Heydt’s existentialism, a philosophy which 
traditionally sees human identity as something fluid, without prior determination, and with an 
onus laid upon the human person to reach forward and ‘re-create’. In Magic Mirror (written 
1955-56) she muses on the word ‘existentialism’: ‘Exist – she couldn’t say the word. Why must 
she think of it? She would work it out sometime – tential – existential. Did her life depend on 
it? It almost seemed so’ (9, original emphasis). In this little passage H.D. discloses the struggle 
that accompanies the realisation that life should not be lived merely as existence – as getting by 
– but rather, out of the anguish of responsibility for one’s own being, to reckon with the 
dependence on this truth for human fulfilment; it is a ‘tent’ in which one moves and has one’s 
being.  
The two texts that have been published together with Magic Mirror take the form of a 
journal meditation, emphasising the intimate and imminent nature of H.D.’s reflections on her 
quest. She writes that ‘my days seem lost when I cannot find time for a short note’ (132), and 
‘I wonder why I go on with these notes. Yes – I learn, as I progress’ (146). Under Heydt’s 
guidance and encouragement, at Küsnacht in the 1950s H.D. demonstrates her profound 
commitment to self-development. H.D.’s philosophical musings are very personal and help her 
to live life on a plane beyond mere existence. Freud had helped H.D. to understand the symbolic 
nature and potential of human life, and by the 1950s this aesthetic, spiritual, and esoteric way 
of being in the world had become a daily source of comfort to her, finding its way into her daily 
notes.  
                                                          
57 Donna K. Hollenberg (ed.), Between History and Poetry: The Letters of H.D. and Norman Holmes Pearson 
(Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1997), pp. 104-105. 
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In the late 1950s H.D. was also preparing her roman à clef, ‘Madrigal’, or Bid Me to 
Live, for publication. H.D. had been working on this text in some form or other since 1921, a 
couple of years after she wrote Notes on Thought and Vision, and indeed, it represents the 
terminus of her ‘Madrigal cycle’ of autobiographical prose works, which includes Paint It 
Today (written 1921).58 Notes on Thought and Vision and Bid Me to Live and its contemporary 
texts effectively bookend H.D.’s interest in consciousness. In 1919 she wrote of the need to 
move beyond the mundane and all that dulls our perception of the world and other people. In 
1960, when she wrote Thorn Thicket, she also invoked the symbol of the thistle and the serpent 
and the potential value of suffering in helping the person move into a new lease of life. In Bid 
Me to Live, H.D. emerges as a self-proclaimed ‘wise-woman. She was seer, see-er. She was as 
at home in this land of subtle psychic reverberations, as she was at home in a book’.59 The H.D. 
character, Julia, is wide awake to the cosmic and spiritual depths of her surroundings in rural 
Cornwall, 1918: ‘She felt that every casual stone was laid there, for a reason […] here, in this 
walled-in-space, was a world; the world, the whole world was given in her consciousness, she 
was see-er, “priestess,” as Rico [D. H. Lawrence] called her, wise-woman with her witch-ball, 
the world’ (147). In 1944, in The Walls Do Not Fall, H.D. had envisioned the role of the poet 
in healing a broken society – a complementary role to Rosenblatt’s literatus (see Chapter 3). By 
the late 1950s, however, the immediacy of the war-context subsided and H.D. condensed or 
distilled the various vocations she felt herself gifted to exercise. Her quest for self-knowledge, 
for healing, and for the existential possible, was grounded in a heterodox brew of discourses 
and symbolic frames of reference which simultaneously directed her attention beyond herself, 
to other people and to other dimensions of existence. And, central to this process – this learning 
process, as she writes in Compassionate Friendship – is a vision of literary experience – of 
                                                          
58 Robinson, H.D., p. 119. 
59 H.D., Bid Me to Live (London: Virago, 1984), p. 146. Subsequent references this to this text are given in 
parentheses in the main body. 
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sensing the ‘reverberations’ when ‘at home in a book’, as much as outside when transacting 
with the symbolic forms surfacing in her heightened consciousness.  
 It is not necessary to understand the intricacy of her philosophical and theosophical 
sources to gain a sense of the contours of H.D.’s quest and how she articulates quest in her 
work.60 For H.D., quest was a very practical process, one which she refracted through different 
lenses throughout her working life, but which nevertheless retains a line of consistency 
throughout. It is true that the two world wars were extremely important in shaping her quest, 
but the interwar and post-war periods are instrumental in showing how she consolidated her 
war-time experiences and drew out a more essential teaching from them, such as her belief in 
the healing potential of suffering and the need to rise above differences to achieve some kind 
of cosmic, universal communion with others.  
 At this point it is worth taking stock of how Rosenblatt, Greene, Mezirow, and H.D. 
contribute to our understanding of being in quest. Rosenblatt begins from her philosophical 
understanding of transactional being in the world, with its grounding in selective attention. She 
broadens this out to involve choices in values by which to live and make sense of the world, 
which most importantly involves weighing up equally positive values and the existential 
challenges involved in this process. She ties this into a broader democratic mission to test and 
weigh up the impact of particular values on actual human lives, as the basis for creating a more 
humane society in America. The language arts and language arts teacher in particular have a 
role in nurturing the individual’s life in language. The aesthetic experience of literature 
specifically involves a transactional interplay of different, emotionally involved worlds. By 
becoming more sensitive to this interplay, learners may be able to grow in the ability to 
formulate, share, and critique the values which shape people’s behaviour and attitudes.  
                                                          
60 I refer again to Matte Robinson’s detailed work, The Astral H.D.: Occult and Religious Sources and Contexts 
for H.D.’s Poetry and Prose (London: Bloomsbury, 2016). 
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Maxine Greene, however, works from an explicitly existentialist position and 
emphasises the indeterminacy of identity and being, and the importance of launching off into 
quest, using the arts to help ‘thematize experience over time’ – to help individuals in concert 
with each other to create meaning that gives shape to their lives, which help them to ‘chart the 
lived landscape’.61 She therefore inflates a more specific preoccupation with value selection 
into the broader task of finding meaning in the experiences of life and art. Mezirow, also 
working in a broadly existentialist way, underscores the transformative potential of experiential 
engagement with the arts. Such transformations may occur in multiple ways, and more recent 
theorists emphasise the non-rational, spiritual, affective, and social dimensions of personal and 
social transformation.  
Through an analysis of H.D.’s developing experience of being in quest, the existential 
quality is highlighted, but so is the ultimately individual and personal nature of quest. H.D. 
sourced and adapted different knowledge discourses in order to process her experience and 
write herself. She worked in a modernist moment that was sensitive to the impact of war on the 
collapse of old values, and her work bears this hallmark of articulating new values for the 
consoling of shattered selves. And yet her example transcends this particular historical moment. 
She shows how one can creatively synthesise initially inapposite discourses, such as 
psychoanalysis and astrology, in the service of communicating meaning not only to her own 
existence, but to the lives of others as well.  
While the dynamics of the transactional literary experience have thus far been in 
abeyance in this chapter, it is important to remember that Rosenblatt and H.D. are ultimately 
concerned with art and with an individual’s personal engagement with art as part of a broader 
quest for meaning. This link will become clearer in the final section. The question that must 
                                                          
61 For further thought on ‘meaning’ and education, see Anders Schinkel, Doret J. De Ruyter and Ahron Aviram, 
‘Education and Life’s Meaning’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 50 (2016): 398-418. 
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now be asked, however, is how does this preoccupation with value formation, existential and 
romantic individuality, and personal and social transformation intersect with definitions of 
wisdom? In order for the quest for wisdom to be operative in higher education, it needs to square 
more clearly with institutional frameworks for the acquisition and articulation of wisdom. After 
a consideration of wisdom definitions and the institutional framework in which these may be 
operative, I turn to conversations in literary studies that seem to be receptive to the quest for 
wisdom via transactional literary experiences.  
 
Creating Wisdom in the University: Walsh and Maxwell 
The psychologist Roger Walsh and the philosopher Nicholas Maxwell are thinkers who have 
recently set themselves the task of establishing a rationale for taking wisdom more seriously in 
academic intellectual life. Walsh has confined himself to developing a cross-disciplinary 
synthesis of wisdom definitions, and Maxwell continues to campaign and write books about the 
need for an academic revolution.62 As Walsh writes in his paper, ‘What is Wisdom?’ (2015), 
the relative neglect of wisdom, meaning concern for what is wisdom and how one might reach 
it, by the intellectual community in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is to be very 
much regretted, ‘because most major problems in our modern world reflect the need for 
wisdom’.63 It is this premise that Maxwell also shares, but in his hands the major culprit is a 
faulty intellectual paradigm that produces ‘knowledge’ frequently dissociated from what he 
repeatedly refers to as ‘problems of living’, and which in concrete terms often coalesce around 
global warming, war, terrorism, and vast inequalities in wealth among populations.  
                                                          
62 As well as writing letters to national newspapers and giving talks, Maxwell also steers the Friends of Wisdom 
network. 
63 Roger Walsh, ‘What is Wisdom? Cross-Cultural and Cross-Disciplinary Syntheses’, Review of General 
Psychology, 19 (2015): 278-93, p. 278. 
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In 2014 Maxwell acknowledged that some trends in academic culture, mostly individual 
research centres, such as the UK’s Cambridge Environmental Initiative (CEI), suggest that 
academics are starting to address the need to engage more directly with social problems – to 
solve them as much as study them.64 And yet his philosophical work frames the intellectual 
work necessary to reconfigure academic inquiry at its root, and for this he turns back to the 
Enlightenment and the romantic dissidence active at the time. Thus, Maxwell also credits 
romanticism and existentialism with questioning and destabilising some of the Enlightenment’s 
cherished beliefs, such as perfectionism, rationality, and empiricism. Yet Maxwell, like 
Rosenblatt, believes that the emotions and rationality need not be in conflict, and a swing either 
way to excessive classicism or to excessive romanticism would be disastrous.65 From 
Maxwell’s philosophical argument, one can then turn to Walsh and flesh out the concept of 
wisdom through his far-reaching synthesis.  
It should be stressed, however, that wisdom is ultimately resistant to rigid classification. 
The growth in wisdom measurement scales (the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm, the Adult Self-
Transcendence Inventory, the Self-Assessed Wisdom Scale, etc.), alongside other self-help 
materials in the past few decades is testament to the relentless drive among wisdom academics 
to try and measure and define wisdom, and to try and help people assess their own wisdom 
levels (the phrase even sounds faintly ridiculous, as if they can be ‘topped up’ at a filling 
station!). As reflexivity is arguably also a quality often associated with wise thinking, one might 
argue that, when thinking about wisdom, it might be wise never to try and pin it down, in 
                                                          
64 Nicholas Maxwell, How Universities Can Help Create a Wiser World: The Urgent Need for an Academic 
Revolution (Exeter: Societas, 2014), pp. 86-96. The University of Nottingham’s Centre for Research in Human 
Flourishing represents an additional nexus of research approximating a quest for wisdom. 
65 In Two Great Problems of Learning: Science and Civilization (Rounded Globe e-book, 2016) Maxwell reprises 
the Enlightenment framework with more vigour, with consequences for his humanistic outlook. See Richard 
Vytniorgu, ‘Review – Two Great Problems of Learning’, Metapsychology, 20 (2016): 
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=7746&cn=394 (accessed October 5, 
2016). 
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language or in individual persons. Instead, one should talk of approximations toward wisdom, 
of the experience of wisdom, of a flexible and tolerant way of engaging the world, a creative 
selectivity of values and the imaginative capacity to determine their possible impact on actual 
human beings. For this, a personalist form of literary study seems of preeminent importance. 
The emphasis on engaging with the experience of others in fictional and poetic worlds, on 
processing one’s own experience like a palimpsest, and on possibly garnering new insights 
about oneself and others – these can be woven into a form of written communication, such as 
transactional criticism (see Chapter 2), which can be more exploratory and discursive about 
wisdom than something more scientific. 
 
From Knowledge to Wisdom 
Perhaps the most fundamental distinction that Nicholas Maxwell makes is (1) thinking about 
problems in such a way that the thinking remains totally detached from the problems, and (2) 
thinking about problems of living in such a way that the thinking changes the actual situation. 
This may seem like an insignificant distinction, but Maxwell’s entire project is concerned with 
dissolving walls in academia so that academics become concerned with ‘the thinking that goes 
on in the great world beyond academia, guiding personal, institutional, social, and global life’.66 
Indeed, his approach echoes Berdyaev’s belief that true thinking is always creative, that it is 
intensely identified with what is known, and that to varying degrees the thinker hopes to change 
what it is contemplated – to move from ‘what is’ to ‘what ought to be’, which implies the 
weighing of values based on an empathic, imaginative contemplation of their possible effect on 
individual personalities.67  
                                                          
66 Ibid., p. 16. 
67 Berdyaev, Dream and Reality, p. 87. 
 213 
 
Maxwell’s major criticism of modern academic inquiry is, contrary to the traditional 
romantic disagreement, that academic inquiry is not rational enough; indeed, he frequently 
refers to it as irrational. What he means by this is that its aims are wrong.68 Instead of 
fragmenting knowledge into specialised disciplines, Maxwell believes that the starting point 
should be thoughtful discussion about some of the central problems of living that face the world 
today, and then from this, working out what needs to be done (and known) in order to help solve 
these problems. Knowledge about social and natural phenomena is simply not enough, and he 
credits this current paradigm with actually causing some of the great problems we face today, 
such as complex warfare, global warming, and the spread of disease. This is why the paradigm 
he hopes to initiate is called ‘wisdom-inquiry’, because the aims of such inquiry are radically 
opposed to ‘knowledge-inquiry’. Maxwell writes: ‘The basic aim of wisdom-inquiry is wisdom, 
understood to be the capacity and the active desire to realize what is of value in life, for oneself 
and others’.69 When he says ‘realize’, Maxwell means this in the sense of actualising as well as 
comprehending.  
There is an essentially creative component to Maxwell’s wisdom-inquiry, which squares 
well with the transactional literary experience and the quest for wisdom. As Greene and 
Mezirow have shown in particular, to be in quest is to be creative, concerned with imagination, 
emotional awareness, and the creation of appropriate context-embedded values. With 
Rosenblatt, of course, the transactional method is founded upon a creative approach to reading 
imaginative literature, and so it is not a big step to Maxwell’s vision of wisdom-inquiry, with 
its emphasis on ‘co-operative rationality’ – the ability to discuss with others matters of vital 
importance to those concerned. Moreover, there is a personalist quality to Maxwell’s vision 
which it is necessary to stress because at times his ideas can seem rather abstract and 
                                                          
68 For a more detailed scholarly analysis of the argument, see Nicholas Maxwell, From Knowledge to Wisdom: A 
Revolution for Science and the Humanities (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). 
69 Maxwell, How Universities, p. 22. 
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unconcerned with the actualities of individual existence. He writes that literary study needs to 
be put ‘close to the heart of rational inquiry, in that it explores imaginatively our most profound 
problems of living and aids personalistic understanding in life by enhancing our ability to enter 
imaginatively into the problems and lives of others’.70 Such a sentiment could come directly 
from the pages of Literature as Exploration, or indeed Releasing the Imagination, and impacts 
the goals of literary education.  
Inevitably, as with any expansive vision, there are complexities with ‘wisdom-inquiry’, 
and Maxwell appreciates that a rigid division between knowledge-inquiry and wisdom-inquiry 
may not always serve his cause. Fundamentally, Maxwell is important to the quest for wisdom 
via literary experiences because he offers an intellectual path for making space in the modern 
university for wisdom to be a valid goal of a literary education. Perhaps by turning to definitions 
of wisdom, one might be able to see even more clearly how being in quest of wisdom is an 
appropriate learning context for literary experience. By nuancing our understanding of what 
wisdom might mean, it may be more amenable to assimilation in contemporary literary studies, 
which, as I show in the next section, are becoming ever more receptive to ideas and sentiments 
with which the quest for wisdom and literary experience are intimately concerned. 
 
Personalising Wisdom 
In his paper, ‘What is Wisdom?’ Walsh begins with historical Western conceptions of wisdom, 
and generally divides them into a focus on general and practical forms of wisdom.71 General 
wisdom refers to thought applied to the central existential issues of life; it may spring from 
intuitions, but generally speaking there is usually some additional thought required. It is this 
type of wisdom, in Greek referred to as sophia, that is classically the preserve of sages and 
                                                          
70 Ibid., p. 59. 
71 See also Charles Cassidy’s invaluable crunching and synthesis of wisdom research: 
https://evidencebasedwisdom.com (accessed online: August 10, 2016). 
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‘wise men’, and is often a gendered concept. It is probably sophia that H.D. rebels against in 
her revisionist poems, Trilogy and Helen in Egypt, in which Wisdom (with a capital ‘W’) stands 
for all that is oppressive and itself in need of re-evaluation. On the other hand, practical wisdom 
tends to be the domain of the ‘old wives’ tale’ and proverbial literature, leading to a tendency 
to smug aphorisms and neat quips about how to deal with rather superficial personal difficulties. 
When Rosenblatt talks about the need for the literature classroom to be a place in which young 
people especially can garner insight about issues in their own lives, through the distancing yet 
intimate powers of the literary experience, she is effectively trying to synthesise these two 
classical approaches to wisdom in a meaningful way. The goal is to experience personally some 
of the more central existential issues of life, even if the individual hasn’t encountered them in 
his own life yet. This is a significant affordance of the literary experience – its potential to lead 
individuals into new experiences and thus possible wisdom that may otherwise be inaccessible.  
Yet Walsh’s contribution is also to extend existing definitions of wisdom and, especially 
by integrating eastern approaches to wisdom, to emphasise the experiential, quest-like nature 
of engaging wisdom. Thus, when he offers some common features of wisdom, such as prosocial 
attitudes and behaviours, value relativism, perspicacity, ability to handle ambiguity, and self-
understanding, he does so in such a way as to emphasise the transformative process of becoming 
wise. It is a personalistic project in the sense of being concentrated in the individual and the 
refraction of these wise qualities through distinct personalities. This complicates any attempt to 
apply standardised measurement scales, given that wisdom will always be appropriated and 
exercised in personalised ways and in concrete situations. What might be wise for one person 
may be folly for another. So one might begin to talk of an existential, personalist wisdom 
assessment in the same way that existential psychoanalysis aimed to take into account a 
person’s psychic dynamics in the context of their wider existence.  
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Applied to literary study, the aim would be to discern a conscious attempt to engage 
experientially with the value-laden world of a given literary work or set of literary works. Or, 
through understanding the logic of a student’s personalist construction of textual sociability, 
one might also apprehend a student’s developing sense of the complexities of their own 
personality and life, as well as the lives and individualities of others. As I showed in Chapter 3, 
while an approach to these concerns may be overt at times, especially through seminar 
discussion or symposia (for academics), the palimpsestuous nature of the transactional literary 
experience safeguards an individual’s privacy by layering any personal discoveries into a 
discussion of the contours of the fictional world in question. Indeed, this was H.D.’s primary 
way of maintaining both her integrity as well as her identity as an artist. Placing the transactional 
literary experience within the quest for wisdom in no way turns English students and academics 
into philosophers, though it does engage them in philosophy; they become integrated thinkers.  
To echo the conclusions of Chapter 3, in the existential sense, to think of wisdom as a 
realistic target for literary study would indeed make philosophers out of learners, if to 
philosophise in this context is to intuit, conceptualise, discuss, and creatively construct an 
evaluation of their engagement with literature, in such a way as to move towards some broader 
conclusions about (to echo Maxwell) what is of value in life, for oneself and for others. This 
need not be done in a simplistic or gauche manner; one can be as creative and subtle as the 
assignment or project requires. But the goal posts have shifted, essentially. No longer would 
credit be given primarily for what Rosenblatt would consider secondary forms of analysis 
(formal criticism, literary history, textual scholarship, etc.), but much more so for aligning 
literary experiences with one’s existential quest for wisdom, in the context of a broader social 
movement toward a better world, redolent with possibility, justice, and tolerance.  
Maxwell, Walsh, and, to some extent Greene and Mezirow as well, are generally outside 
literary studies specifically, although their insights are crucial to articulating what the quest for 
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wisdom might mean in literary studies. Yet within literary studies itself, over recent years 
attention given to various concerns indicates that we are moving into a climate that can 
accommodate the transactional literary experience as a pedagogical movement for those who 
wish to situate themselves openly in quest of wisdom. Concern for the human, for affect, and 
for ethics speak to different aspects of the dialogue I have created between Rosenblatt and H.D., 
and it is to these that I turn now.  
 
New Directions for Literature and the Human, Affect, and Ethics 
At the outset of this thematic discussion the most important point to establish is that together, 
Rosenblatt and H.D. require that a consideration of literature’s relationship to the human, affect, 
and ethics be reflexively studied in relation to the reader’s literary experience as well as these 
relationships inside literature. In fact, the transactional approach would take issue with an 
implied separation between literature and its readers in the first place. Insights into the 
representation of human beings in literature, its affective power, and its concern with ethics all 
arise within the mental activity of the reader who has deliberately set herself to think about 
these issues, self-conscious of herself and the ways in which she has evoked the literary work 
of art from the text. Any new directions proposed by this thesis therefore need to be studied 
reflexively, returning issues of learning to the heart of these long-standing concerns of literary 
theory.  
 
Literature and the Human 
Andy Mousley, who has already featured periodically in this thesis, is perhaps the most 
significant theorist currently writing about literature’s relationship to the human, profoundly 
interested in what he calls ‘literature’s human significance, interest and appeal’ – issues with 
which critics and theorists sometimes forget about or obscure and place at ‘a sceptical 
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distance’.72 Derek Attridge’s The Singularity of Literature (2004) should also be considered a 
contribution to evaluating literature’s relationship to the human, and indeed to affect and ethics 
also. In one sense Attridge’s work has the advantage over Mousley’s in that he is more willing 
to discuss how readers perform literary works on themselves, and through this performance – 
this event in time – engage with literature’s ‘singularity’, by which he means its ability to 
engage and transform an individual’s ‘idioculture’ – a concept which denotes all that is 
individually refracted in an individual of wider culture.73 Attridge comes extremely close to 
Rosenblatt in his insistence that literature comes into being through an experience akin to a 
performance, which is the metaphor Rosenblatt began to use from the 1960s.74 Attridge even 
acknowledges Rosenblatt and writes that after he completed his book, he ‘found much in her 
account of “transactional reading” that chimes with my argument for reading as performance’.75 
I can only suggest that Attridge’s book met with such critical acclaim (with regard to 
originality) among English academics because he wrote from within a more restricted literary 
field in which Rosenblatt was less well-known, whereas Rosenblatt’s need to explicitly factor 
in student learning experiences ultimately pushed her to the fringes of literary theory and, as I 
have said, her legacy now lives on primarily in education departments.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that the more organic approach which Attridge 
and Mousley adopt, talking about literature’s relationship to the human through close reading 
of literary texts rather than through philosophical theorising, means that their contribution to 
literary studies is more obvious, if ultimately not as holistic as Rosenblatt’s. Even so, I would 
suggest that Attridge failed to appreciate fully the implications of the transactional approach. 
By extracting only one of Rosenblatt’s core commitments – to literature as performance – 
                                                          
72 Andy Mousley, Literature and the Human: Criticism, Theory, Practice (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 2. 
73 Derek Attridge, The Singularity of Literature (London: Routledge, 2004). 
74 Louise M. Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 4th ed. (New York: MLA, 1983), pp. 277-91. 
75 Attridge, The Singularity of Literature, p. 144. 
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Attridge was able to continue with his obviously literary-theoretical agenda and side-line 
Rosenblatt’s political and educational commitments, which, I would argue, are foundational to 
appreciating the significance of literature as performance and which, moreover, would have 
necessitated explicit commentary on literature’s human significance in terms of pedagogy.  
 Even though Mousley does not address issues of learning directly, his interest in 
literature’s human value nevertheless touches on its transformative potential, in particular its 
ability to particularise human experience through its foregrounding of character – ‘one of 
literature’s staple generators of emotion’.76 Mousley is concerned with literature’s potential to 
console, challenge, awaken, disturb, and pacify, through engagement with individual human 
characters. His vision of literature is very much a meeting-ground of human personalities and 
a potential meshing of diverse human experiences. He emphasises the embodiment of human 
experiences in literature by the individualities of especially fictional characters. In this sense 
Mousley perhaps even moves beyond humanism to personalism, by emphasising the need to 
engage with the particularity of specific characters. However, his talk of persistent human traits 
and ‘the human’ as a valid philosophical category seems to crystallise his commitment to a 
more humanist than personalist orientation.  
By emphasising personal engagement with literature, Mousley echoes Valentine 
Cunningham’s sentiments in Reading After Theory (2002) in which the primary purpose of 
engaging with literature at all is because of its potential to ‘feed’ us – to help nourish us as 
humans in an Arnoldian fashion.77 According to Cunningham, reading literature can be ‘a 
selving, self-making process’.78 Such a process involves ‘a kind of self-knowledge, an 
education in understanding and feeling one’s own condition. It’s a sentimental education. It’s a 
                                                          
76 Mousley, Literature and the Human, p. 131. 
77 Valentine Cunningham, Reading After Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 148. 
78 Ibid.  
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kind of self-affirming too’.79 As I have shown in this thesis, the literary experience in the 
context of a quest for wisdom also draws the self out to encounter others and possibly broaden 
one’s experiences and outlook on life, and in Chapter 3 I critiqued Cunningham for placing too 
much faith in a corporeal metaphor for reading, which belies the actual distance between readers 
and texts. But essentially, the embodiment of human experiences in affectively potent 
characters offers the potential to feed us and help us to ‘selve’ ourselves. 
Where Mousley, Attridge, and Cunningham approach the question of educative value 
of literature in terms of broader human development, Rosenblatt and H.D. together allow for a 
much more explicit picture, in which a ‘selving, self-making process’ can become part of the 
existential quest for wisdom, in which aesthetic experience of literature plays a pivotal role – a 
role which cements the link between transactional reading and transactional being in the world. 
Where Mousley speaks of the capacity of literature to embody human personality, Rosenblatt 
adopts transactionalism as a philosophically preferable view of human being in the world, one 
which extends to the experience of literature which is transformative to varying degrees. 
Rosenblatt also stresses the transactional nature of the learning environment, in which readers 
join in quest one with another and move forward to a pluralistic environment in which each 
person can develop freely and fully by creating the conditions in which others can do so as well. 
H.D., meanwhile, questions the limits of cognising the human in aesthetic experience of text, 
through her emphasis on wisdom occurring through bodily touch and dwelling in proximity to 
one another. She gestures toward Mezirow’s and Greene’s emphasis on different languages for 
engaging the human through the arts, synthesising the visual with the verbal, the kinetic with 
the aural.  
Without wishing to anticipate my discussion in the Conclusion about the subject matter 
of literary studies, the implication here is that the quest for wisdom via literary experience 
                                                          
79 Ibid., p. 153. 
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requires a more multi-modal kind of learning, which permits the human to be approached in 
multi-sensorial ways, in a learning environment that also seeks to bring human beings together 
through literary experiences in innovative and democratic ways. English educationalists have 
been arguing for multi-modal approaches to literary study for some time now, in what has been 
called a ‘convergence culture’ of media forms, so what the quest for wisdom adds to this 
commitment is a re-configured learning goal, from knowledge to wisdom (to echo Maxwell).80 
In other words, it is a goal which is focused more on personal and social transformation, 
existential authenticity, and the growth of human personalities to their fullness of being, rather 
than simply the accumulation of knowledge about literature and the human, important though 
this is in its rightful place in the process of exploring the literary experience. The affective 
potential of studying literature in a ‘convergence culture’ is arguably much greater, because 
learners are confronted with the human in a more holistic way, adding sight, hearing, and 
perhaps even touch, to their traditional activity of imaginative reading of text; the multi-modal 
approach gestures at the learning potential of affective presence, of physical proximity to the 
other.   
 
Literature and Affect 
In Mousley’s work in particular, a re-evaluation of the relationship of literature to the human 
also entails an exploration into literature’s relationship to affect. He weaves his own thoughts 
on this link into a broader ‘resurgence in literary affect’, represented by the work of Patrick 
                                                          
80 For example, see Henry Jenkins, Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media Education for 
the 21st Century (MacArthur Foundation, 2006), p. 46. 
https://www.macfound.org/media/article_pdfs/JENKINS_WHITE_PAPER.PDF (accessed October 4, 2016); 
see also Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide (New York: New York 
University Press, 2006). 
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Colm Hogan, Suzanne Keen, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Jenefer Robinson (among others).81 
What much of this work has in common is its reliance on modern neuroscientific research on 
the nature of emotions, then applied to literature. Brigid Lowe, on the other hand, uses the 
Victorian novel as a way of moving critical sensibilities away from the ‘hermeneutics of 
suspicion’, toward an intersubjective notion of sympathy which Victorian novels were often 
keen to propagate.82 The work of the former authors works as a bridge to Text World Theory 
and its scientific interest in readers’ (affective) entrance into fictional worlds (see Chapter 3). 
Yet Lowe and Mousley work more tightly within literature itself in order to impact literary 
criticism and theory; Lowe in terms of critiquing a discourse of suspicion more generally; and 
Mousley by re-evaluating literary criticism’s current intense interest in history.   
As Chapters 2 and 3 revealed, the transactional literary experience and its undertaking 
within the context of a quest for wisdom has significant consequences for how a learner 
approaches the thorny issue of history and difference. Reliant on a subtle vision of aesthetic 
experience for its successful enactment, the transactional literary experience urges a re-
configuration of literary contexts, from historical to existential ones – to contexts legislated by 
the personal learner based on the emotional and intellectual reverberations triggered by 
pressures within the literary experience. I have termed this form of context ‘personalist textual 
sociability’. The shift in contextual possibilities is made possible because of a prior commitment 
to the individual and her experience – to a sense of the humanity of the learner, in other words. 
The aesthetic experience, through its emphasis on the affective dimension of understanding as 
well as the cognitive, foregrounds the ways in which readers may respond emotionally to 
fictional and poetic worlds.  
                                                          
81 Mousley, Literature and the Human, p. 14. See Patrick Colm Hogan, What Literature Teaches Us About 
Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, 
Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003). 
82 Brigid Lowe, Victorian Fiction and the Insights of Sympathy: An Alternative to the Hermeneutics of Suspicion 
(London: Anthem Press, 2007). 
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In his work, Mousley frames this response in terms of incarnation and cathexis and the 
characterological way in which literature communicates history.83 Through an analysis of Toni 
Morrison’s Beloved, Mousley suggests that characters or speakers, or in this instance ‘spirits’, 
are ‘the holding places for elemental emotions – anger, venom, outrage, spite, vengefulness, 
fear of abandonment, love, need for love, remorse – to be defended against the emotionless, 
disaffected, censored, sanitised history’.84 Instead of rejecting the claim of literature upon 
history, Mousley speaks of multiple histories and ways of apprehending the historical, and 
literature’s principal method is through affective engagement of specific human situations and 
experiences. 
This thesis basically affirms an experiential way of cognising the past and weaving its 
complexities into the trajectory of one’s own stream of existence. To this end, it is worth 
recalling the philosophical frameworks within which H.D. and Rosenblatt considered affect and 
its relationship to the human. Rosenblatt, via Dewey and William James, is interested in finding 
the emotion within reason and so eroding a distinction between the two; in this she 
approximates a Russian school of personalism focused on the rationality of the heart. Her theory 
of the literary experience seeks to foster rational thinking within an emotionally coloured 
experience; thinking about literature and the human element in literature is therefore supposed 
to prepare one to think rationally in emotional situations in the rest of life – to become wiser, 
and to foster emotional homeostasis. As a modernist influenced by Bergson, H.D., on the other 
hand, is interested in modes of private time that release the individual from subservience to 
clock time. Bryony Randall has framed H.D.’s work in the context of Bergsonian notions of the 
durée and the day as the most psychologically significant marker of time, which in part explains 
H.D.’s aesthetic interest in ‘the hour’ as an encapsulation of psychological and spiritual 
                                                          
83 Mousley borrows ‘characterological’ from Amanda Anderson’s The Way We Argue Now (2006); ibid., pp. 46-
47. 
84 Ibid., p. 69. 
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activity.85 H.D.’s sympathy with Bergsonian time manifests in her preference for the non-linear, 
for the repetitious and the re-materialisation of human experiences over time, suggestive of a 
more horizontal than vertical plane of existence, concentrated on affectively traversing time 
rather than travelling cognitively through it.  
The significance of these conceptions of time and emotion in relation to literary 
experience and the quest for wisdom lies in Rosenblatt’s and H.D.’s capacity to question 
conventional modes of context building. What H.D. and Rosenblatt gesture towards is a way of 
foregrounding the affective experience of literature as a significant means of re-configuring 
notions of structure and context, based more on the dynamics of the existential human 
microcosm than on an exteriorised, ‘out-there’ vision of verification. The romantic and 
existentialist contours of Rosenblatt’s and H.D.’s thought are therefore most obvious in their 
connection between the value of the individual and a different approach to time and to history 
in the context of handling literary experiences.  
To explore this a little connection further, one might return to Berdyaev. Also influenced 
to some degree by Bergson, the existentialist Berdyaev believed that ‘history takes no notice of 
personality, of its individual unrepeatability, its uniqueness and irreplaceability’.86 Initially this 
may run counter to the emphasis in this thesis on shared experience over time and space, but 
what Berdyaev is getting at here is history’s exteriorisation and objectification of human 
experience – the very opposite of the characterological that becomes cathectic in the literary 
experience. Berdyaev pits ‘existential time’ against ‘cosmic’ and ‘historical’ time, the former 
being (like H.D.’s ‘dream time’) the most personal and human plane of existence, to which 
moments of (aesthetic) experience may often bring us. The crucial point that Berdyaev makes, 
however, is that the human is not to be projected into history, but rather, history is to be taken 
                                                          
85 Bryony Randall, Modernism, Daily Time and Everyday Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
p. 34. 
86 Nicolas Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom, trans. R. M. French (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1944), p. 255. 
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‘into his own infinite subjectivity, in which the world is part of man’.87 This view is in accord 
with the exploration of the literary experience in Chapter 2, in which the individual learner 
becomes the legislator of context, effectively ‘taking all history into his own infinite 
subjectivity’.  
Being in quest of wisdom is an existentialist project that unites with the transactional 
literary experience in opening up possibilities for re-evaluating one’s relationship to time. The 
affective experience of ‘the human’ in literary art enables the learner to ‘take all history into his 
own infinite subjectivity’ and to create unique, personalist contexts for investigating issues with 
which wisdom is intimately concerned. Finally, therefore, such a move is also an ethical one, 
because it can be framed in terms of emancipation – a release from the pressures of a certain 
understanding of time, into an intersubjective, existential realm of creative understanding.  
 
Literature and Ethics 
In his autobiography, Berdyaev explained how in the interwar period ‘everything that showed 
the slightest signs of human depth and insight, both in art and philosophy, came under the 
charge of romanticism’, and that he realised that ‘romanticism stands for everything that is 
human’ and was therefore ‘prepared to fight for it’.88 Such a sentiment could also be applied to 
Rosenblatt and H.D., both of whom drew upon romantic and existentialist discourses in order 
to humanise their thought. Their work is undoubtedly of an ethical nature and it is for this reason 
that Rosenblatt, at any rate, has been related to an ‘ethical turn’ in literary theory.89  
What Elizabeth A. Flynn meant by the ‘ethical turn’ in her 2007 article for College 
English is that Rosenblatt can be connected to what Laurence Buell in 1999 called 
                                                          
87 Ibid., p. 267. 
88 Berdyaev, Dream and Reality, p. 105. 
89 Elizabeth A. Flynn, ‘Louise Rosenblatt and the Ethical Turn in Literary Theory’, College English, 70 (2007): 
52-69. 
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‘postpoststructuralism’, or an ‘ethically valenced literary inquiry’.90 This means two things: 
firstly, an ethical sensitivity to the human culture of literary creativity, and secondly, readerly 
responsibility to relate to the literary work in a ‘conscienceful’ manner. Flynn argued that 
Rosenblatt ‘insists on the humanness of both authors and readers. They are not constructs but 
people’.91 Meanwhile, Buell emphasises the ethical act of ‘listening’ to the human qualities of 
a literary work.92 For Rosenblatt, listening entails an explicit attempt to bring into the 
foreground issues of human values as part of the cultivation of democratic citizens who are 
capable of putting themselves into another person’s shoes and sensing the human impact of 
impersonal political decisions. Her commentaries over the decades on students discussing 
Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus as well as Ibsen’s A Doll’s House, in Literature as Exploration, and 
Emily Dickinson’s ‘I Heard a Fly Buzz’ in Reader, Text, Poem, for instance, are representative 
of Rosenblatt’s commitment to emphasising literature’s ability to particularise human 
experiences for their ethical consequences. While Rosenblatt modified and re-contextualised 
her theory from the 1920s to the 2000s, I would argue that the germination of her core vision 
took place in the interwar period, in which, as Berdyaev noted, romanticism was under attack. 
Her commitment to the ‘humanness’ of authors, readers, and characters in a 
‘postpoststructuralist’ era is essentially a transmuted version of her youthful and passionate 
faith in Shelley’s vision of poets as the ‘legislators of mankind’ and literature’s intimate claim 
upon people. 
If the question of ‘universals’ is turned to at this point, as it was in Chapter 3 during my 
discussion of the literary portrayal of human relations, Mousley has created a vocabulary for 
articulating the ways in which literature might help contemporary ‘postpoststructuralist’ readers 
to re-affirm or transform aspects of human experience evoked in literature from different 
                                                          
90 Quoted in ibid., p. 54. 
91 Ibid., p. 55. 
92 See Lawrence Buell, ‘In Pursuit of Ethics’, PMLA, 114 (1999): 7-19. 
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periods and places.93 As a new humanist, Mousley frames his discussion in terms of coming to 
a needful consensus about what ‘the human is’, because ‘if we don’t have any sense of what 
the human condition is, then the human can be co-opted on behalf of anything and everything, 
from totalitarianism to raking gravel eighteen hours a day’.94 Mousley’s work reaffirms the 
connection found in Rosenblatt between ways of reading and ethics, particularly regarding 
conceptions of the human which can be operationalised for better or for worse in actual 
situations.  
Yet while ‘conscienceful listening’ to the ‘humanness’ of literary texts and contexts is 
perhaps the most obvious way in which this thesis speaks to the ethical in literary studies, there 
is a more significant aspect. The foundational emphasis on the individual, on the validity of his 
or her experience and existential quest, and on the inauguration of a different conception of 
time in the literary experience, point towards another ethical implication. The prioritising of 
personal contexts over historical ones and dream or existential time over clock or historical time 
indicates a mode of emancipation for the individual.  
It is possible to read H.D.’s entire oeuvre, for example, as a struggle toward personal 
and creative emancipation from constraining patterns of thought and creative agency. Her 
gradual assimilation and transformation of non-traditional knowledge discourses, along with 
her incessant self-mythologising and palimpsestuous approach to history make H.D. a lodestar 
toward which learners might move in the quest for a more individual course of inquiry, 
somehow transcending traditional conceptions of historical contingency and pedagogical 
necessity. In other words, as someone with a highly developed sense of personality, H.D. 
approached time and space in such a way as to make these realities speak to her in intimate 
                                                          
93 See Mousley, Literature and the Human, pp. 72-103. 
94 Ibid., p. 77. 
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ways. The palimpsestuous embraces the human face of history at the same time as controlling 
it through aesthetic distance.  
Moreover, H.D. was brave enough to step outside the normal conventions of discourse 
with regard to psychoanalysis and psychic research, which can be framed as pedagogies 
designed to educate. Defining herself as a ‘wise-woman’ in Bid Me to Live seems to speak 
directly to her wisdom of gradually personalising knowledge discourses so that they fit into her 
own stream of life in a more complete way. Perhaps in the Rogerian sense of personal 
becoming, she finally learned to live less by fear and more by a sense of personal freedom. No 
longer did she feel completely ‘owned’ by her circumstances. 
In exploring the literary experience, therefore, learners are freed to enter into existential 
time and from this affective experience of specific human beings in literature, to formulate and 
re-formulate their quest for wisdom. While the ethical in the transactional literary experience 
intimates at a weighing of values and the creation of new ones, it also signifies the freedom of 
the human learner to orient themselves to the literary in a new way, to build their own contexts 
for inquiry. Moving into existential time and being released from subservience to clock-time or 
historical time, the reader is perhaps at greater liberty to experience cathexis, to sense the 
embodiment of human experiences, and to use this affective turn to formulate a path of inquiry 
that can be consciously grounded in their overarching quest and the various interpretive points 
surfacing during the process of reflecting on the literary experience. If the goal of the quest for 
wisdom via transactional literary experiences can be framed, at least in part, as a mode of 
transformative learning, then the various key aspects of this process – emotion, identity, growth, 
connection – can be located as integral parts of literary study, as key markers in the future of 
English studies. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to broaden the discussion by considering what the quest for wisdom 
means in relation to the transactional literary experience, with which the previous three chapters 
have principally been concerned. Rosenblatt frames the literary experience as part of a 
generalist language arts education, geared toward the health of the individual and the nurture 
of a democratic society characterised by value selection and creativity. Maxine Greene and Jack 
Mezirow speak more explicitly about quest, and frame it as part of a broader existentialist 
movement toward self-awareness and becoming. Newer contributions to transformative 
learning stress the affective and spiritual dimensions of existential transformation, as well as 
recalling the social aspect of personal transformation, in which the individual is brought into 
dialogue with the other. An analysis of H.D.’s growth in quest and of how she explores this 
concept through her various professional phases develops the notion of quest by highlighting 
the creative element, in which various ‘languages’ can be employed and adapted according to 
the individual’s needs. H.D.’s interest in literary experience and in modes of consciousness – 
explored in previous chapters – can thus be placed in an overarching existential and romantic 
quest for becoming, for creating her own mythology. H.D. uses art to grow in self-knowledge 
as well as to explore different values by which to create a more peaceful world.  
 The second half of the chapter focused more on the institutional dynamics of wisdom in 
the university, before it folded the quest for wisdom via transactional literary experiences into 
current conversations in literary studies about literature’s relationship to the human, affect, and 
ethics. Roger Walsh and Nicholas Maxwell offer some useful pointers for weaving the insights 
of the existential quest and transformative learning into existing conceptions of wisdom and 
how academic inquiry more generally might be transformed in order to prioritise a movement 
towards wisdom. It should be stressed, however, that wisdom is essentially resistant to neat 
definition, and the overarching emphasis on existential experience in this chapter controls 
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consideration of the complex question of wisdom by recognising the need to personalise it. 
Wisdom is always something that is internalised and assimilated into the stream of a person’s 
ongoing transactional experience in the world.  
 The emphasis on personalisation and the individual is also prominent in current 
conversations about literature and the human, affect, and ethics. This chapter contributes to 
these conversations by arguing that discussion of ‘the human’ can be streamlined as part of a 
more explicit quest for wisdom, utilising insights in English education which emphasise the 
benefits of multi-modal literary study, bringing learners even closer to the human and the 
ensuing consideration of values and myriad human experiences. Moreover, interest in affect 
chimes with Rosenblatt’s insistence that literature be emotionally experienced and H.D.’s 
practice of approaching personalities in history through an affective palimpsestuous 
consciousness, simultaneously identifying herself with others as well as protecting herself 
through the aesthetic distance inherent in the palimpsestuous.  
The question of the reader’s and literature’s relationship to history in literary study is 
further addressed by the form of context construction which H.D. and Rosenblatt gesture 
toward. This touches upon the ethical: readers are very much encouraged to sense the 
‘humanness’ of characters and their fictional lives. Mousley has referred to characters as 
‘holding places’ of emotion and experience.95  
But the ethical is also present in the need for readers to be free to internalise history and 
therefore be the legislators of their own literary contexts, which become the building blocks for 
writing about literature. Such a move is founded upon the central philosophical commitment 
which H.D. and Rosenblatt subscribe to, namely, the value of the individual and her experience. 
While both thinkers advocate some form of dialogue and conversation with others as part of 
                                                          
95 Mousley, Literature and the Human, p. 69. 
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their existential quest, ultimately the person and their free and full growth is the preeminent 
marker to which all other considerations should submit. 
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Conclusion 
 
If at this point a reader of this thesis can say of themselves, ‘I veer round, uncanonically seated 
stark upright with my feet on the floor’, then they will have shared in this thesis’s 
methodological personalism and its ambitious aims.1 I have endeavoured to contribute to the 
formation of a personalist theory of literary studies by drawing upon Russian personalism in 
order to create a dialogue between two complementary American thinkers of differing types – 
one an analytic theorist and educator, and the other a mystical, highly intuitive and esoteric 
prose writer and poet. Rosenblatt and H.D. are not natural bedfellows and one of the main 
challenges throughout the process of writing this project has been to determine for myself the 
synergies between the two as well as the unmistakable differences. 
If this thesis had been a more conventional literary-historical exploration of H.D. and 
Rosenblatt as two twentieth-century writers, then the task would have in fact been much harder. 
But my goal all along has been to read these figures as thinkers, which in H.D.’s case at least, 
is to intervene in the current of H.D. criticism, which has already witnessed attempts to 
understand her as a thinker as much as a writer, but which has yet to offer an extended study of 
her engagement with quest as a pedagogical process. And because I have read H.D. as a thinker, 
I have drawn upon methodologies appropriate to the philosophical domain of literary and 
cultural theory – broad and welcoming fields of different and innovative critical approaches.2  
With Rosenblatt, on the other hand, the task has been a recuperative one. Ignored for so 
long by literary theorists and side-lined as a reader-response figure, Rosenblatt’s vision of 
literary studies has struggled for a voice, for a critic who understands and communicates its 
                                                          
1 H.D., Tribute to Freud (New York: New Directions, 2012), p. 15. 
2 John Schad has referred to English as ‘a very broad church with all sorts of side chapels into which one can slope 
off and go after the strangest gods’. John Schad and David Jonathan Y. Bayot, John Schad in Conversation 
(Manila: De La Salle University Publishing House, 2015), p. 7.  
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significance. Being classified as a reader-response theorist has led to the general assumption 
that as such, she only cares about subjective individual reader reactions. In fact, nothing could 
be further from the truth. In a sense, as I showed in Chapter 1, Rosenblatt is profoundly 
concerned with the individual. But her transactional philosophy is also deeply social. Placed in 
conversation with H.D., it has been especially necessary for me to emphasise Rosenblatt’s 
social vision, as I did in Chapters 3 and 4, because H.D.’s interest is generally in the self, and 
particularly her own experiences, although contrary to Ian Hamilton’s speculation, this is not a 
bad thing; indeed, H.D,’s voice shines through as a singularly personalist one.3 But again, even 
for H.D., such a focus is tempered by her belief in the commonality of various human 
experiences across time and space. Helen in Egypt, for example, becomes a moment of affective 
contact between two personalities, one real (H.D.) and the other fictional or mythical (Helen). 
As Rosenblatt repeatedly pointed out in the 1990s and 2000s, her own advocacy of a continuum 
of reading stances – from efferent to aesthetic – was a move against what she saw as extreme 
pendulum swings: aesthetic or efferent, individual or social. One could even say that her 
continuum is a mark of wisdom, showcasing the kind of scrutiny and deliberation discussed in 
this thesis as a beneficial activity to follow the literary experience.  
One of the principal arguments in this thesis has been that H.D.’s writing is a treasure 
trove for theorising ‘the quest for wisdom’. Although H.D. never used such a term herself, I 
have shown how her autobiographical writing and writing from the 1940s onwards is concerned 
with her quest to engage with her experiences and find parallels in those of others throughout 
history, leading to self-renewal. Ultimately, H.D. is committed to creating herself as a 
personality, and her writing can be read as, among other things, her attempt to think through 
this project self-consciously. H.D. helps to bridge the gap between the literary and the 
                                                          
3 See Ian Hamilton, Against Oblivion: Some Lives of the Twentieth-Century Poets (London: Viking, 2002), pp. 
62-66.  
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philosophical, the creative and the analytical, and as such also finds a parallel in Rosenblatt’s 
aesthetic-efferent continuum, whereby in any given literary experience, the mind can shuttle 
between the aesthetic end of the reading scale and the efferent end. Both H.D. and Rosenblatt 
come close to Kireevsky’s discourse of the ‘rationalism of the heart’, connecting reason and 
emotion.  
 While recent scholars of H.D. have concentrated on delineating her source material and 
the various contexts for placing her later, complex work, there is further scope for reading her 
writing to uncover her theoretical ideas about art, human relations, and education. I have 
examined all three of these areas, but separate studies could be devoted to each of these, perhaps 
entailing a more systematic exploration by way of breaking down different groups of texts and 
analysing some of the central thoughts expressed in these which might impact beyond an 
understanding of H.D. herself. How do her ideas of genetic inheritance, for example, intersect 
with other mystical ideas about racial characteristics? A multidisciplinary approach would suit 
this work best, drawing on both philosophy and literary history to strike a balance between 
conceptual analysis and contextualisation.  
 A similar project could be undertaken for Rosenblatt, reading her as a philosopher rather 
than an educator. Or rather, Rosenblatt would be served well if she could be squared more 
clearly within philosophy of education, so that her contribution to this field could become 
crystallised. I have sought to clarify Rosenblatt’s engagement with literary theory by 
emphasising her institutional context; it was necessary to do so because my own thesis is a 
contribution to literary theory. But Rosenblatt is a multifaceted thinker who involved herself 
with multiple disciplines. It is understandable that she should have been celebrated and explored 
most fully in education circles, especially because her theory offers guidelines for developing 
practical teaching methods. But I am sure that this is not her only niche. If 1948 seems to be a 
symbolic year for Rosenblatt due to her move from a liberal arts department to a department of 
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education, I am convinced that she never bought wholesale into her newfound identity as an 
educator. That she published articles on Walt Whitman and Walter Pater in the 1960s and 
1970s, some of which recycled material dating back to her doctoral work from the 1920s, is 
testament to her reluctance to abandon a ‘literary’ identity. Indeed, her PhD experience in the 
1920s was especially formative, and at that stage in her life she was almost entirely encamped 
within literary circles, associating with poets and writers.  
 Finally, Rosenblatt’s commitment to education itself needs to be engaged with much 
more substantially and critically. Although she distanced herself from the Progressive 
Education Association, which first published Literature as Exploration, she remained deeply 
committed to democracy and firmly believed that political and economic alterations, which 
would usher in an educational climate sympathetic to her transactional approach, would help 
save the world.4 In a sense, this thesis has undertaken a sceptical reading of Rosenblatt, because 
I have tried to indicate the ways in which Rosenblatt’s faith in the abstract concept of democracy 
may in fact work against her otherwise personalistic vision of literary experience. But a more 
robust critique of Rosenblatt’s educational humanism, while deepening understanding of her 
personalism, would serve her legacy well.  
Principally, though, the ideas and practices developed in this thesis need to be explored 
in practice. This might happen on three levels. The first would be by continuing to re-evaluate 
the position of English as a discipline within the modern university and its overarching purpose 
in society. In this thesis I have argued via the thought of Nicholas Maxwell that framing the 
university’s role as engaging in wisdom-inquiry would allow the quest for wisdom in literary 
studies to find an institutional sanction.  
                                                          
4 Eugene F. Provenzo Jr., ‘Louise Rosenblatt Interview’, School of Education, University of Miami. 14 March 
1999. http://www.education.miami.edu/ep/rosenblatt/ (accessed online, June 17 2015). See also Jeanne M. 
Connell, ‘Continue to Explore: In Memory of Louise Rosenblatt (1904-2005)’, Education and Culture, 21 (2005): 
63-79. 
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Secondly, by working towards a broader institutional re-ordering of intellectual aims, 
the creation of new modules and programmes in English, which align with some of the 
approaches developed in this thesis, would become a distinct possibility. The kinds of modules 
which Rosenblatt developed at NYU (see Chapter 1) could be enhanced by enshrining a 
methodology of personalist textual sociability, thereby allowing students to engage in 
personalist literary study, which would manifest in the way in which they write their essays and 
discuss texts with others in class.  
Thirdly, personalist literary studies can be put into practice by writing literary criticism 
which uses the methodology developed in this thesis. Essays and articles can organise their 
inquiry by invoking the mode of context foregrounded here, which works according to 
existential time rather than clock time. But fundamentally, the personalist angle, which values 
the quests for wisdom learners may be undertaking in various ways, would manifest in different 
aims of inquiry. Rather than seeking only to extend our knowledge of particular literary or 
cultural themes, personalist literary studies would primarily, though not exclusively, seek to 
contribute to public discussions about important existential issues. The literary critic thereby 
becomes a literatus. In Literature as Exploration Rosenblatt seems to assert that literary study 
need not make the choice between studying non-literary aspects such as ethics, and literary 
concerns such as the ‘text’. Her theory of literary experience means that literary study can 
reasonably do both things. Therefore, personalist literary study can contribute to the 
understanding of literature at the same time as it grapples with questions of wisdom which take 
the attention outside the text to the world beyond. The key is in the nature of the literary 
experience, which this thesis has explored in detail. In the context of literary studies, the quest 
for wisdom can only find expression in and through the transactional literary experience, 
because it is this experience and the process of inquiry stemming from it which can adequately 
embrace and fuse both the literary and the non-literary.  
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However, discussion of practical aspects of personalist literary study prompts a question 
which I touched upon in Chapter 4 in my reading of Andy Mousley’s new literary humanism, 
but which has lurked throughout. Although Rosenblatt refused to subscribe to traditional 
notions of the canon (as when she placed Jane Eyre alongside A Tree Grows in Brooklyn as 
cognate texts dealing with female adolescence), there is a lack of sufficient attention in her 
writing given to alternative modes of aesthetic experience which move beyond the label of 
‘literature’.5 Indeed, at one point in Literature as Exploration she talks with disdain about ‘the 
pulp magazines, comic books, or lurid drugstore paperbacks’, referring to these as ‘trashy 
writings’.6 Clearly, Rosenblatt’s notion of ‘good’ writing depended on whether or not it could 
be classed as ‘literature’ – something which could enter positively into the developmental 
project of increasing the quality of students’ literary experiences. As a theorist engaged in 
literacy, it seems natural that Rosenblatt should have focused on the written word (of promising 
quality) as the most appropriate subject material for ‘English’. But her theory in fact does not 
automatically lead to this conclusion, and H.D.’s writing is perhaps more generous in the kinds 
of material with which one can have an aesthetic experience (see Chapter 2). Indeed, in his 
preface to Literature as Exploration, Wayne Booth asked: ‘Can we hope that Rosenblatt’s plea 
that we treat reading as a transaction between two great kinds of stuff – literary works and living 
persons – will be extended more aggressively to the treatment of viewing as transactional in the 
same sense?’7 My conclusion is that Rosenblatt and H.D. implicitly both open themselves to 
the plea set forth by Anthony Easthope in his Literary into Cultural Studies (1991), whereby 
signifying practices are substituted for literature as the stimulus for inquiry in the discipline.8  
                                                          
5 Louise Rosenblatt, Making Meaning with Texts: Selected Essays (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2005), p. 66. 
6 Louise M. Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed. (New York: MLA, 1995), pp. 59-60. 
7 Wayne Booth, ‘Foreword’ in Louise M. Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed. (New York: MLA, 1995), 
pp. vii-xiv, p. xiii, original emphasis.  
8 Antony Easthope, Literary into Cultural Studies (Routledge: London, 1994). Cultural studies has, of course, 
morphed since Easthope’s book, and indeed was born well before its arrival. For an evaluation of its current status 
and its internal complexities, see Chris Barker and Emma A. Jane, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice (London: 
Sage, 2016).  
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For Easthope the main benefit of this transition is to allow space for the study of ‘popular 
culture’ and to discard once and for all the distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ forms of 
practices, thereby creating his own kind of democratic, poststructural (anti-binary) study. But I 
would urge a note of caution, or rather, an additional caveat. My thesis has posited aesthetic 
experiences with ‘texts’ as the basis for a personalist quest for wisdom in the university. The 
key point that Easthope seems to overlook is that signifying practices still require an individual 
to transact with them personally and aesthetically if there is to be the kind of education that 
fosters qualities of self-criticism and conversation with others about human experience – that 
might lead to wisdom, in other words. In fact, he even seeks the eradication of the aesthetic 
from cultural studies: ‘Cultural studies promises to step aside from this whole Kantian project. 
By including texts of everyday life in its object of study it can challenge if not circumvent 
entirely the privileged self-enclosure of the aesthetic’.9 By enclosing the aesthetic within 
modernist practices in particular, which he wishes to dispense with, Easthope excludes the 
possibility of any other role for the aesthetic.10 But I contend that the aesthetic, personal, and 
transactional experience of signifying practices is crucial to the vivifying of these practices in 
the first place – making them agents for change in the present, in other words.11 What this 
means is that a re-configured notion of ‘English’ must offer space for aesthetic experiences of 
signifying practices that intimately connect the aesthetic with the social, or the literary with the 
non-literary. In the cradle of the literary experience lie the seeds for further thinking about 
human experience, not in generalist terms, but through the concrete, emotionally-coloured cast 
of art. This is something to celebrate, not denigrate.  
                                                          
9 Ibid., p. 166. 
10 I think it would be unusual to find a theorist today, even a theorist of cultural studies, who would be quite so 
antagonistic towards the aesthetic. The ‘new aestheticism’, among other more recent developments, has helped to 
deepen the role of the aesthetic in literary studies. 
11 Easthope affirms the cultural materialist emphasis on reading texts in light of present concerns. See ibid., p. 
168.  
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Such a move would also honour one of Rosenblatt’s other treasured convictions, this 
time concerning non-Anglophone texts. Trained in comparative literature, Rosenblatt 
advocated that non-English literature in translation be studied alongside Anglophone texts. The 
reason behind this connects to the overall drive towards questions of wisdom, of how to make 
the most of our lives together in this world. By allowing literary students license to engage with 
non-English ‘texts’ as a matter of routine rather than under the umbrella of ‘literature in 
translation’, discussion about differences and understanding of unfamiliar contexts can, for 
Rosenblatt, be stimulated with a view to questioning and revising one’s own culture.12  
Perhaps the most significant practical implication of my thesis, then, is to affirm cultural 
studies’ predilection for studying other forms of media than the written word as signifying 
practices, with the important caveat that they be approached via transactional, aesthetic 
experience. But of course the ends of such study in my view are rather different from those of 
cultural studies, at least from the Easthopian version. Concerned with a transition from 
knowledge-inquiry to wisdom-inquiry, this thesis seeks to channel aesthetic engagement with 
signifying practices through people’s personal quests for meaning in life, however they are 
articulated by themselves. When designing courses and writing personalist, transactional 
criticism for example, one might expect to see films set alongside novels, or poems set 
alongside music videos, as occurs in cultural studies. But in this instance, subject material 
would be linked by a process of personalist textual sociability and harnessed by an ambition to 
grapple with some of life’s insuperable challenges, or even just those concerns which, if 
explored in a course of study, might lead the learner to a sense of emotional or intellectual 
satisfaction. The difference between cultural studies and personalist literary study lies in the 
fact that where cultural studies largely rests on a trajectory of neo-Marxist cultural critique, 
                                                          
12 See Rosenblatt, Making Meaning, pp. 51-58. The University of Birmingham, for example, is sympathetic to a 
comparative approach within an English degree, offering an undergraduate module in ‘Landmarks in European 
Literature’, using foreign works of different historical periods in translation. 
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personalist literary studies is less prescriptive about the direction literary experiences take, 
seeking instead to embrace aspects of cultures past and present, near and remote, as well as to 
revise and seek new visions – all contingent on the specific qualities of individuals’ quests and 
how they negotiate these together.  
I am not going to end my thesis now as Rosenblatt ended her seminal text, Literature as 
Exploration, where she wrote that ‘Literary experiences will […] be a potent force in the growth 
of critically minded, emotionally liberated individuals who possess the energy and the will to 
create a happier way of life for themselves and for others’.13 I believe that the quest for wisdom 
via literary experiences can indeed help nurture the growth of personalities who can 
demonstrate qualities of sensitivity and humanity. But I fall short of arguing that the teaching 
and study of literature is guaranteed to counteract human suffering and evil in the world and 
thus make us ‘happier’, for as George Steiner famously remarked in relation to Auschwitz, 
educated (not to say ‘cultured’) people hurt themselves and others too, and we still ask ‘why?’.14  
Berdyaev even claimed that an individual ‘does not strive for happiness at all. Such 
striving would be objectless and meaningless. Man strives for concrete values and goods, the 
possession of which may give him bliss or happiness, but happiness itself cannot be his 
conscious purpose’.15 Wisdom, therefore, cannot be considered the same as happiness. To be 
in quest of wisdom is to engage with ‘literature’ for its capacity to increase self-understanding, 
spark self-development, ignite the imagination that ‘magically creates realities’, open 
possibilities for healing, for transcendence, for the new. This is a very different project than one 
based on happiness – ‘the emptiest and most meaningless of human words’.16  
                                                          
13 Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration, 5th ed., p. 262. 
14 Easthope, Literary into Cultural Studies, p. 9.  
15 Nicolas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, trans. Natalie Duddington (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1945), p. 74.  
16 Ibid, pp. 74-75. 
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To return to one of H.D.’s images which I explored in Chapter 4, wisdom can be 
symbolised by the thistle and the serpent – the presence of suffering and the awakening of new 
life, a deeper realisation of personality. What literary studies has done so well to prove in the 
past thirty years or so is that, as Berdyaev wrote in the 1930s in relation to developments in 
psychology, ‘Man is a sick being, with a strong unconscious-life [sic] […] He frequently does 
not know what is going on in him and wrongly interprets it both to himself and to others’.17 
What literary studies needs to do now, then, in the classroom, the conference hall, and in pieces 
of academic writing, is to celebrate those sensations of thaw, moments of transformation, 
flickers of integration be they ever so tentative, for they are precious. They are the stuff of life, 
the emergence of personality. Wisdom is born.  
 
                                                          
17 Ibid., p. 68. 
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